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ABSTRACT 
 
Complicity, Jogee and the Principles of Criminal Law 
 
Sarah Tromans, University of Birmingham 
 
MJur, 2018 
 
This thesis explores the rules of complicity and parasitic accessory liability (PAL) in 
England and Wales and their relationship with the principles of criminal law. 
Complicity creates a general liability for assisting or encouraging a crime. PAL 
allowed for the conviction of an accessory to a joint criminal venture, for a possible 
collateral offence of the principal, as long as it was foreseen as a possible incident of 
the initial crime.  
 
Complicity is important because it attributes responsibility to individuals who 
contributed in some way to a substantive offence of another, without committing the 
offence itself. PAL did not work well in practice but was followed for thirty years until 
Jogee in 2016, which was considered to be a breakthrough in the requisite mental 
element of complicity and also the abolition of PAL.  
 
This thesis examines the relationship of both complicity and PAL with a set of 
criminal law principles. It then moves on to consider the impact of Jogee on the 
relationship of both doctrines with these principles. The thesis challenges the idea 
that the judgment was a major change in the law and concludes that many criminal 
law principles remain breached, post-Jogee, in some factual scenarios. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The legal system in England and Wales accepts that the reach of the criminal law 
extends beyond those who commit an offence to include individuals who assist or 
encourage a criminal offence. Complicity creates a general liability for assisting or 
encouraging another in a crime. Furthermore, the unitary system of liability treats an 
accomplice as a principal in terms of conviction, so that both are guilty of the 
substantive offence. 1  This, together with complicity, is how the law attributes 
responsibility to individuals who contributed in some way to the substantive offence 
of another, but who did not carry out the actus reus of the crime with the relevant 
mental element.  
 
In addition to this basic form of complicity, the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability 
(PAL) developed following Chan Wing-Siu.2  This case held that, if a number of 
defendants agreed to carry out a particular crime but one participant went further and 
carried out a different crime, all defendants could be liable for the principal’s collateral 
crime, if in participating in the first offence they had foreseen that the subsequent 
crime might take place.3 Crucially, the prosecution did not have to prove that the 
accessory intended the second offence to be committed, allowing a jury to convict an 
                                            
1 Section 8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. 
2 [1985] AC 168 (PC). 
3 ibid 175. 
 2 
accomplice on mere foresight of a crime.4 PAL was part of the law of complicity5 and 
the doctrine was followed and extended6 for thirty years. 
 
Despite this, in February 2016 the Supreme Court and the Privy Council, following 
what they deemed to be thirty years of misinterpretation of the law, delivered their 
decision in Jogee and Ruddock (hereinafter Jogee).7 This case held that Chan Wing-
Siu could not be supported and claimed it was based on an incomplete and 
erroneous interpretation of earlier criminal case law.8  Indeed, judges, lawyers and 
academics had battled with both complicity and PAL for the previous three decades.9 
 
Following Jogee, a secondary party can no longer be convicted based on mere 
foresight of the principal’s crime. An accomplice’s foresight of a principal’s crime is 
now only evidence of an intention to assist or encourage the second offence.10 The 
jury do not have to find the secondary party liable if she foresees that the principal 
might carry out the collateral crime. Ultimately, it is the jury’s decision based on the 
evidence.  
 
                                            
4 ibid. 
5 This has been contested and is discussed further in Chapter 3, 58-64. 
6 For example Powell; English [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL); Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 
1 AC 129. 
7 [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7, [2017] AC 387. 
8 ibid [79]. 
9 Rajakumar [2013] EWCA 1512, [27]; Dyson M, ‘The future of joint-up thinking: living 
in a post-accessory liability world’ [2015] J Crim L 181; Wilson W, Ormerod D, 
‘Simply harsh to fairly simple: joint enterprise reform’ [2015] Crim LR 3; Crewe B, 
Liebling A, Padfield N, Virgo G, ‘Joint enterprise: the implications of an unfair and 
unclear law [2015] Crim LR 252. 
10 Jogee (n 7) [100]. 
 3 
Jogee captured the interest of the nation because it followed years of campaigning 
against the use of PAL.11 When the judgment was first handed down, it was widely 
considered to be a major break through in the requisite mental element for complicity 
and also the abolition of PAL.12 One of the key questions in this thesis is whether 
Jogee will have the impact initially expected. It is anticipated that the importance of 
this case may have been over emphasised by judges, some academics and lobby 
groups. 13 
 
                                            
11 Walton G. ‘Hundreds of convicted killers may seek to appeal after 'joint enterprise' 
law wrongly interpreted for 30 years’ The Telegraph (London, 18 February 2016) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/12162445/Supreme-Court-
joint-enterprise-ruling-accessories-to-murder.html accessed 24 September 2016; 
McGovern J, Common < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-28148073> 
accessed 7 April 2018. BBC, Guilty by Association 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b049bb31 accessed 7 April 2018. Crewe B, Hulley 
S, Wright S. (2014] ‘Written evidence on joint enterprise’, Institute of Criminology, 
University of Cambridge 
<http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/ltp_from_young_adulthood/evidence_to_justice
_committee.pdf > accessed 7 April 2018; McClenaghan M, McFadyean M and 
Stevenson R, ‘Joint Enterprise: An investigation into the legal doctrine of joint 
enterprise in criminal convictions (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2014), 7. 
Williams P and Clarke B, ‘Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and 
racism’ (Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, January 2016); Joint Enterprise Not 
Guilty by Association (JENGbA). 
12 Persaud S and Hughes C, ‘In Practice: Joint enterprise’ (2016) LSG 11 Apr, 22; 
Buxton R, ‘Jogee: upheaval in secondary liability for murder’ (2016) Crim LR 324; 
Robins J, ‘Masterpiece of Modern Reasoning’ (2016) 180 JPN 147; Grell M, ‘Joint 
enterprise ruling: How many people serving life sentences should not be in prison?’ 
http://thejusticegap.com/2016/02/what-does-this-mean-for-my-boy-what-does-this-
mean-for-my-ken-uk-supreme-court-rules-on-joint-enterprise/ accessed 7 April 2018; 
Doughty Street Chambers ‘R v Jogee – The Supreme Court Re-Writes the Law of 
Joint Enterprise’ http://doughty-street-
chambers.newsweaver.com/flyercampaign/mfkhnqdc7p8 accessed 7 April 2018. 
13 Joint Enterprise after Jogee: Reconsidering Law and Policy Conference’, 
University of Liverpool, London Campus, 1st September 2016; Stark F, ‘The demise 
of “PAL’: substantive judicial reform, not common housekeeping’ (2016) CLJ 550; 
Dyson M, ‘Case Comment – Shorn-off complicity’ [2016] Cam LJ 196. 
 4 
The aim and structure of this thesis 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate whether complicity and PAL 
conformed to the evaluative principles of criminal law prior to Jogee and the extent to 
which the decision in Jogee responded to the concerns raised. This work seeks to 
establish whether there was an awkward relationship between both standard 
complicity and PAL with these principles. 
 
Jogee gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to review and reframe complicity. 
Given its apparent importance, the case is analysed to explore the impact of the 
judgment on the relationship of complicity and PAL with the principles. This includes 
consideration of the question whether PAL and joint enterprise14 still exist. It can then 
be established whether Jogee has improved the relationship of complicity with these 
principles and the impact of the judgment. 
  
The criminal law principles selected are used as a critical bench-mark against which 
the law of complicity, PAL, and Jogee, can be assessed. They have been identified 
because of their relevance to complicity and PAL. These principles are causation, 
individual autonomy, mens rea, fair warning, correspondence, legality and fair 
labelling. A brief overview of each principle is detailed at the end of this 
Introduction.15  
 
Jogee will have wider ramifications than those set out in this thesis. For example, the 
judgment will impact on how the rules of complicity are used in practice by 
                                            
14 See Note on terminology below, 9. 
15 Below, 10. 
 5 
prosecutors and on sentencing. These issues are important, but within the context of 
this work they do not fall for consideration on grounds of space. As such, the 
approach in this thesis is doctrinal rather than socio-legal. In addition, other aspects 
of complicity remain problematic post-Jogee, such as the defence of withdrawal. 
Withdrawal of the accomplice was not an issue in Jogee and was not discussed in 
the judgment. As a result, a discussion of withdrawal does not form part of this thesis. 
Similarly, space does not permit an analysis of the purposes of criminal law in 
relation to complicity and PAL, nor an historical analysis of the development of PAL.  
 
While complicity applies throughout the criminal law, it is particularly controversial in 
relation to the law of murder, due to the mandatory life sentence that follows 
conviction for both a principal and an accomplice. This thesis considers the issues 
arising in the context of murder but is not confined to this offence.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the issues surrounding the basic law of complicity in relation to 
the principles of criminal law identified above16 and summarised below.17 The chapter 
begins with the rationale for basic accessorial liability, in terms of how the criminal 
law justifies its ability to criminalise one person for the crime of another. The chapter 
then explores whether this area of law complies with the identified principles.  It will 
be shown that the unitary theory of liability in England and Wales has procedural and 
evidential advantages and allows for a wide variety of accomplices. Yet, it does not 
allow for the varying contributions of secondary parties and unfair labelling may arise. 
Further, the role of individual autonomy in complicity may be contradictory and 
                                            
16 Above, 4. 
17 Below, 10. 
 6 
causation is attenuated. The chapter advocates that the mens rea of complicity has 
been controversial and is hard to define, resulting in a dilution of meaning over the 
years. Ultimately, the mental element was conflated with the mens rea of PAL, 
leading to breaches of the principles of fair warning, legality and correspondence. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on PAL. This chapter analyses the issues arising from PAL with 
the same criminal law principles, to assess whether these issues provide one reason 
why the Supreme Court decided to restate the common law in Jogee. The chapter 
starts by setting out the rationale for PAL, followed by an analysis of its relationship 
with basic accessorial liability. The chapter will suggest that PAL was always part of 
complicity. The chapter moves on to highlight areas of PAL that were problematic, 
prior to Jogee, with reference to the same principles. It will be shown that causation 
in PAL was even more remote than in complicity and the requisite mental element 
could cause injustice to secondary parties in terms of the principles of fair labelling, 
warning, legality, correspondence and autonomy. 
 
Chapter 4 centres on the case of Jogee. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the 
impact of the judgment on the relationship of the law of complicity with the same 
principles of criminal law. Consideration of these principles was not instrumental to 
the decision in Jogee, but it helps establish the impact of the case on future group 
crime. The concern is that while Jogee has been held up as an important case in the 
law of complicity,18 in reality the judgment may not be as great as first anticipated. 
Furthermore, the decision may even create more issues than it resolves.  
                                            
18 n 12. 
 7 
The chapter begins by setting out the restatement of law from Jogee and the reasons 
given for this restatement by the Supreme Court. The decision is considered in detail, 
in relation to the same principles of criminal law. This includes an analysis of the 
actus reus and mens rea for complicity, after Jogee, how the case dealt with the use 
of weapons and the possibility of manslaughter as an alternative verdict. Finally, the 
chapter reviews whether PAL and joint enterprise still exist post-Jogee and the 
general application of Jogee to the criminal law is debated. 
   
It will be shown that while Jogee restated an intention to assist or encourage as the 
mental element in complicity in an attempt to remove the injustices caused by PAL, 
many issues remain unresolved. Jogee confirmed that PAL is part of complicity, so 
that an accomplice must intentionally encourage or assist every crime of the 
principal. With the issue of intention left to the jury to decide based on the evidence, 
complicity will increasingly become a jury prescribed offence, leading to the potential 
for inconsistent decisions and a breach of the principle of legality. Breaches of the 
principles of fair labelling, warning and correspondence may well remain following 
Jogee. The debates on causation are left untouched and even the restatement of 
intention, as the mental element of complicity, may not succeed in removing the 
injustices present prior to Jogee. 
 
This thesis concludes that, prior to Jogee, the law of basic complicity breached the 
principles of fair warning, labelling, correspondence and legality in some factual 
scenarios. The causal contribution required of an accomplice was unclear and the 
mental element was diluted over the years. These breaches were even greater for 
 8 
PAL. Furthermore, the most recent case on this area of law to reach the Supreme 
Court, Jogee, did not resolve these breaches and any changes made will have little 
impact in practice. In fact, Jogee may have muddled the law by creating additional 
issues, particularly in relation to the interpretation of intention and the level of 
foresight required to find intention in complicity. With the demise of PAL in Jogee, it is 
doubted whether basic complicity can adequately accommodate the fast moving 
developments of violent group crime, which often escalate rapidly. Therefore, 
Parliament should intervene to reconsider the law of complicity as a whole. 
 
Facts of Jogee 
To help understand the impact of Jogee on complicity, it is important to consider a 
brief set of facts. The principal (Hirsi) and the accomplice (Jogee) arrived at the 
victim’s house having spent the evening drinking and taking drugs. The victim’s 
girlfriend gave evidence at the trial that Jogee was angry and earlier in the evening 
had picked up a kitchen knife and threatened to ‘shank him’. Both participants left but 
returned sometime later that evening. Jogee remained outside, striking a car with a 
bottle and shouting encouragement to Hirsi to do something to the victim. At one 
point Jogee came to the doorway with the bottle raised and leant forward towards the 
victim saying he wanted to smash it over the victim’s head. Soon after, Hirsi stabbed 
the victim who died as a result of this attack.  
 
Jogee was initially convicted of murder as a secondary party following Chan Wing-
Siu. Jogee appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal, who dismissed his 
 9 
case,19 and an appeal to the Supreme Court followed, who were asked to review 
PAL. The Supreme Court decided that Chan Wing-Siu had misinterpreted earlier 
case law and it overturned the decision of the lower courts in Jogee by restating the 
common law of PAL.20 Jogee was sent for a retrial. At the retrial Jogee was found not 
guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. 21 
 
Note on terminology 
‘PAL’ was previously referred to as ‘joint enterprise’ by academics and judges.22 
However, ‘joint enterprise’ has been used in different ways over the last thirty years 
and some of the issues arising from this area of law may be caused by this differing 
use of the terminology.23 It has been used to refer to the initial joint criminal venture 
out of which a collateral offence may arise.24 It has also been used to refer to the rule 
from Chan Wing-Siu, which allowed for a secondary party to be convicted for the 
collateral crime of a principal beyond that agreed as part of the joint venture, where 
the secondary party had foreseen it as a possibility.25 More recently, the courts have 
adopted the term PAL to refer to the rule from Chan Wing-Siu and the term PAL is 
                                            
19 Jogee [2013] EWCA Crim 1433. 
20 Jogee (n 7)  [79]. 
21 Importantly, the trial judge at the retrial, HH Judge Dickinson QC, stressed that the 
new verdict was more of a matter of a change of evidence by the primary witness, 
than a change in the law. This is an important point that could be easily overlooked; 
Grell M, Justice Gap ‘Ameen Jogee cleared of murder sentenced to 12 years’ 
<http://thejusticegap.com/2016/09/ameen-jogee-cleared-murder-sentenced-12-
years-manslaughter> accessed 7 April 2018.  
22 Discussed below, 84 – 87, 142 -145. 
23 ibid. 
24 Baker DJ, Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity and Inchoate Participation Offences 
(Taylor and Francis 2016). 
25 ABCD [2010] EWCA Crim 1622, [2011] QB 841 [9] (Lord Hughes). 
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used in this thesis, unless citing original work.26  Further, the term principal or primary 
actor is used in this work to denote an individual whose criminal liability is direct and 
independent of all other parties. The term accessory, accomplice, or secondary party 
is used to denote those individuals who are criminally liable for the offence of 
another. For reasons of brevity, this thesis adopts the female pronoun but this 
includes both genders. 
 
The principles and doctrines of criminal law under scrutiny 
The principles of criminal law discussed in this study of complicity and PAL are 
causation, individual autonomy, mens rea, fair warning, legality, correspondence and 
fair labelling. Some of these principles have been compromised, others have been 
conflated over the years, in this area of criminal law. They are a set of judicial 
guidelines that allow for critical appraisal of the criminal law.27 These principles have 
evolved over time and are a set of general ideals to which the criminal law of England 
and Wales aspires.28 Causation and mens rea from the general part of criminal law, 
on the other hand, lay down how, rather than why, an action is criminalised and these 
are also advisory or permissive. 29  
 
                                            
26 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 AC 827 [15]. 
27 Raz J, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law’ [1972] 81 Yale Law Journal 823, 
847. 
28 For a full discussion of what is a principle, see Gardner J ‘Ashworth on Principles’ 
in Zedner L and Roberts J, Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (OUP 2012). 
29 Gardner J, ‘On the General Part of the Criminal Law’ in Duff RA Philosophy and 
the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique (CUP 1998) 208. 
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These principles are not absolute and some overlap. 30  However, there is an 
underlying notion of autonomy. If the criminal legal system is allowed to interfere in 
the lives of individuals and to respect their autonomy at the same time, the criminal 
law should abide by the rule of law principles of fair warning, certainty and clarity of 
legal rules and subjective requirements for liability.31 This means that a defendant 
should not be convicted of a criminal offence unless she intended to cause or 
knowingly risked causing a particular harm. In this way, all these principles maximise 
the choice of individuals on how they go about their lives in order to choose whether 
to risk committing a crime and so be subject to conviction and punishment.32 The 
next few paragraphs of this Introduction set out an overview of the identified 
principles starting with causation.  
 
Criminal offences, in particular result crimes, are often defined in terms of whether 
the conduct of the defendant has caused a specific harm. 33  The courts have 
suggested a common sense approach should be taken, but over the years cases 
have shown that this is not always straightforward.34 Causation in complicity is more 
complex than factual and legal causation and moral issues are often taken into 
account to allow for just decisions in particular circumstances. In Jogee, causation in 
complicity was not seen as a pressing issue. However, it has been the subject of 
debate over the years and this is discussed further in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.35 
 
                                            
30 Ashworth A, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (Hart 2013) 132-133. 
31 ibid 133. 
32 ibid 135. 
33 Hart H and Honore T, Causation in the Law (2nd edn, OUP 1985) 84. 
34 ibid 26. 
35 Below, 28, 64, 101. 
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However, the role of causation in complicity may be contradicted by the principle of 
individual autonomy as a basis of liability. This is because the principle of individual 
autonomy reflects the view that each individual is entitled to choose his acts (and 
failures to act) as long as they are within their control and have no defence available 
to them. In turn, this necessitates responsibility for those choices.36 The principle of 
individual autonomy stops any possibility of moral luck being responsible for actions 
that were beyond the control of the actor.37  
 
That said, a free and deliberate voluntary act of an individual could break a chain of 
criminal causation and act as a novus actus interveniens.38 This is why the criminal 
law generally associates punishment with the actions of the actor who is the most 
immediate cause of the offence and not the acts of others.39 The primary actor has 
made their choice to carry out a proscribed harm and so only they should be liable for 
their behaviour.40 This is contradictory to the notion of complicity where the actions of 
the secondary party results in her liability for the actions of the primary actor but 
                                            
36 Horder J, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016), 72; Kennedy 
(No 2) (2007) UKHL 38, [2008] 1 AC 269. Broome v Perkins [1987] Crim LR 271. 
37 Horder J, ‘A critique of the correspondence principle in criminal law’ [1995] Crim 
LR 759, 760. Horder argues there are 3 types of moral luck. For a full discussion on 
luck see also Ashworth A, ‘Taking the Consequences’ in Shute S, Gardner J and 
Horder J Action and Value in Criminal Law (OUP 1993) 107. 
38 Kennedy (n 36). 
39 Williams G, ‘Finis for Novus Actus’ [1989] CLJ 391, 398. 
40 Kadish S, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study into the Interpretation of 
Doctrine [1985] 72 Cal LR 324, 405. A free, deliberate and informed 
intervention will not break the chain of causation if the act was reasonably 
foreseeable or in self-defence Roberts `[1971] 56 Cr App R 95 (CA); Pagett 
[1983] 76 Cr App R 279 (CA). 
 13 
illustrates that the important issue in terms of causation is often who should be held 
responsible for the result.41 This is discussed further in Chapter 2.42 
 
While causation relates to the prohibited act and how it came about, one role of mens 
rea in criminal law, on the other hand, is to make certain that a defendant has an 
adequate level of fault before being punished (except strict liability offences).43 Mens 
rea is so fundamental that it has been stated as a presumption of the criminal law.44 
While this presumption can be rebutted, its existence reflects the basis of our criminal 
law that liability should not arise unless the defendant has acted to cause harm 
advertently or at least negligently.45 The stigma of a criminal conviction requires 
accountability to be attributed appropriately. For serious criminal law offences it is 
usual for a subjective mens rea to be required (involuntary manslaughter is an 
exception).46 The most commonly used terms to reflect fault for serious offences are 
intention and recklessness.47 The criminal law also recognises conditional intention 
as a form of mens rea. 48  
                                            
41 Simester AP, Sullivan GR, ‘ Causation without limits: causing death while driving 
without a licence, while disqualified, or without insurance’ [2012] Crim LR 753, 757. 
42 Below, 28. 
43 Mitchell B, ‘In defence of a principle of correspondence’ [1999] Crim LR 195, 205. 
44 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, (HL) 148 (Lord Reid). 
45 Chan W and Simester A, ‘Four Functions of mens rea’ [2011] CLJ 381, 381. 
46 The history of this development has been open to criticism in Horder J, ‘Two 
histories and four hidden principles of mens rea’ [1997] LQR 95. 
47 Stark F, ‘It’s only words: on meaning and mens rea’ [2013] CLJ 155; 155. Ashworth 
A, ‘Taking the Consequences’ in Shute S, Gardner J and Horder J Action and Value 
in Criminal Law (OUP 1993) 116. The criminal law has struggled to define the precise 
boundary between these two ways of committing a crime: see Fletcher G, Rethinking 
Criminal Law (Little Brown and Company Canada Ltd 1978) 442. Also see Simester 
AP, ‘Why Distinguish Intention from Foresight?’ in Simester AP and Smith ATH Harm 
and Culpability (OUP 1996). 
48 Simester AP, ‘Accessory liability and common unlawful purposes’ [2017] LQR 73, 
85. 
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In theory, a crime should have a fault element so as to warn the individual that he is 
about to break the law.49 If a crime could be committed accidentally there would be 
no fair warning to the defendant of his impending criminal offence.50 This criminal 
principle posits that an accused individual should only be liable for conduct, 
circumstances or a result of which they intended or knowingly risked taking.51 The 
essence is that a criminal offence may only be committed if the accused are 
sufficiently aware of their conduct and its result, or circumstances, so that they have 
chosen their actions with no element of surprise.52 This is directly related to the 
principle of autonomy discussed earlier.53 That said, many new criminal offences are 
strict liability offences that do not require a fault element for policy reasons. As a 
result, the fair warning role of mens rea has reduced over the years in relation to 
lesser crimes.  
 
The principle of fair warning requires law to be stated clearly.54 It requires a language 
understandable to lawyers and defendants.55 Individuals are entitled to know what 
the criminal law expects of them.56 While this principle is a criminal law aspiration, it 
is clear that in practice that most people only gain knowledge of the law from 
                                            
49 Chan and Simester (n 45) 384. 
50 Gross negligence manslaughter is another exception to the requirement for a 
subjective mental attitude. Fair warning for this offence should be provided by the 
duty of care that is required. 
51 Horder Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (n 36) 174. 
52 Chan and Simester (n 45) 389; Stark ‘Its only words’ (n 47) 163. 
53 Above, 11 - 12. 
54 Chan and Simester (n 45) 389. 
55 Duff DA ‘Law, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal Liability’ 
(1998) 18 OJLS 189, 197. 
56 Robinson P ‘A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law’ (1994) 88 NwUL Rev 857, 876 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1609&context=faculty_s
cholarship accessed 26 February 2017. 
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educational institutions, word of mouth, parental influence, moral intuition and press 
reports of criminal offences. 57  These sources of knowledge have shortcomings. 
Individuals may have differing moral intuitions, the press is not always accurate and 
word of mouth can be unreliable. It cannot be presumed that most people know the 
law.58 As a result, criminal prohibition should be publicised sufficiently.59 The criminal 
law aspiration of fair warning may be hard to fulfill in reality. 
 
In addition, the principle of fair warning requires that the law should be stated 
prospectively to give predictability.60 This is more achievable and is important to allow 
lawyers to advise clients with some certainty how to plead to a criminal charge and 
trial judges to give clear directions to juries.61 While the principle of fair warning is an 
ideal, it is open to criticism as to whether defendants take into account any intended 
warning prior to a crime.62  
 
The principle of fair warning overlaps with the principle of legality.63 The two can, 
however, be differentiated.64 Fair warning reflects the idea that potential criminals 
should be warned of their potential criminal behaviour. The principle of legality 
                                            
57 ibid. 
58 Gardner J ‘Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences against the Person’ 
(1994) 53 CLJ 502, 513. 
59 Von Hirsch A, ‘Extending the Harm Principle: Remote Harms and Fair Imputation’ 
in Simester AP and Smith ATH Harm and Culpability (OUP 1996) 270. 
60 Rimmington and Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459 [33]. 
61 From a constitutional perspective, both the rule of law and Article 7 of European 
Convention of Human Rights also require the law to be fixed and certain. 
62 Ashworth A, ‘Interpretation of criminal statute: a crisis of legality’ [1991] LQR 419, 
442. 
63 Chan and Simester (n 45) 388. 
64 Rimmington (n 60) [33]. 
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promotes that there should be no crime without law: nullum crimen sine lege.65 This 
also means that the law should be fixed, certain and prospective. 
 
On the other hand, the correspondence principle, first coined by Ashworth, requires 
that a defendant should not be found guilty of a crime unless the requisite fault of the 
offence refers to the harm which the law is trying to prevent.66 The defendant should 
be found to have the necessary mens rea of an offence and that this mens rea in 
terms of intention, knowledge or recklessness should relate to the actus reus of that 
particular crime.67  
 
If applied strictly, the correspondence principle entails every element of the actus 
reus having a corresponding mental element which should be fulfilled 
simultaneously.68 This helps justify liability for the relevant crime. A looser version of 
this doctrine requires a moral guilt to be attached to the prescribed acts as opposed 
to every element having a matching mens rea requirement.69 For complicity, this 
means that if the accomplice assists or encourages the principal, they must intend to 
assist or encourage the principal in their offence.  
 
However, the correspondence principle in complicity can be given a different 
interpretation, so that the mental attitude of the accessory towards the offence being 
                                            
65 Chan and Simester (n 45) 388. 
66 Ashworth A, Principles of Criminal Law (4th edn OUP 2003); Tadros V, Criminal 
Responsibility (OUP 2007) 94. 
67 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (n 36) 175; Tadros V, ‘The Homicide 
Ladder’ 68 MLR 601, 608. 
68 Horder, ‘A critique of the correspondence principle’ (n 37) 767. 
69 Simester A P, Spencer J R, Sullivan G R and Virgo G R, Simester and Sullivan’s 
Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th edn, Hart 2013), 196. 
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assisted or encouraged has to match the mental element for the principal offence. 
Therefore, the accomplice should have the same mental attitude towards the 
principal offence that is required of the primary actor himself. This would help to 
justify the unitary system of liability. Whether this is achieved for both basic complicity 
and PAL is considered in this thesis. 
 
Criminalisation results in a label being attached to offenders, which should not be 
imposed lightly due to the stigma attached.70 Accordingly, any label attached to a 
defendant should accurately describe the crime for which they have been 
convicted.71 It would be unfair if the label attached to an offence were too strict or too 
lenient. It would either overstate or understate to the public the defendant’s fault.72 
Therefore, crimes should be separated out and labelled to ensure that the nature and 
seriousness of the offence is clearly identified.73 A label has a meaning and sends a 
message to people that harm was, or could be, done.74 The label indicates to the 
accused, and the public, why she is being punished and so should be fair. 75 This is 
                                            
70 Ashworth, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (n 30) 19; Gardner J, ‘On the 
General Part of the Criminal Law’ in Duff RA Philosophy and the Criminal Law: 
Principle and Critique (CUP 1998) 236. 
71 Ashworth A, ‘The Elasticity of the Mens Rea’ in Tapper CFH Crime, Proof and 
Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (Butterworth 1981). Shute, 
Gardner and Horder, Action and Value in Criminal Law (Oxford Clarendon Press 
1993) 9. Horder J, ‘A critique of the correspondence principle in criminal law’ [1995] 
Crim LR 759, 761. 
72 Williams G, ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ [1983] 42 CLJ 85, 85. 
73 Mitchell B, ‘ Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency 
and Fair Labelling’ [2001] 64 MLR 393, 393. 
74 Baker D, Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity and Inchoate Participation Offences 
(Routledge 2016)  
75 Chalmers J and Leverick F, ‘Fair labeling in Criminal Law’ [2008] 71 MLR 
217, 226. 
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known as the principle of fair labelling76 which is necessary in a democratic society in 
order to give confidence in the legal system.77  
 
The principle of fair labelling also has a role to play in relation to victims, the judiciary 
and public solidarity.78 This is so that victims know that their suffering is recognised 
by the law, judges may be influenced in sentencing and public respect for the content 
of the law is maintained. 79  
 
Fair labelling could be successfully achieved by the creation of a structure of 
individual offences reflecting the causal contribution of each party. The offender 
could be labelled according to their contribution, giving legitimacy to the law by 
indicating accurately the nature of the wrongdoing to be punished and deterred. 
Participants with higher causal contributions could be held responsible and labelled 
with the same offence as the principal. While this would be the ideal solution, 
unfortunately, offences that are labelled by way of numerous sub-divisions would be 
a ‘law professor’s dream’ and is totally unrealistic in an already overloaded criminal 
justice system.80 
 
                                            
76 Originally termed ‘representative labeling’ by Ashworth, Williams coined the use of 
fair labelling in Williams G, ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (n 72) 85. 
77 Tadros V, ‘Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity in Zedner L and Roberts J, 
Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of 
Andrew Ashworth (OUP 2012), 68. Simester AP, Review of Shute, Gardner and 
Horder, Action and Value in Criminal Law (Oxford Clarendon Press 1993) (1994) 53 
CLJ 605, 605. 
78 Tadros V, ‘Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity’ (n 77) 69. 
79 ibid 69-71. Tadros gives an account of fair labelling, social justice and public 
solidarity. 
80 Ashworth A ‘Conceptions of Overcriminalisation’ (2008) 5 Ohio State JCL 407, 
410. 
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The key principles of criminal law against which complicity, PAL, and the criminal law 
post-Jogee will be evaluated in this thesis are set out above. These are the principles 
of causation, individual autonomy, mens rea, fair warning, legality, correspondence 
and fair labelling. The aim of Chapter 2 is to evaluate the law of basic complicity 
against these principles. This is important to consider prior to the evaluation of PAL in 
relation to the same set of principles and the extent to which Jogee improves the 
issues raised. 
 
This thesis is up to date until July 2018.
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CHAPTER 2 - COMPLICITY AND THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
In criminal law, an individual is primarily accountable for his own conduct and not for 
the acts of others.1 Despite this, people other than the primary actor can also be 
criminally liable.2 The criminal law recognises that it can be appropriate to punish 
other participants who were complicit in the commission of an offence, but who did 
not carry out the actus reus of the crime.3 As such, a defendant can be liable for the 
actions of another individual. This is the design of complicity.4 Jogee5 is an example 
of complicity, despite the focus of the judgment being on PAL, because the 
defendant, Jogee intentionally encouraged the principal, Hirsi, to commit the principal 
offence. Jogee did not carry out the act of stabbing which resulted in the victim’s 
death. He encouraged Hirsi to carry out the fatal act. It is this act of culpable 
encouragement, or assistance, which was criminalised.  
 
This chapter examines the basic law of complicity against the identified principles of 
criminal law set out in the Introduction.6 The chapter starts by setting out the statutory 
basis and rationale of complicity. It will show that this rationale is not totally sound 
and exceptions to the derivative nature of complicity have been created to allow for 
particular circumstances. The chapter then moves on to explore whether this area of 
                                            
1 Ashworth A, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (Hart 2013) 162; Williams G, ‘Finis 
for Novus Actus’ [1989] CLJ 391, 391. 
2 Simester A P, Spencer J R, Stark F, Sullivan G R and Virgo G R, Simester and 
Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (6th edn, Hart 2016) 211. 
3 Ashworth, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (n 1) 162. 
4 Smith KJM, ‘The Law Commission Consultation Paper on complicity: Part 1: A 
blueprint for rationalism’ [1994] Crim LR 239, 239. 
5 [2016] UKSC 8, [2017] AC 387. 
6 Above, 10 - 18. 
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law complies with the identified principles. It suggests that in some factual scenarios 
the law breaches the principles of fair warning, labelling, correspondence and 
legality. The causal contribution required of an accomplice is unclear and the mental 
element was diluted over the years. Yet, the most recent case on this area of law, 
Jogee, has not resolved these breaches and the changes made will have little impact 
on the law.  
 
The current law on basic accessorial liability is statutory and derives from s 8 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (hereinafter 1861 Act), as amended, which states 
that: 
Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any 
indictable offence ... shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished 
as a principal offender. 
 
However, the terminology of aiding and abetting from the 1861 Act is out of date 
making the statute hard to use in practice. 7 For certain, there has been a plethora of 
debate seeking to define these various terms.8 In an attempt to update the language 
of the original act, the Law Commission has more recently referred to this conduct 
as assisting or encouraging the commission of an offence.9  These words are more 
often used today 10  and were adopted in Jogee. This is a sensible change of 
terminology and aids compliance with the principle of legality. However, this is 
merely one small simplification in an overly complicated area of law.  
                                            
7 Horder J, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2013), 443. 
8 AG Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773 (CA); Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 (QB); 
Smith JC ‘Aid, Abet, Counsel or Procure’ in Reshaping the Criminal Law, Essays in 
Honour of Glanville Williams (Glazebrook 1978), 130. 
9 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) para 2.21. 
10 Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396, [2012] QB 160 [45]. 
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Under this unitary system of liability, the accomplice is to be convicted as if she had 
carried out the offence herself.11 The accessory is convicted and eligible for the 
same sentence as the principal, whatever their role. In practice, the culpability of an 
accomplice may be reflected in sentencing. However, this is problematic where the 
offence committed is murder, due to the minimum mandatory life sentence. Yet the 
role of the accomplice in the murder may have been minor. 
 
Despite their eligibility to be convicted as a primary actor, the actus reus of an 
accessory is different and independent from that of the principal offender.12 The 
accessory does not carry out the actus reus of the substantive offence, she aids or 
abets the offence.13 Nevertheless, the liability of the accomplice is dependent on the 
principal’s conduct. In Jogee, for example, Jogee did not himself carry out the killing. 
He encouraged Hirsi to do so and for Jogee to be liable for homicide, Hirsi had to 
carry out the killing. The resulting harm that justifies liability in complicity is not 
included within the definition of the actual offence of complicity itself, which is 
assisting or encouraging the offence.14  
The rationale of basic accessorial liability 
The idea that a secondary party who did not commit the actus reus of the offence 
with the relevant mens rea can be convicted of the same offence as the principal has 
been around for hundreds of years.15 The aim is to punish those involved in a crime 
                                            
11 Smith JC, ‘Criminal liability of accessories: law and law reform’ [1997] LQR 453, 
453. 
12 Simester A P, ‘The mental element in complicity’ [2006] LQR 578, 588. 
13 Krebs B, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’ [2010] 73(4) 578, 586. 
14 Simester AP and von Hirsch A, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart 2011) 44. 
15 Smith JC, ‘Criminal liability of accessories’ (n 11) 453. 
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that have encouraged or participated in it yet did not actively commit the proscribed 
harm. These parties, who may or may not be present at the time of the offence, are 
often equally as blameworthy and are viewed in the eyes of the law as just as 
culpable as the primary offender, so should be accountable for their involvement. 16 
For example, in Jogee, Jogee was charged with murder because he was considered 
by the prosecution to have contributed to the killing by his encouragement, so should 
be held accountable for his actions. 
 
Complicity is controversial because in some factual scenarios the act carried out by 
the participant may fail to reach that required to convict the principal of either an 
attempt or the full offence.17 In Jogee, the defendant’s encouragement would not 
have been sufficient for him to be convicted of an attempted murder, murder or 
manslaughter as a principal. Yet, in accordance with the unitary system set out in s 8 
of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, an accessory is convicted as a primary 
actor, despite the fact that an accomplice could be liable merely by driving a getaway 
car or selling a gun in the normal course of their business. Whether all participants 
should be held equally accountable as the principal in all factual scenarios may be 
questionable where the involvement of the accomplice is minor.  
 
Complicity in England and Wales allows for a wide variety of accomplices with both 
minor and major contributions to the actus reus of the principal’s offence. 18  This 
                                            
16 Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005 (CA). 
17 Wilson W, ‘A rational scheme of liability for participating in crime’ [2008] Crim LR 3, 
3. 
18 Smith KJM, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1991) 93. 
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approach may be severe on some accessories but there are positive benefits to a 
flexible system of accessorial liability, which enable the many types of accomplice to 
be convicted where their actions justify accountability.  
 
One of the advantages of the unitary basis of liability is a practical one.19 Procedural 
and evidential advantages allow for a group of criminals to be convicted even if it is 
not possible for the principal who carried out the ultimate crime to be identified.20 In 
Jogee, there was no dispute over the identity of the principal, but this is not always 
the case. All parties can be treated as principals and the same sentence may be 
imposed.21 Despite the procedural advantages, it has been described as ‘simplicity at 
the expense of justice’.22 Indeed, it appears that by enacting s 8 the legislature 
favoured a simpler process for dealing with accomplices, in spite of the potential 
injustice caused to defendants. Parliament allows for any accomplices to be charged 
as principals, to avoid the prosecution having to prove the identity of the primary 
actor. This is not justice to the accomplice who may have only been a minor player in 
the offence. 
 
Furthermore, the extent of the primary actor’s guilt necessary for complicity has been 
diluted over the years. The requirement was that the principal had to have been 
convicted in order for liability to accrue to any accomplice. This has been lessened to 
the need to show some harmful act or result, which has been brought about by 
                                            
19 Wilson (n 17) 4. 
20 Swindall and Osborne (1846) 175 ER 95, 2 C and K 230 (Assizes). 
21 Smith JC ‘Aid, Abet, Counsel or Procure’ in Reshaping the Criminal Law, Essays in 
Honour of Glanville Williams (Glazebrook 1978) 121; Wilson (n 17) 4. 
22  Dressler J, ‘Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice 
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem’ [1985] 37 Hastings LJ 91, 140. 
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another party.23 The initial approach was stringent in terms of the ability to prosecute 
an accessory and again prosecutorial ease has been prioritised. 
 
The problem is that a unitary system does not allow for the varying contributions of 
secondary parties. Some accessories are instigators and some are not, yet all 
participants are treated as if they were the principal in both charging and 
conviction. 24 This can be harsh in some factual scenarios. For example, an 
accomplice may be the mafia boss masterminding and controlling a group of 
participants but who does not take part in the executory stage of the offence. 
Alternatively, she may be the person that drives the getaway car or provides the 
weapon before the crime is committed, not realising it will used on multiple occasions 
years later. Further, the shopkeeper carrying out her normal retail business can be 
an accessory to a crime where the item sold is used as a weapon.  
 
In complicity, a participant is held responsible for what the principal does.25 Whether 
an individual is to blame depends first on whether they have done something wrong 
and second whether they should be responsible and accountable for that wrong.26 
Complicity is concerned with sharing responsibilities. The secondary party shares 
liability with the principal because they have contributed to the criminal actions of the 
                                            
23 Smith KJM, A Modern Treatise (n 18) 73. 
24 Fletcher G, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little Brown and Company Canada Ltd 1978) 
645. 
25 Kadish S, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study into the Interpretation of 
Doctrine [1985] 72 Cal LR 324, 330. 
26 Gardner J, ‘On the General Part of the Criminal Law’ in Duff RA Philosophy and 
the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique (CUP 1998) 237; Simester, ‘The mental 
element in complicity’ (n 12) 579. 
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primary actor.27 Jogee shared liability with Hirsi because he was encouraging Hirsi to 
injure the victim.28 Jogee was responsible because he had a choice whether to 
contribute to the Hirsi’s offence or not. He had become the Hirsi’s ‘shadow’.29 It is this 
role of the accomplice behind the actions of the primary actor that justifies their 
liability. The criminal law only holds those people accountable if they are responsible 
in some way.30  
 
Liability of an accomplice derives from the acts of the principal.31 As a result, if the 
crime does not take place, then any other co-participants would also be relieved of 
any liability for the offence (the defendants may be liable instead for an inchoate 
offence).32 In Jogee, Jogee’s liability derived from Hirsi’s fatal attack on the victim. If 
Hirsi had not carried out the attack, Jogee would not have been liable for homicide. 
The derivative nature of complicity has been described as one of the ‘clear and 
enduring foundational requirements of (complicity) liability’.33  
 
Despite the derivative nature of accessorial liability, an accessory can be liable for a 
greater offence than the principal in some circumstances. For example, if the 
principal is not found to be legally responsible (because they were under the age of 
criminal responsibility), or if the primary actor lacks mens rea in their conduct or if 
                                            
27 Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame’ (n 25) 338. 
28 Hirsi was also convicted of murder. 
29  Dressler J, ‘Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice 
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem’ [1985] 37 Hastings LJ 91, 103. 
30 Fletcher (n 24) 455. 
31 ibid Ch 8; Duff RA, ‘Can I Help You? Accessorial Liability and the intention to 
Assist’ (1990) 10 LS 165, 168. 
32 Fletcher (n 24) 680. 
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they have been subjected to duress. Under these circumstances, the principal will not 
be liable. It follows that under a strict interpretation of the derivative theory, an adult 
accomplice would also not be liable. 34 Despite this, any culpable accomplice who did 
have the necessary mental attitude for the primary actor’s offence should be 
responsible for their crime. 35  To allow for this the criminal law has developed 
exceptions to the derivative theory. 36 As a result, the liability of the secondary party 
cannot be said to purely derive from the criminality of the principal’s offence. Instead 
derivative liability derives from the carrying out of the actus reus of the offence. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the derivative nature of accessorial liability 
has had to adapt to enable just convictions of culpable and responsible participants 
in appropriate circumstances. Jogee merely accepts the role of complicity in the 
criminal legal system. It would not have been the Supreme Court’s role to question 
the role of complicity in the legal system, but it could have explained the rationale 
behind this area of law. 
 
The role of Individual autonomy and causation in complicity 
The role of individual autonomy in complicity is contradictory. To be guilty an 
accessory must choose to intentionally assist or encourage the principal in the 
commission of their criminal offence fulfilling the principle of individual autonomy.37 
                                            
34 ibid 122. 
35 Cogan and Leak [1976] QB 217 (CA). Law Commission, Participating in Crime 
(Law Com No 305, 2007) para 2.9. 
36 For example, the doctrine of innocent agency. This doctrine differs from complicity 
but that is not the subject of this thesis. Innocent agency is used, however, to avoid 
awkward results if derivative liability is applied rigorously. 
37 See above, 11 - 12. 
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By making her choice to contribute to the offence the accomplice should be held 
responsible for her actions. On the other hand, individual autonomy could contradict 
the role of causation as a basis of liability in complicity.38 The autonomy of the 
principal could serve as a novus actus interveniens.39 The choice of the primary actor 
to carry out the elements of the principal offence acts as a break in the chain of 
causation between the actions of the accessory in assisting or encouraging the 
principal and the principal crime being committed. As a result, it is the individual who 
has made the decision to do harm that is culpable, not the original contributor.40 
 
One issue for complicity is that the encourager or assister may contribute by 
providing advice or verbal encouragement but they do not, strictly speaking, ‘cause’ 
the principal to commit the crime.41 This is a debate which has raged for many years. 
Yet the courts seem reluctant to settle this issue by providing any form of guidance to 
judges as to how to direct juries, other than to say a strict application of the ‘but for’ 
test is inappropriate.42 This reluctance from the courts continues in Jogee and is 
discussed further in Chapter 4.43  
 
This indecision on the role of causation has an impact on the relationship of 
complicity with other principles. For example, fair labelling could be breached 
because if the courts are unclear about the requisite causal contribution of the 
                                            
38 See above, 11 - 13. 
39 Kennedy (No 2) (2007) UKHL 38, [2008] 1 AC 269. 
40 Von Hirsch A, ‘Extending the Harm Principle: Remote Harms and Fair Imputation’ 
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secondary party it may not be fair to label them as a principal when their causal 
contribution is minimal.44 Furthermore, if the courts are not clear on the causation 
issue then the law is not fixed, certain and prospective because it gives too much 
discretion to judges when directing juries, breaching the principle of legality. 45 
Similarly, those with a propensity to crime will not be fairly warned that minimal 
causal contribution to an offence can be criminalised.46 
 
Hart and Honore, Kadish and Williams have suggested that the doctrine of secondary 
liability was developed because the accessory cannot have caused the result of the 
principal’s offence supporting the novus actus interveniens principle. 47  This will 
depend on the facts but may over simplify the causational issue. The problem with 
their approach is how to justify the conviction and punishment of secondary parties 
without any reference to causational principles. 
 
A conviction is, in itself, a penalty irrespective of the sentence imposed. By having a 
criminal conviction a person is labelled as a criminal in a public condemnatory 
statement that affects their ability to obtain employment or a mortgage. 48 There is 
also a stigma attached to having a criminal conviction. If, as Hart and Honore, Kadish 
and Williams suggest, the secondary party is not seen as having a causal influence 
on the principal’s crime, because the actions of the principal break any chain of 
                                            
44 Below, 47 - 51. 
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47 Hart H and Honore T, Causation in the Law (2nd edn, OUP 1985); Kadish, 
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causation, then the liability of a secondary party needs to be grounded in some other 
theory. With eligibility of equal punishment under the unitary system of liability, the 
justification for the criminality of a secondary party becomes even greater. Yet, as will 
be shown in Chapter 4, Jogee did not attempt to justify the unitary system or the 
liability of the secondary party by way of causation.49 Jogee will have little impact on 
the causation debate. 
 
Virgo based the liability of a secondary party on his ‘association’ with the principal.50 
This has the advantage that causation, a connecting link or an association can justify 
liability, but some defendants may believe that they can be held liable by mere 
association with another individual, which is not correct. The problem with this 
approach is that association is not defined and can be broad. It raises issues of the 
principle of legality by not being fixed, clear and prospective. If the basis of 
association were to be used, it would have to be an association with the crime itself 
to justify conviction and to support fair labelling. Association does not support a 
unitary theory of liability. The judgment in Jogee merely confirmed that mere 
association with the principal is not sufficient to justify liability.51 
 
Gardner has argued that liability of a secondary party can be justified because they 
have partly caused the harm to the victim, but that their causal contribution differs to 
                                            
49 Below, 99 - 103. 
50 Virgo G, ‘Joint enterprise liability is dead: long live accessorial liability’ [2012] Crim 
LR 850, 860. Mirfield disagrees see Mirfield P, ‘Guilt by association: a reply to 
Professor Virgo’ [2013] Crim LR 577, 580. 
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that of the principal.52 Indeed, given the varying roles of accomplices, it is true that 
not only will the causal contribution of an accomplice vary from that of the principal, 
but also the causal contribution of each accessory will differ depending on their level 
of involvement. It was suggested in the Introduction that causation issues are often 
decided on moral grounds.53 By not entering into the causation debate, it could be 
implied that Jogee supports the idea that the causal contributions of accessories can 
differ from the causal contribution of the principal. Flexibility is maintained allowing 
judges to convict in appropriate circumstances.  
 
Gardner’s approach to causation in complicity is preferred to that of Hart and Honore, 
Kadish and Williams because it maintains a distinction between principals and 
accessories by the difference in their wrongs. Sometimes the accessory may play an 
important role such as the mafia boss, others may provide a weapon a few weeks 
before, in the hope it would not be used. Both types of secondary party, however, 
had some sort of a causal role, which is different to that of the principal who carried 
out the actus reus with the necessary mental attitude. There appears to be some 
causal influence by the accessory, even if less than the criminal law idea of the ‘but 
for’ causal contribution. Gardner’s view also provides flexibility to the law. Jogee does 
not conflict with Gardner’s view. 
 
KJM Smith takes a more radical approach and sees a causal element as an 
‘essential ingredient’ for complicity. He suggests a structure of offences could be 
created to reflect the causal contribution of the accomplice to the substantive 
                                            
52 Gardner J, ‘Complicity and Causality’ (2007) Crim Law and Philo 1:127,128. 
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offence.54 This would also avoid the criticisms of the criminal law being used to over 
criminalise defendants and allows the role of each individual accessory to be taken 
into account in conviction. There is often a moral justification in punishing an 
accomplice at the same level as the perpetrator, particularly in the gang crime 
scenario set out above. Equally, there can be a moral justification for differentiating 
between the role played by each party where the main player has control over the 
other participants or where an accessory plays a lesser role, as a result of their 
inability to commit the ultimate offence. A structure of offences would allow all 
scenarios to be reflected in conviction and sentencing.  
 
A structure of offences may be the ideal reform but whether this would work in 
practice is open to debate. This structure of offences would result in a substantial 
increase in criminal offences with the advantage of more accurate labelling, but this 
approach would increase the workload of an already over worked criminal court 
system. 55  A fundamental restructuring of complicity, such as this, would require 
legislation by Parliament and would not have been the constitutional role of the 
Supreme Court in Jogee. 
 
Academic views may differ on the role of causation, but the courts seem to allow an 
attenuated causal influence of the accomplice to be criminalised, as well as the 
stricter causal acts of the principal, even if the latter is considered to have made a 
free and informed voluntary act. Jogee continues this approach. Only a ‘sufficient 
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connection’ in fact appears necessary.56 While it may be hard to define exactly what 
connection is required to justify a conviction,57 we know that the level of causal 
contribution need not be high because the principal need not necessarily even be 
aware of the assistance and it could be as simple as a cough.58 That said, it should 
be a real connection justifying accountability and not just some distant association 
with the principal. This would help to justify the stigma attached to a conviction. This 
gives judges the flexibility to hold accomplices responsible in appropriate 
circumstances and this may be why they have not been forthcoming with their 
guidance on the requisite causal contribution of an accomplice.  
 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the courts have not provided a clear 
coherent account of the necessary causal relationship between the secondary party’s 
conduct and the substantive offence. 59  Jogee does not provide any additional 
guidance on this debate, as will be shown in Chapter 4.60 This may be because, in 
practice, there is no set doctrine of causation and causational issues are often 
decided on moral grounds, rather than legal ones, to allow for just decisions in 
individual circumstances.61 By not entering directly into this debate, Jogee maintains 
this flexibility. However, guidance from the Supreme Court in Jogee would have 
provided clarity to judges sitting in the inferior courts and assisted them in directing 
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juries. Importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, additional guidance may have 
allowed complicity to better fulfil the principles of legality, fair warning and fair 
labelling.  
 
Mens rea of complicity prior to Jogee and the principles of criminal law  
Historically, little was said in relation to the mental element of complicity. Unusually, 
there was no mention of mens rea in the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, so it fell 
to the courts to consider. However, it is clear that even before the 1861 Act came into 
force there was a necessity to find that the defendant had mens rea.62   
 
The mental element of complicity was, and still is, that the secondary party must 
intend to assist or encourage the commission of the relevant crime committed by the 
principal. 63  The correspondence principle appears to be fulfilled. Despite this, in 
reality, the mens rea was uncertain and controversial prior to Jogee. 64 It has been 
asserted65 that Jogee clarifies the mens rea of complicity but on further analysis this 
may not be the case and many of the issues will remain, post-Jogee. This is 
                                            
62 Chitty J, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law (2nd edn, G and C Merriam 1836) 
258. Historically, parties to a crime were defined by different terminology. The 
primary actor, who carried out the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, was the 
principal in the first degree. A defendant who was present at the scene of the crime, 
and aided or abetted the carrying out of the crime, was known as a principal in the 
second degree. A defendant who was not present at the time of the crime but 
procured, counseled, abetted or incited the commission of the crime was an 
accessory before the fact and an accessory after the fact was a defendant who 
comforted or assisted the principal after the crime had taken place, knowing the 
crime had been committed. 
63 Duff RA, ‘Can I Help You? (n 31) 165. 
64 Simester, ‘The mental element in complicity’ (n 12) 578. 
65 Persaud S, Hughes C, ‘In practice: Joint enterprise’ [2016] 22 LSG 11 Apr. 
 35 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.66 The discussion below sets out the issues 
arising from the law prior to Jogee. 
 
Before Jogee, part of the uncertainty arose because the mens rea for complicity was 
diluted over the years so that, in practice, only recklessness was required.67 Yet, in 
the case of murder by a principal, the accessory would be sentenced to the 
mandatory life sentence by virtue of s 8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. This 
dilution of mens rea provided potential for breaches of the principles of fair labelling, 
warning, legality and correspondence. This is because it may not be fair to label a 
defendant as a principal where they were merely reckless to the possibility of a future 
criminal offence. This depends on the level of foresight of the primary actor’s crime 
by the secondary party.  
 
Similarly, adequate warning was not provided that a defendant was about to commit 
a criminal offence even though, for example, they were going about their normal 
course of business. With the continual dilution of mens rea over a number of years, 
the law did not comply with the principle of legality because the parameters of the 
mental element kept changing, so that it was not fixed, clear and certain. How this 
came about is discussed in Chapter 3. 68  For specific intent crimes, the wider 
definition of the correspondence principle set out in the Introduction69 was breached 
because the principal had to intend the offence, yet the accomplice was reckless 
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towards the offence. The mens rea requirement for the parties differed, dependent on 
their role. 
 
The mental attitude of a complicit party is not straightforward. In accessorial liability 
there are two sets of conduct, the principal’s and the accessory’s, and two mental 
attitudes, both relating to the accessory.70 The requisite mens rea for accomplices is 
independent of the final crime.71 She is required to intend her own contribution of 
assisting or encouraging the principal. In addition, however, the secondary party 
must appreciate the nature of their actions.72 This relates to the secondary party’s 
mental attitude towards the conduct and fault element of the principal’s criminal 
offence. It is this second aspect of fault which has become controversial and has 
been diluted over the years.73 Each of these mental elements will be discussed in 
turn below. It is disappointing that the judgment in Jogee did not clearly identify the 
two separate elements of mens rea because this would have provided clarity to this 
complicated area of law. 
An accomplice’s mens rea for her own act of assisting/encouraging 
This first element is that the secondary party must intend to assist or encourage the 
primary actor in the crime, with the intention, or belief that their conduct is capable of 
assisting or encouraging the crime.74 This appears to conform to the correspondence 
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principle, because if the actus reus in complicity is assistance or encouragement and 
the mens rea is an intention to assist or encourage, the mental attitude of the 
accomplice has a direct relationship with the prohibited conduct. However, an 
intention to assist or encourage in complicity does not mean that it was defendant’s 
aim or purpose to assist or encourage, which is the usual definition of intention.75 For 
example, Gamble76 implied that an intention to assist or encourage the primary actor 
meant that the secondary party’s act was merely voluntarily and deliberate, not an 
accident or involuntary. This approach was followed in later cases to include not 
acting by turning a blind eye.77 In addition, the criminal law has never allowed motive 
to be a consideration in conviction, although it is taken into account on sentencing.78 
 
Criminalising a defendant for merely acting deliberately (or for deliberately not 
acting), in order to assist or encourage a principal, does not attribute accountability 
accurately. It is not a high level of mens rea and does not fulfil the criminal law 
aspiration of fair labelling, fair warning or correspondence for criminal acts. 
 
For example, an individual who acts deliberately (or turns a blind eye) in order to 
carry out their usual commercial business, has a different mental attitude to the 
person who acts with a criminal purpose in mind or acts with foresight of the virtual 
certainty of a result. The latter has far greater culpability. The retailer of kitchen 
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75 Mohan [1976] QB 1 (CA). 
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knives may deliberately assist a criminal by selling them a knife, but it is not the 
shopkeeper’s aim or purpose to assist or encourage a stabbing. If the primary actor 
kills a victim with an intention to kill or cause serious harm, an accomplice would be 
convicted of murder and labelled a murderer, with a mandatory life sentence, yet it 
may not have been the accomplice’s aim or purpose that the victim should die or 
even suffer serious harm. This is unfair labelling.  
 
Similarly, by just acting deliberately in their business a potential accomplice is not 
warned that they may be about to commit a criminal offence. There is no requirement 
that the accomplice wants the principal to commit the offence or even that they know 
it will take place. Further, the principle of correspondence is not fulfilled because the 
mens rea of the shopkeeper does not correlate with their prohibited act because their 
mental attitude was determined by the development of their business. Despite these 
breaches of principle, Gamble was endorsed in Jogee, so it appears that this idea 
that the accomplice merely has to act deliberately remains unchanged. 79  Fair 
labelling in standard complicity is considered in further detail below.80 
 
Despite these concerns, there may be good reason for only requiring a deliberate act 
of the secondary party for liability. For example, if a defendant does not want, or it is 
not their purpose, to kill an occupant of a house yet they still drive the getaway 
vehicle, they should be responsible for their contribution. Their conduct is wrongful 
because it assists the commission of the offence. Instead, they should refuse to be 
the driver or should report the potential offence to the relevant authorities. Their 
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actions are deserving of accountability and punishment, whether at the same level as 
the principal is open to debate and is fact dependent. 
 
Furthermore, the uncertainty regarding the definition of intention in complicity for 
offences, other than murder, is disappointing and breaches the principle of legality. 
While the definition of intention has been settled in relation to murder,81 complicity 
relates to most offences, not just murder. However, a trend towards definitional 
uniformity does not necessarily lead to a rational and principled criminal law, albeit 
this would help to fulfil the principles of fair warning, fair labelling, correspondence 
and legality.82 
 
The above discussion shows that merely requiring a deliberate act by an accomplice 
may conflict with the principles of criminal law. It appears that Jogee does not fully 
improve the relationship of this element of mens rea with these particular principles 
and that these breaches will continue post-Jogee. This is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 4.83 
 
An accomplice’s mens rea as to the primary actor’s crime 
The second element of mens rea is an accessory’s mental attitude in relation to the 
principal’s crime itself. Disappointingly, Jogee was not clear on this element and left 
questions unanswered, as will be seen in Chapter 4.84 
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There is no statutory definition of mens rea in complicity and no mention of this 
aspect of mens rea in the courts until 1950 in Johnson v Youden.85 In Johnson, Lord 
Goddard CJ held that an accessory should, at least, know the essential matters 
which constitute the principal’s offence.86 Strictly interpreted, therefore, recklessness 
would not suffice.87.  
 
Johnson v Youden was not without criticism. One criticism was that the decision did 
not expand on what essential matters had to be known, only that whether it was 
known that these essential matters were unlawful, was irrelevant.88 Crucially, the 
judgment did not set out how much knowledge and detail the accomplice was 
required to have.89 Presumably the judges could not expand on this element, as the 
essential facts would vary from case to case. Yet, not even any guidelines were set 
out, resulting in the potential for inconsistencies between judges in directing juries 
and differing verdicts in similar circumstances.  
 
Contradictions in the application of this mental requirement in the courts arose and 
confusion among academics was apparent. 90 It was hard for lawyers to predict the 
law and advise their clients how to plead. Inconsistent decisions allowed the criminal 
law aspirations of fair warning to prospective offenders and the principle of legality to 
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be breached due to this lack of clarity. Offences should be stated prospectively to 
give predictability to the law.91  
 
Johnson was one of the most commonly cited cases for the mens rea requirement of 
an accessory.92 It was recited again in Jogee but this did not provide clarity.93 Jogee 
amended the words from Johnson v Youden to a requirement of knowledge of any 
existing facts necessary for the crime, but level of knowledge of the facts required are 
later diluted in the decision, as will be seen in Chapter 4.94  
 
Knowing the essential matters from Johnson v Youden was considered by the Law 
Commission to be fulfilled, if the secondary party knew or believed the principal was 
committing or would commit the actus reus of the offence, with the necessary 
circumstances and result.95 This sounds straightforward, but case law has shown that 
this approach was not strictly adhered to, because this could be unduly lenient to 
defendants.96 This is because an accomplice cannot know whether the elements of 
the crime will be present before they have occurred and at the encouragement or 
assistance will have taken place before the principal’s offence.97 
 
This potential for undue leniency to accomplices led to a dilution of mens rea. In fact, 
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there was evidence of this dilution in earlier cases.98 Therefore, while in Jogee, Chan 
Wing-Siu99 was seen as the turning point after which the mens rea of complicity was 
reduced, this does not appear accurate.100 The requisite mental attitude may have 
even been diluted in Johnson v Youden itself. It was clear from Lord Goddard’s 
judgment that wilful blindness was sufficient to impose liability on a secondary party. 
His judgment implied that the third defendant in that case must have realised the 
principal was committing an offence by taking an illegal payment, so he must have 
turned a blind eye to the principal’s offence.  He was convicted as having aided and 
abetted the principal.101 If an individual turns a blind eye, this could mean that they 
had knowledge but chose to ignore that knowledge. This is constructive knowledge. 
This deserves responsibility on the part of the accomplice, similar to a failure to act in 
particular circumstances.  
 
Yet, turning a blind eye could also mean that the defendant had a suspicion of the 
knowledge, but did not make further enquiry. If this is also willful blindness, then 
judicial precedent from the criminal law offence of conspiracy shows that a defendant 
should not be made accountable for mere suspicion.102 Conflicting decisions between 
conspiracy and complicity did not provide clarity to an already confused area of law.  
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Without doubt, the amount of knowledge of the principal’s crime required for an 
accessory to be liable under Johnson v Youden was diluted in Bainbridge103 and 
again in DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell.104 On a strict application of Johnson v 
Youden, the defendants in Bainbridge and Maxwell would not have been convicted 
because they did not know the essential matters of the crime committed by the 
principal. Despite this, these cases held that an accomplice was not required to know 
the exact details of the crime in terms of time and place in order to be convicted, as 
long as she knew the type of crime (guidance provided by the court on ‘a type of 
crime’ was limited) or was aware of the range of crimes that the principal intended to 
commit. 105  
 
Ashworth and Horder, before Ashworth passed over the rewriting of this book to 
Horder, suggested that this may be because a person who willingly helps a principal 
knowing that one of a number of offences may be carried out, without realising which, 
should be held responsible.106 This is correct because by assisting in the criminal 
venture they have endorsed whichever crime, within a range of crimes known to the 
accomplice, the principal chooses to carry out. The accessory contributes to one of a 
potential range of crimes by, for example, driving the getaway car or providing the 
weapon or information and so should be held responsible because by participating 
they authorise the substantive offence. Jogee endorses Maxwell and so again 
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appears to confirm the dilution of mens rea from a strict basis of knowledge. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 4.107 
 
Bainbridge was helpful in terms of enforcing the law, but it also widened the mens rea 
to a form of recklessness for accessories allowing them to be convicted even if they 
were not aware of an aspect of the crime committed. 108  This may breach the 
correspondence principle because if they did not have full knowledge of the 
impending crime the mens rea would not relate to the prohibited act. However, to 
require the accomplice to know all the details of the collateral crime in order to fulfil 
this principle would not work well in practice.  
 
The Law Commission speculated that the rule referred to in Johnson v Youden was 
too strict and that Bainbridge (and presumably Maxwell) was a compromise.109 This 
may well be true, because it would have been all too easy for accomplices to say 
they did not have the knowledge of the precise details of the intended crime by the 
primary actor. It could also have been argued that it is not possible to have 
knowledge of something in the future.110 This, strictly speaking, is not accurate.111 
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Despite this, it is often impossible to know at present time the outcome of some 
forthcoming act. These issues were not satisfactorily dealt with in Jogee leaving 
questions unanswered, which are considered further in Chapter 4.112 
 
Bainbridge also illustrated an anomaly of the derivative nature of the law of 
complicity.113 If the accomplice is liable even though she does not know the precise 
details in terms of time, place or victim, she could be liable for countless offences 
carried out by the principal, even though the accomplice did only one act of, say, 
providing the necessary equipment.114 The accessory may provide the equipment for 
one crime, but under a strict interpretation of the derivative theory, they could be 
liable for subsequent offences carried out by the principal using the same equipment, 
even years later. This would breach the correspondence principle, because their 
mental attitude would not relate to the later offences. This could lead to unjust 
convictions. An earlier accomplice should not be held guilty for later crimes carried 
out by a principal that the accomplice was unaware of. Jogee115 may resolve this 
particular issue by requiring the secondary party to assist or encourage every crime 
of the primary actor, as will be seen in Chapter 4.116 
 
The words from Johnson v Youden have continued to be diluted over the years. 
Bryce, held that it was not necessary to prove that the accomplice intended the 
                                                                                                                                        
Belief in the Criminal Law’ in Shute S and Simester S, Criminal Law Theory: 
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principal to carry out the crime. It was enough that when the accessory assisted or 
encouraged the principal by her acts, that they contemplated the offence or that there 
was a ‘real or substantial risk or real possibility’ that it would be committed.117 While 
Ormerod prefers the approach to mens rea from Johnson v Youden, Herring prefers 
the route to mens rea for accessorial liability from Bryce.118 Bryce is to be preferred 
because it has already been shown that Johnson v Youden could be too lenient to 
defendants, if strictly interpreted, and it has been watered down on more than one 
occasion, raising doubts about its application. Bryce is also a more practical 
approach. It is easier for the prosecution to show that the accomplice contemplated a 
‘real or substantial risk or real possibility’ that the substantive crime would be 
committed than the application of Johnson v Youden, as amended by Bainbridge and 
Maxwell, which requires proof of knowledge of a specific range of crimes. 
 
To summarise, the mens rea requirement of knowledge of the essential matters of the 
principal’s offence, from Johnson v Youden, was ill-defined. It led to numerous 
appeals and a dilution of the words to enable convictions in appropriate 
circumstances. This dilution breached the principles of correspondence, legality and 
fair warning by being unclear and uncertain. This was not addressed in anyway by 
Jogee, as will be seen in Chapter 4.119 Jogee amends the words from Johnson v 
Youden to a requirement of knowledge of any existing facts necessary for the crime, 
but the level of knowledge of the facts required are later diluted in the decision, 
following Maxwell and Bainbridge. Bryce is not cited at all, so the standing of Bryce 
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remains uncertain. Many of the issues raised above from Johnson v Youden therefore 
continue post-Jogee. Further, there was evidence of the dilution of mens rea in other 
earlier cases120 as well as in Johnson v Youden itself, despite Chan Wing-Siu being 
seen as the turning point in Jogee.121  
 
Is the principle of fair labelling reflected in complicity? 
Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 raises issues of fair labelling, by 
allowing accomplices to be labelled and convicted as principals. There is no 
conviction of aiding and abetting per se. The accomplice commits the same offence 
as the principal and is given the same label, whatever the contribution of the 
accessory, unless negligible.122 Whether the accessory drives the other participants 
to the scene of the crime, or stands on look out while a burglary takes place does not 
matter. Their contribution is seen as assistance or encouragement to the substantive 
offence and so they should be held responsible. In practice, however, the level of 
participation may be relevant when it comes to sentencing.123 
 
As shown above,124 the requisite mens rea for complicity was, and still is, subject to a 
slight change in terminology from Jogee,125 an intention to assist or encourage, with 
knowledge of the essential matters that comprise the substantive offence. If a 
secondary party intended to assist or encourage the principal in the commission of a 
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particular offence, it could be fair to label them with the same offence.126 As an 
autonomous agent they chose to assist or encourage the offence and so should be 
held responsible for their actions and given the same label as the principal. This 
would be correct if the accomplice’s purpose was that the conduct element of the 
principal’s offence be carried out by the principal, with the requisite mental attitude. In 
these circumstances it would be fair to label them as a substantive offender and so 
should be held responsible for their proscribed conduct of assisting and 
encouraging.127  
 
However, it is unfair to label a mechanical assistant as a principal, if they did not 
intend the substantive offence be committed.128 It could be argued that the driver of a 
car who did not want or intend the victim to die, should not be labelled as a murderer, 
just because they gave the principal a lift to the scene of the crime knowing that the 
principal had this in mind. Yet, the courts have consistently shown that the secondary 
party could be liable, however small their contribution is to the crime of the 
principal.129 The label could be justified on the basis that the secondary party could 
have refused to participate or could have informed the relevant authorities.  
 
The accomplice can be given the same label, yet it is the principal who makes the 
decision, as an autonomous agent, whether or not to commit the substantive offence 
and may make the decision not to do so. Furthermore, the primary actor may not 
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actually be encouraged by the actions of the accomplice. While the assister has to 
assist the principal, the encourager’s acts need not have an impact on the actions of 
the principal.130 It is unfair to the encourager to label them with the same offence as 
the principal when their contribution did not have an effect on the conduct of the 
primary actor. Jogee does not address this point, except to confirm that proved 
encouragement need not have a positive impact on the principal.131 Unfair labelling 
will continue in these circumstances post-Jogee. 
 
This issue of fair labelling in complicity arises because the definition of aiding, now 
assisting or encouraging, is broad. As a result, a jury is open to find almost anything 
as aiding. This can lead to uncertainty and potentially unjust decisions.132 It can also 
lead to over criminalisation.133 While this allows for flexibility in the law, a balance has 
to be reached which is fair to both defendants and victims. Jogee does not assist 
here, since this would be a role for Parliament.  
 
The possibility of unfair labelling is stark where a retailer sells a potential weapon, 
say a baseball bat, to a purchaser where they are aware that the purchaser has a 
propensity towards violence and that it may be used in a fight. By selling the bat the 
retailer’s purpose is to develop their business and make a profit, it is not to assist or 
encourage the potential defendant. If the bat was subsequently used as a weapon 
and a fatality resulted, the shopkeeper could be held liable for the offence of the 
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principal and convicted of murder. To label them as a murderer, in this situation, 
seems wrong. They were just going about their daily commercial business. Jogee134 
did not enter into the debate on fair labelling, except to confirm the liability of the 
shopkeeper. Accordingly, this aspect of fair labelling will continue post-Jogee. 
 
Crucially, if the mens rea for the secondary party’s mental attitude towards the 
principal’s offence has been diluted from intention to recklessness, then labelling is 
not applied consistently. 135  The label of murder is applied to a principal if she 
intentionally kills or causes serious harm to the victim, yet the same label is given to 
a secondary party for the reckless version of the same offence.136 Consistency of 
offence labelling is to be preferred, as it is reflective of a reasoned and principled 
legal system. 
 
Furthermore, the rights of victims should not be overlooked. All of the above 
discussion ignores the fact, as referred to in the Introduction, 137 that fair labelling also 
has a role to play towards victims. The label can be important to the rights of victims 
to know that their suffering, due to the wrongdoing of the accomplice, is recognised 
by the law.138 The more involved an accomplice is, the more a victim will expect their 
suffering to be respected by the law. Even when an accomplice has a relatively minor 
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role, if that role was indispensible, it could be argued that a victim should have their 
suffering reflected in the labelling of the accomplice.  
 
In theory, fair labelling should be achievable, but whether the rights of defendants 
and victims can both fully be respected is more debatable. Fair labelling is often 
given as one of the grounds for creating multiple offences.139  A restructuring of 
complicity based on a defendant’s causational contribution could achieve this but is 
unrealistic due to the creation of numerous new offences and the practical difficulties 
that would arise in enforcing these offences.  
 
Conclusion  
Complicity offences have been described as ad hoc, because they criminalise the 
neutral act of an individual in particular circumstances.140 It has been shown above 
that the participation offences potentially breach the principles of autonomy, fair 
warning, fair labelling, correspondence and legality. Furthermore, whether a causal 
connection is required between the act of the secondary party and the offence of the 
perpetrator is uncertain and the mens rea requirement is complicated. All these 
issues suggest that this area of law is ripe for reform, yet the most recent case on 
complicity to reach the Supreme Court, Jogee, failed to address many of these 
issues, as will be seen from Chapter 4.141 
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Simester and von Hirsch raise the idea of Parliament enacting prophylactic offences 
that proscribe acts, which raise the risk of eventual harm.142 Prophylactic offences 
incriminate acts that are not necessarily inherently wrong, but stand as offences in 
their own right, without any mental requirement. They offer an offence of preventing 
retailers from selling particular weapons, as an example. While fair warning and 
labelling could ultimately be achieved, this approach would be unrealistic in terms of 
prosecution, along similar lines to complicity based on an accomplice’s causal 
contribution.143 Furthermore, it would necessitate numerous prophylactic offences to 
cover all potential risks of future harm.  
 
Parliament took a different approach when it enacted ss 44-46 Serious Crime Act 
2007 (2007 Act). It created separate inchoate offences of assisting or encouraging a 
crime, so that a secondary party is labelled as an assister or encourager. 
Accordingly, in comparison with basic complicity, the principle of fair labelling is 
better fulfilled, from both the defendant’s and the victim’s perspective. Furthermore, 
this new Act allows for a maximum penalty for the accomplice, dependent on the 
facts, as if the main offence had been committed, so that culpability can be reflected 
through punishment. Individuals are treated as autonomous agents responsible for 
their own actions, respecting the principle of individual autonomy. This is to be 
preferred to individuals being judged based on actions of others.  
 
The need to establish causation is also resolved because offences under the 2007 
Act can be committed whether or not the principal commits the substantive offence, 
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whereas complicity requires the substantive offence to have taken place. Offences 
under the 2007 Act relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving the 
commission of the offence. Before 2007 there was no criminality unless the 
substantive offence had been committed or attempted. Yet, complicity remains with 
its inherent breaches of criminal law principles so that accessories are still 
prosecuted and convicted as principals. The court in Jogee had no remit to change 
this.  
 
Having considered the relationship between basic complicity and the principles under 
discussion, Chapter 3 moves on to consider the relationship of PAL with the same 
principles.  
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CHAPTER 3 – PAL AND THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
While the law of basic accessorial liability discussed in Chapter 2 is statutory, PAL 
developed in a piecemeal basis from common law, although this doctrine’s exact 
development has been the subject of some debate 1  since the case of Jogee. 2 
Whatever the roots of PAL, it is clear that in addition to the basic law of complicity, 
the question has arisen on many occasions as to whether the principal has in fact 
gone beyond the agreed course of conduct.3 Until Jogee, an accomplice involved in 
an initial offence was liable for a principal’s subsequent offence if the secondary party 
foresaw that the later offence might take place as a possible consequence of jointly 
carrying out the first crime, reflecting the rule from Chan Wing-Siu.4 The secondary 
party was liable even if they did not factually encourage or assist the principal in the 
second offence or intend it to take place.  
 
Having considered the role of basic complicity and its relationship with the identified 
principles of criminal law in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on the common law rule of 
PAL, which existed pre Jogee. The aim of this chapter is to consider the relationship 
of PAL with basic complicity and to identify some of the issues arising from PAL in 
relation to the same criminal law principles. The chapter begins by setting out the 
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justifications for the use and development of PAL before Jogee. It identifies that the 
continued use of the doctrine was primarily based on policy. An analysis of the 
relationship between PAL and basic accessorial liability follows, where it is advocated 
that PAL was always part of complicity and was not a separate rule of law. The 
chapter then attempts to consider the relationship of PAL with the identified principles 
of criminal law. It suggests that PAL breached many of these fundamental principles, 
such as legality, fair warning, correspondence and fair labelling because the law prior 
to Jogee was too complicated, leading to a plethora of appeals.5  It shows that the 
breaches continued, and in some areas increased, over the thirty years running up to 
Jogee. It will be argued below that this was untenable and change was necessary if 
these breaches were to be resolved. Whether the restatement of the law from Jogee 
resolved these breaches, is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
The role of PAL in criminal law, pre-Jogee 
The rule from Chan Wing-Siu was endorsed in Powell; English,6 which identified that 
protection of the public played a part in the rationale for PAL.7 Gang crime was seen 
as a particular issue, which needed to be deterred by the sanctions of the criminal 
law.8 For example, individuals were recognised as acting differently when in a group. 
Green and McGourlay identified that ‘a pack is held to be more dangerous than its 
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members would be if they were acting alone’.9 This is often true. A gang is stronger 
and so more dangerous due to the various participants supporting each other. 
Greater harm can arise when groups of people come together to act as one unit and it 
was this harm that the courts were trying to deter. Jogee confirmed this as one of the 
rationales for PAL.10 
 
This rationale behind PAL was good, but the use of PAL increased as a result of a 
potentially lower level of mens rea than complicity, based on mere foresight of an 
offence. This meant that it was easier for prosecutors to use PAL against secondary 
parties than to charge them in accordance with the Accessories and Abettors Act 
1861. While this thesis is doctrinal, rather than socio-legal, it is important to note that 
PAL helped the police and the Crown Prosecution Service in the battle against 
group violence.11 The law is hostile to violent gangs and rightly so.12 Any law aimed 
to prevent gang crime must be good as long as it works in practice, is fixed and clear 
and provides fair warning to potential offenders.13  
 
It will be argued in this chapter that PAL breached the principles of legality and fair 
warning because it was overly complicated. Defendants did not understand why they 
were being convicted of say murder, when they did not stab the victim or shoot the 
gun. If defendants did not understand why their actions were criminalised using PAL, 
the law could not be said to be clear and prospective or give fair warning that an 
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offence was about to be committed. Indeed, a breach of the principle of legality was 
part of the defence’s case in Jogee.14  
 
The Law Commission took a different approach to justifying the existence of PAL, 
following a line of respected academics.15 In its view the accomplice has adopted the 
‘normative position’ of the other participants. 16  It stated that ‘a significant moral 
threshold is crossed when a person knowingly embarks on an unlawful 
enterprise…(so) may be liable for whatever consequences are caused’. 17  By 
involving themselves with known criminals the secondary party is liable for all 
consequences as a result of this involvement. This approach would comply with the 
principles of fair warning and legality, if potential offenders understood the rationale 
and were aware of their possible criminality, which is doubtful. It does not justify the 
labelling of an accomplice to PAL as a principal.18 
 
More recently, the rule from Chan Wing-Siu was justified in Rahman. 19  Lord 
Neuberger confirmed that legal coherence, protection of the public, fairness to 
defendants and the realities of jury trials were all important in seeking to resolve 
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criminal law principles. 20 In his view, the criminal law could only work in practice if it 
was acceptable and understandable to law-abiding individuals. 21  His judgment, 
therefore, reflected an appreciation of the principle of legality, yet it is not clear that 
there was legal coherence or necessarily fairness to defendants.  
 
The relationship between complicity and PAL, prior to Jogee 
Prior to Jogee, academics and the judiciary debated whether PAL was part of the 
law of complicity or a separate doctrine.22 This thesis advocates that PAL was, and 
always has been, part of complicity. PAL developed out of basic accessorial liability 
but always remained part of it. To consider otherwise would require judicial creativity 
beyond their constitutional role.23  
 
JC Smith, as long ago as 1994, considered PAL to be part of secondary liability.24 
Smith believed that the existence of PAL depended on basic accessorial liability.25 
This, perhaps, explains his use of the term ‘parasitic’. In contrast, the Law 
Commission26 and the court in Stewart and Schofield27 believed PAL was separate 
from ordinary accessorial principles. In their view, the rule from Chan Wing-Siu did 
not overlap with basic complicity because under joint enterprise (the term used to 
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reflect PAL at the time)28 there was no need for the prosecution to prove acts of 
assistance or encouragement for the second offence, just the participation of the 
accomplice in an unlawful venture with foresight of the second crime. 29  This 
approach separated the initial crime from the subsequent crime, yet the second 
crime was carried out as a consequence of the initial joint crime. The 
encouragement or assistance to the collateral offence could have been provided by 
the participation of the accomplice in the initial offence.  
 
In any event, the idea that PAL was a separate rule from basic complicity could not 
be correct, because there is only one form of complicity, that set out in s 8 of the 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. While judges have to interpret primary 
legislation they are not democratically permitted to create a separate doctrine from 
that legislation. Therefore, any form of complicity should fall within the provisions of 
this Act. It follows that, the rule from Chan Wing-Siu, should have fallen within the 
realms of complicity as soon as it was handed down. The idea that PAL was 
separate from complicity, should not have been suggested by the courts, or the Law 
Commission. 
 
To comply with the 1861 Act an accessory should have factually assisted or 
encouraged the collateral offence, as well as the initial offence.30 This is where the 
error was made in cases following Chan Wing-Siu. The modern cases following 
Chan Wing-Siu, but prior to Jogee, appeared to dispense with the conduct element 
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for complicity in group crime scenarios when considering a participant’s liability for 
another’s collateral crime. Instead of requiring factual participation (by factual 
assistance or encouragement) by the accessory in the collateral crime, juries have 
been permitted to infer encouragement where there appeared to be no evidence of 
actual encouragement.31 This became a presumption of implied encouragement, 
which was presumed by the accessory joining the initial criminal venture.32  
 
This presumption of encouragement, as a substantive rule of law, should not have 
been permitted by the courts because s 8 makes clear that liability under that 
section requires factual assistance or encouragement. If the accessory did not 
factually participate in the collateral crime then their liability could not be derivative.33 
Jogee is helpful in that it reinstates the need for factual assistance or 
encouragement for the collateral crime, as will be seen in Chapter 4, so abolishing 
PAL.34 
 
Simester saw PAL to be a special case of secondary participation, not merely a sub-
species of assistance and encouragement.35 He considered there to be a ‘structural 
difference’ between aiding and abetting and PAL because there was only one crime 
involved in aiding or abetting and the secondary party would be involved in that 
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particular offence.36 He contrasted this with PAL, where the first crime opened the 
way for further liability for foreseen crimes committed by the principal in carrying out 
that first offence. In his view, the accomplice’s connection with the principal was 
direct for aiding or abetting but indirect in PAL.37 While this initially appears to be a 
sound argument by Simester, the two doctrines are only structurally different because 
a factual conduct element in the parasitic form was dispensed with after Chan Wing-
Siu. If, however, the encouragement for the collateral crime was provided by the 
secondary party’s contribution to the initial crime together with the continued 
participation by the accessory, despite their foresight of the potential later offence, 
then the structural difference is removed or at least reduced. The difference was that 
the conduct element in basic complicity was factual assistance or encouragement but 
was implied assistance or encouragement in PAL prior to Jogee.  
 
Jogee removed this difference by requiring the accomplice to assist or encourage the 
principal in all offences. Presumably, it can still be implied from the facts that by 
participating in the first offence the accomplice encouraged or assisted the principal 
in the substantive offence, but it is no longer a presumption. 
 
Baker has argued convincingly that the reference to foresight in Chan Wing-Siu by 
Sir Robin Cooke was only intended to refer to providing evidence of a conditional 
intention.38 If Baker was correct then the conduct element of assisting or encouraging 
the collateral crime should have remained a necessity prior to the criminalisation of a 
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co-participant, in which case the two doctrines would have been structurally alike, 
dismissing Simester’s view. 
 
As was shown in Chapter 2,39 Virgo, on the other hand, used his requirement of a 
need for an ‘association’ between the accessory and the principal’s collateral crime to 
allow PAL to be part of the general law of complicity. Virgo appeared to be trying to 
provide the encouragement or assistance element, dispensed with by modern courts, 
by allowing an association instead. The problem with this approach was that the 
nature of association is very broad and the 1861 Act does not include mere 
association within its participatory conduct.40 
 
Despite the various debates over the years, there seemed to be a trend from the 
courts towards PAL being part of secondary liability. 41 Yet despite this, they failed to 
show how the factual participation in the collateral offence required by s 8 of the 
1861 Act was achieved, instead an implied encouragement was permitted. It was 
this implied encouragement that became so controversial. 
 
Whether PAL was part of complicity may sound like an academic argument, but the 
issue became important in practice. With the increasing use of the PAL doctrine by 
the prosecution, basic complicity was effectively ‘swallowed up’ and became surplus 
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law in gang violence crimes.42 Every multi handed act of violence became a PAL to 
the prosecution because it permitted implied encouragement, rather than the need to 
show actual encouragement. It was easier to prove implied encouragement through 
foresight of the later offence than it was to prove direct assistance or encouragement 
to that offence. Yet, it appeared on the surface that there was no backbone to PAL. It 
was merely a route to liability without any statutory backing. While many laws are 
founded on common law, it would be constitutionally wrong for judges to allow a 
statutory provision such as the 1861 Act to be ignored or circumvented.  
 
In fact, PAL did have statutory backing from the 1861 Act because it was part of 
complicity all the time, but this was not always made clear by judges or understood 
by academics. PAL should have been accepted as part of basic complicity, with the 
requirement that any collateral crime had to be factually assisted or encouraged in 
accordance with s 8 of the 1861 Act.  
 
This particular point has now been resolved in Jogee. Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson 
confirmed that there was no need for PAL to be a separate form of secondary 
liability. 43  In their view, the basic principles of complicity could be of general 
application.44 At least there appears to be some consistency among judges in this 
respect, albeit Toulson LJ was a common denominator in many of these judgments.  
 
                                            
42 Dyson M, ‘The future of joint-up thinking: living in a post-accessory liability world’ 
[2015] J Crim L 181, 182. 
43 Jogee (n 2) [76] (Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson). 
44 ibid. 
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Indeed, the rules of PAL should be part of standard complicity for the benefit of fair 
labelling and fair warning. A defendant who was convicted of a serious criminal 
offence, such as murder, following the PAL route to liability was convicted, labelled 
and punished by the courts as a principal offender. It was the statutory provisions of 
complicity in s 8 that provided the courts with the authority for this. Liability arises 
from basic complicity and was derivative as a result. Jogee confirmed that there is 
only one form of complicity and that is the basic form.45 The accomplice must assist 
or encourage every crime of the principal to be liable as a secondary party.46 It is 
disappointing that it has taken so long for this issue to be resolved, when PAL should 
have been part of complicity all the time. 
 
How were causation and individual autonomy reflected in PAL? 
It was suggested in Chapter 2 that upholding liability of a basic accomplice on the 
basis of a strict application of the causation theory of criminal law was weak.47 All that 
seemed to be required was a connecting link between the act of the accomplice and 
the resulting harm.48 In PAL, prior to Jogee, the arguments for the causation theory 
upholding liability were even more remote than for basic complicity. It was hard to say 
that an accomplice who merely foresaw the possibility of the second crime had 
caused the offence.49 Yet, the accomplice was still liable for the principal’s collateral 
                                            
45 ibid [9]. 
46 ibid. 
47 Above 28 - 33. 
48 Above, 33. 
49 Virgo G, ‘Case in detail: Mendez and Thompson’ [2010] Arch Rev 4, 5. 
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offence. Jogee did not directly refer to causation in PAL and the indirect references 
made are contradictory, as will be shown in Chapter 4.50 
 
In PAL scenarios, there would have been a connecting link between the primary actor 
and the accomplice by the joint contribution to the initial criminal offence. However, 
the only link between the accessory to the first crime and the harm caused by 
principal’s collateral one, was the contribution to the initial venture with foresight of the 
second. This has a flavour of guilt by association.51 An accessory should not be liable 
merely by being associated with the principal, unless it was an association with the 
actual harm caused by the principal. Jogee confirmed this.52 Otherwise all the rules of 
culpable responsibility and accountability of defendants discussed in Chapter 2 would 
be breached.53 Jogee resolved this by insisting on foresight as only evidence of an 
intention to assist or encourage the collateral crime. 54  The connecting link is 
strengthened, as a result, if this evidence is found to exist. 
 
Further, similar to the same idea put forward for standard complicity in Chapter 2,55 
following the principle of individual autonomy the primary actor in PAL should assume 
responsibility for their actions, thereby relieving any other party of liability.56 As a 
                                            
50 Below, 99 -103. 
51 Above, 30. 
52 Jogee (n 2) [11]. 
53 Above, 26. 
54 Jogee (n 2) [83]. 
55 Above 28. 
56 Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38,  [2008] 1 AC 269. 
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result, any suggestion that an accessory contributing to PAL is liable for a collateral 
offence of a principal appears to go against this fundamental principle.57  
 
It is clear that the issues raised earlier58 in relation to the causal contribution of an 
accomplice under the 1861 Act were even more pronounced in PAL scenarios. By 
finding a secondary party to the initial crime liable for the subsequent crime of the 
principal based on mere foresight of the collateral crime, the rule that a third party’s 
autonomous act of breaking a chain of causation was contradicted. The inconsistency 
between the common law of PAL and Kennedy59 was unhelpful to judges in directing 
juries and did not support the principle of legality requiring clarity and consistency of 
law. It seems that a ‘moral component’ was given priority.60 
 
Jogee strengthened the link between the accomplice and the principal by requiring an 
intention to assist or encourage by the accessory for every act of the principal and this 
intention would provide the individual autonomy for the accomplice in their actions. 
Yet, as will be seen in Chapter 4,61 the inconsistency of the individual autonomy of the 
principal breaking the chain of causation between the secondary party and the harm, 
                                            
57 Kennedy is a very recent statement of principle and for more than ten years appeal 
cases show that a supplier of illegal drugs was guilty of manslaughter if an individual 
died due to taking the drugs, which she had supplied.57 However,, it would seem that 
this fundamental principle of criminal law does not apply to strict liability cases 
regarding the environment: Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd 
[1999] 2 AC 22 (HL) and Natural England v Day [2014] EWCA Crim 2683, [2015] 1 
Cr App R 53. 
58 Above, 28. 
59 Kennedy (n 56).  
60 Mendez (n 41) [37]; Virgo G, Case in detail: Mendez and Thompson [2010] Arch 
Rev 4, 5. 
61 Below, 99 - 103. 
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discussed in Chapter 2,62 was not resolved, because the accomplice is still eligible to 
be convicted as a principal.  
 
The mens rea of PAL and the principles of criminal law 
The prosecution in PAL had to prove the state of mind of the accomplice was 
sufficient for their conviction, where the offence carried out by the principal differed 
from that agreed. Similar to complicity, the mens rea in PAL could be broken down 
into the mens rea of the secondary party for her own act of assisting and encouraging 
the first crime and also the secondary party’s mens rea as to the conduct and fault 
element of the principal’s collateral criminal act. It was the latter mental element in 
PAL that became so controversial following Chan Wing-Siu.  
 
In Jogee,63 Chan Wing-Siu was seen as the turning point in relation to the law of 
violent group crimes, due to the development of what had been considered a new 
substantive rule of law for PAL scenarios.64 This rule from Chan Wing-Siu raised 
issues of fair labelling, particularly where a homicide arose. Secondary parties who 
participated in group crime without any real intention that a victim would be killed or 
seriously harmed could be convicted of murder, and labelled a murderer, if they had 
foreseen the possibility of death or serious harm. It was shown earlier in this chapter 
that PAL was part of complicity.65 As a result, in accordance with the 1861 Act a 
judge would then have no choice but to give a life sentence to the secondary party 
                                            
62 Below, 28 - 35. 
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65 Above, 58 - 64. 
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even when, based on the contribution of the accessory, a shorter sentence may have 
been more appropriate.66  
 
A mental attitude that merely requires foresight as the relevant test raises issues of 
the threshold of that foresight. 67  While the vagueness of foreseeability applies 
throughout criminal law, it posed a potential problem for trial judges who needed to 
have a clear workable statement with which to direct juries.68 Prior to Jogee, the law 
did not provide this, leading to a possible breach of both the principles of legality and 
fair warning. The issue was that different juries could apply the foresight test at 
varying thresholds, some requiring a higher level of foresight than others. This may 
have led to inconsistent decisions and a breach of these fundamental principles. In 
fact, Jogee may have muddled the level of foresight in the context of murder even 
further, as will be seen in Chapter 4.69 
 
While Woollin70 set a high threshold of foreseeability for the definition of intention for 
a principal of a murder, PAL caused a legal anomaly because a secondary party, 
who did not contribute to the collateral crime in any way, could be convicted on mere 
foresight that murder might take place. This was hard to justify to secondary parties 
and hard for them to understand, potentially breaching the principle of legality.  
                                            
66 Bentley D QC, ‘Joint enterprise: lifting a flawed dragnet’ (Law Society Gazette, 7 
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69 Below, 117 - 123. 
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In Powell Lord Hutton expressed sympathy with this mens rea anomaly.71 He posited 
that the common law was not always based on logic and considerations such as the 
need to protect the public against gang related crime were also important. He justified 
the approach of the courts by stating that public policy outweighed the strict 
application of logic.72 
 
Simester argued that the mens rea for PAL was not lower than that for the substantive 
offence. It was just different.73 He suggested that the difference arose because the 
secondary party had a different actus reus to fulfil and so having a different mens rea 
should not be an issue.74 In his view, whether the secondary party was sufficiently 
culpable was the important point. 75  Yet eleven years before he had said that 
culpability was not enough and that responsibility was more important. 76 Liability 
should rest on culpability and responsibility. It is only those participants who are 
sufficiently blameworthy that should be held responsible for the crime of the principal. 
The issue then becomes whether foresight of a collateral crime justifies conviction 
and punishment as a principal. Further, fair warning to those with a propensity to 
commit crime is unlikely to be given where the mens rea requirement for the 
accomplice is lower than that for the principal.  
 
Details of the criminal law are not well known and fair warning may rely on society’s 
everyday moral sense of wrong doing to ensure compliance. The more remote the 
                                            
71 Powell; English (n 6) 25 (Lord Hutton). 
72 ibid. 
73 Simester, ‘Accessory liability and common unlawful purposes’ (n 1) 88. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 Simester, ‘The mental element in complicity’ (n 15) 600. 
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link between the initial actor and the resulting harm, the greater the need for the 
publicity of the potential criminal censure.77 There was a lack of publicity around PAL, 
until Jogee, and even the more recent publicity was provided by pressure groups 
arguing for the demise of this area of law. It was not publicity provided by Parliament, 
the judiciary or government officials. It should also be remembered that even if this 
area of law was well known among the public, this does not endorse it as a fair law.78  
 
The lower mens rea of the accomplice in PAL also breached the correspondence 
principle. The prohibited act of the secondary party was assistance or 
encouragement to one crime but the mental element related to foresight of a different 
crime. In addition, adopting the alternative approach to correspondence outlined in 
the Introduction, 79  if the mental attitude of the accomplice was lower than that 
required of the principal who actually carried out the fatal act, the mens rea did not 
correspond between principal and accomplice, prior to Jogee. There is no good 
reason why the mental element for the conviction of an accomplice was at a lower 
level than that of the principal in PAL. 
 
One of the aims of Jogee was to remove the anomaly of differing mens rea for 
principals and accomplices where a fatality arose in PAL. Whether this has been fully 
achieved is analysed in Chapter 4.80 
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The merging of complicity and PAL  
Prior to Jogee, PAL and basic accessorial liability had effectively merged due to the 
dilution of the mens rea of complicity and the complicated nature of this area of the 
law.81 PAL first started to be conflated with basic accessorial liability after Rook.82 In 
doctrinal terms, the judgment in Rook was not well considered because it appeared 
to allow for mere foresight of a crime as the mens rea for the basic offence, even 
though Johnson v Youden had required knowledge of the essential matters of the 
offence. Dyson saw Rook as a ‘weak’ decision of the Court of Appeal.83  
 
Bryce84  also illustrated how basic liability and PAL rules were conflated, prior to 
Jogee. In Bryce, the accomplice was exactly that, an accomplice that had driven the 
principal and weapon to the scene of the crime. He could therefore have been 
convicted of murder under the 1861 Act. Instead, Lord Justice Potter referred to the 
requirements of deliberate assistance and foresight of the murder.85 There was no 
need for any reference to foresight of the crime by the accomplice. This was a clear 
case of basic complicity whereby the secondary party deliberately assisted a principal 
to commit an offence by driving the main actor and the weapon to the scene of the 
crime. This accomplice had knowledge of the essential matters of the crime, namely 
the intended murder.  
 
                                            
81 Dyson M, ‘Bases and Baselessness in Secondary Liability’ [2015] Legal 
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Dyson argued that the mens rea for PAL was lower following Chan Wing-Siu, which 
only required foresight of the collateral crime, than for even basic accessorial liability, 
which demanded a ‘real or substantial risk’ of a crime following Bryce. 86 This appears 
to be correct because in some factual instances it would be easier to convict a 
secondary party under the PAL route, than it was as a basic accomplice following 
Bryce. Yet, a basic accomplice who had actually assisted or encouraged a principal 
in the commission of a crime should be more responsible for his actions than a 
secondary party who merely foresaw a collateral crime. It followed that prosecutors 
started to use PAL with enthusiasm. Dyson called for a return of the court system to 
requiring knowledge or intention that the crime would take place.87 It was Jogee that 
answered this request but the impact of this change is not as great as first anticipated 
and the case is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Even judges seemed to conflate the two doctrines.88 For a law to be so complicated 
that judges direct juries incorrectly conflicts with the rule of law and the principles of 
legality and fair warning. Ironically, evidence that the rules of basic accessorial 
liability and PAL had merged was provided by the case of Jogee itself. The facts of 
Jogee were an example of basic complicity. Jogee encouraged Hirsi to attack the 
victim. He clearly intended Hirsi to cause serious harm to the victim. He could have 
been charged and convicted using the rules from the 1861 Act. Instead the 
prosecution and the lower courts approached the facts of the case using the doctrine 
of PAL, which allowed for risk taking to require responsibility. 
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Dyson has suggested that, prior to Jogee, there were two standards of risk-taking, 
giving rise to a potential breach of the principle of legality: mere foresight of a 
substantial or real risk for secondary parties and traditional recklessness, defined as 
foresight of a risk by a principal, which was unjustifiably taken.89 This dual approach 
risked tainting the respect given to the legal system of England and Wales.90 Based 
on Dyson’s more recent analysis, outlined above,91 that the level of risk for secondary 
parties in PAL was lower than for basic complicity following Bryce, there may have 
even been three different levels of risk taking in the criminal law. In multi-party crimes 
it can be hard to prove the individual roles of the various participants. All parties are 
tried and sentenced as principal offenders, so it is surprising that there were different 
tests for risk taking for accomplices and principals.92  
 
The conflation of standard complicity and PAL may have been one aspect that the 
Supreme Court was keen to resolve in Jogee. The rules of this doctrine were 
complicated and following repeated calls for reform, the Supreme Court was asked to 
reconsider the rules. It may not have been the most appropriate case in which to do 
so, as will be shown in Chapter 4, but the Supreme Court in Jogee may have seen an 
opportunity when the Court of Appeal decision was appealed and decided to take it, 
in view of the increasing criticism of the doctrine. Jogee reinstated intention as the 
requisite mental attitude for all complicity offences. Whether this judgment fully 
resolves the mens rea issues in complicity is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The fundamental difference rule and the principles of criminal law 
The House of Lords in Powell; English93 recognised that the direction from Chan 
Wing-Siu could be harsh to secondary parties and, as a result, they introduced a rule 
which allowed for complete acquittal of a secondary party in particular circumstances. 
This fundamental difference rule, allowed for a defendant to be acquitted of murder 
and manslaughter if the principal carried out the crime with a weapon that was 
fundamentally different to that foreseen by the accomplice.94 Yet, there was no clear 
basis for this new rule, other than if the principal’s conduct was a fundamental 
departure from the joint purpose, the carrying out of the collateral offence could not 
have derived from the initial crime itself.95 The rule also breached the criminal law 
principles under discussion in this thesis as will be seen below. Despite this, Jogee 
appeared to introduce a narrow application of the fundamental difference rule and as 
such, some of these breaches may continue post-Jogee. This is considered in further 
detail in Chapter 4.96 
 
The fundamental difference rule from Powell; English may have breached the 
principle of fair labelling. By not substituting manslaughter as the offence, the court 
implied that where a fundamental difference arose the accomplice would not be liable 
for any homicide offence. In terms of fair labelling this could be too lenient to some 
defendants. While Chan Wing-Siu could be harsh to secondary parties, the new rule 
from Powell; English appeared to be favourable to accessories that were, in any 
event, still intending to commit grievous bodily harm, despite the change of weapon. 
                                            
93 Powell; English (n 6). 
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They were still culpable and should have been held accountable for their role. Jogee 
allowed for a manslaughter verdict in particular circumstances and so appeared to 
rectify this potential breach, but this opportunity for a manslaughter conviction may in 
fact be doctrinally awkward. This is explored in further detail in the next chapter.97 
 
The rule from Powell; English was controversial because it was not consistently 
applied, with the potential for a breach of the principle of legality.98 A definition of 
‘fundamentally different’ was not provided in the judgment. This allowed for flexibility 
in the rule but it also provided uncertainty, which was unhelpful to lawyers and trial 
judges when directing juries. Unsurprisingly, numerous appeal cases on this point 
arose as secondary parties tried to prove that the act committed by the primary actor 
was fundamentally different to that contemplated by them. As will be seen in Chapter 
4,99 Jogee introduced a similar rule based on an overwhelming supervening act, 
which may suffer from similar criticisms. 
 
English placed too much emphasis on the type of weapon used by the principal. For 
example, a boot is not a weapon per se, but could be just as dangerous as a weapon 
if used to kick a victim in the head. Greater consideration should have been given by 
the courts, pre-Jogee, to the way an item was used by the principal as a weapon, in 
comparison with what weapon had been foreseen by the accomplice. This would 
have allowed for conviction and punishment based on the criminal law principles of 
attributing responsibility according to the mental attitude of the defendant towards the 
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resulting harm. The only guidance provided by Lord Hutton in Powell; English was 
that if the weapon used by the primary actor was ‘different, but just as dangerous’ as 
the weapon which the accessory contemplated she might use, the accomplice would 
still be liable.100 This may have breached the principle of legality because it just led to 
fine distinctions being made in court as to whether a weapon foreseen by the 
accessory was equally as dangerous as the one actually used. 101  The decision in 
Jogee has resolved this particular issue, as will be seen in Chapter 4.102  
 
In addition to the controversial approach to the use of weapons, pre Jogee, it 
appeared for a while that an accomplice could simply be convicted based on 
foresight of what the principal may do. Rahman 103  implied the foresight of the 
principal’s mens rea was irrelevant. The appellant in Rahman had claimed he did not 
foresee that the primary actor would intentionally kill the victim, only that they 
intended to do grievous bodily harm and so the difference in mens rea was a 
fundamental change by the principal.104 The House of Lords disagreed.105 To hold 
otherwise would have undermined the established law of murder, which allows for 
the intent to kill or the intent to cause really serious harm as founding a conviction. 
ABCD106 confirmed that it did not matter if the accessory contemplated an intention to 
kill or just serious harm. Foresight of either was satisfactory for a conviction. Jogee 
supported this approach as will be shown in Chapter 4. 
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Rahman left the legal profession debating whether foresight of the principal’s 
intention was always irrelevant. This lack of clarity may well have breached the 
principle of legality. Furthermore, the five judges in Rahman unanimously dismissed 
the appellants’ appeals, yet their reasoning varied substantially but had equal 
weighting. This was not helpful in an already complicated area of law. Judges in the 
lower courts are required to follow the decisions of the higher courts, but trial judges 
were left to decide which judgment they should follow when directing juries.  
 
Lord Brown, obiter dicta, even redefined the fundamental difference rule so that it 
appeared that an accessory could in some situations use the rule even though she 
contemplated that the primary actor may have the intention to kill. 107  In some factual 
circumstances, this could have breached the principle of fair labelling by being too 
lenient because an accomplice should not have been relieved of liability just because 
of a different method of killing. What should have mattered was the harm that the 
principal brought about and what the accomplice thought the primary actor intended, 
not what method was used. If the accessory contemplated that the primary actor 
might have had an intention to kill or cause serious harm, she was still responsible 
and should have been accountable if they continued with the initial criminal venture 
because, despite their contemplation of the principal’s mens rea, the accessory 
continued to participate. Jogee did not directly deal with this issue, as will be seen in 
Chapter 4, but appears to resolve the debate by requiring the secondary party to 
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intend to assist or encourage the principal to act with the particular intent required of 
the offence.108 
 
Commenting on Rahman, Dyson suggested the idea of an alternative ‘fundamentally 
more dangerous test’.109 Two years later, Mendez refined Lord Brown’s controversial 
rule when it was held that in a joint plan to cause serious harm, the defendant was 
not liable for murder if the direct cause was the unforeseen ‘deliberate act’ by 
another, which was likely to be ‘more life-threatening’ than the acts foreseen by the 
accused.110 At least the courts had started to look at how a weapon was used rather 
than just the type of weapon used. This was a good refinement, albeit by the Court of 
Appeal rather than the Supreme Court. It was the dangerousness of the conduct of 
the principal’s act as a whole that mattered. This may have resulted in more 
secondary parties being acquitted. If the accomplice foresaw the use of a particular 
weapon by the principal to cause the victim serious harm in a non-life threatening 
way, but the principal actually used it to fracture his skull and the victim died as a 
result, the secondary party would be acquitted. The actual use of the weapon by the 
principal was more life threatening and so the accomplice was not held 
responsible.111   
 
Finally the courts attributed responsibility according to the harm that was foreseen. If 
the defendant had foreseen the principal using a knife to cut the victim’s hand but it 
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was actually used to cut the victim’s throat, the fact the same weapon was used was 
immaterial. What was important was how the accomplice had foreseen that it would 
be used.  
 
The availability of a manslaughter verdict for an accessory reduced after Powell: 
English and subsequent case law revisiting the fundamental difference rule. Many 
accomplices who would have been committed of a homicide offence before the case 
were either convicted of murder or acquitted altogether.112 If a secondary party joined 
an attack but other participants went further than foreseen, the accomplice would still 
have deserved punishment, albeit different to that of the killer. Manslaughter would 
have fulfilled that role. 113  This would have reflected fair labelling, subject to the 
doctrinal criticisms raised by Baker, discussed in Chapter 4.114  
 
While Powell acquitted defendants of any homicide if the act carried out by the 
principal was fundamentally different to that contemplated by the accomplice, a 
number of cases, 115 before Jogee, confirmed that an accessory should be convicted 
where the very deed carried out was that contemplated, even though she did not 
realise that the principal intended a more serious consequence. The accomplice 
should be found guilty for the offence appropriate to the intent with which she had 
acted.  
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The secondary party did not have to share the same mens rea as the principal and 
foresight of what the principal may do was held to be sufficient in these cases. For 
example, where an accessory participated in a fight and so encouraged or assisted 
the principal, if only some minor harm was foreseen (as opposed to serious harm or 
death) but death resulted due to an unforeseen mens rea of the principal, the 
accomplice would be liable for manslaughter, but not murder. Again, this approach 
fulfilled the principle of criminal law requiring a culpable mental attitude before the 
stigma of a conviction and punishment could be imposed. Similarly, the punishment 
appeared to reflect the criminal law aspirations of fair labelling. This approach, 
however, is open to the criticisms recently raised by Baker following Jogee, that 
these defendants are being labelled based on a crime that might, but did not, take 
place. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.116 
 
This complicated area of law was refined over a number of years and it is anticipated 
that Jogee was intended to simplify and settle this area of law. With the introduction 
of a narrow version of the fundamental difference rule some of the above criticisms 
may remain. This is analysed in Chapter 4.117 
 
How PAL applied to cases of spontaneous group violence before Jogee 
PAL applied to spontaneous group violence, but did not readily suit these 
circumstances. 118  Events can spiral out of control very quickly in spontaneous 
scenarios and proving an agreement for an initial joint venture with foresight by the 
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secondary party of a collateral crime proved hard. If one defendant was a passer-by 
and suddenly joined in an attack on a victim this would be considered to be the initial 
crime, but establishing what she had agreed with the principal and what she foresaw 
could be difficult. In spontaneous violence participants only consider their own 
actions and intentions. They do not usually consider the actions and mental attitude 
of others.119 Despite this, PAL was often used in spontaneous violence scenarios.  
 
In Mendez,120 Lord Toulson identified the problems with PAL in spontaneous group 
violence. He stated: 
All that a jury can in most cases be expected to do is form a broad brush 
judgment about the sort of level of violence and associated risk of injury 
which they can safely conclude that the defendant must have intended 
or foreseen.121 
 
The criminal law norm is for the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable 
doubt. This should not allow the jury to make ‘broad brush’ decisions, which could 
lead to inconsistent decisions and breach the principle of legality by not being clear 
and precise. It may also breach the principle of fair warning because, without 
adequate publicity of PAL, potential defendants may only expect to be punished for 
their own role in the violence and not the role of others. However, in practice, the facts 
of a case often require juries to take a ‘broad brush’ view and at least this maintains 
flexibility to allow for individual circumstances to be taken into account by the jury.   
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Over the years the courts justified the Chan Wing-Siu/Powell direction on the basis of 
the deterrence and punishment of gang crime, 122  yet when the violence was 
spontaneous the law did not work well in practice. This was one of the reasons given 
in Jogee for restating the law to effectively abolished PAL. Whether Jogee 
adequately deals with situations of spontaneous violence is discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 4,123 where it will be shown that it is anticipated that problems will 
remain. This is because juries will continue to have to take a ‘broad brush’ approach 
to the mental element of the participants and whether they intended to assist or 
encourage the substantive offence. 
 
Was fair labelling reflected in PAL? 
It was shown in Chapter 2124 that the law of complicity has the potential to breach the 
principle of fair labelling and similar arguments applied to PAL. JC Smith opined that 
PAL had ‘a savour of constructive crime where a person is convicted of a greater 
offence because it resulted from a lesser offence of which she was guilty.’125 The 
actus reus of the greater offence was effectively just participating in the initial crime 
with the principal. There was no need for any direct assistance or encouragement in 
relation to the second offence, resulting in a potential for unfair labelling upon 
conviction. 
 
There was no mental attitude attaching to the collateral offence. The defendant may 
have intended one result but be liable and labelled for a more serious outcome, 
                                            
122 Above, 55 – 56. 
123 Below, 105. 
124 Above, 28 - 34. 
125 Smith JC, ‘Criminal liability of accessories’ (n 22) 465. 
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which was hard to justify unless responsibility attached to the defendant. PAL was 
considered by the courts to be part of complicity,126 meaning that the contribution of 
the secondary party to the initial crime was considered as encouragement for the 
second crime, providing the necessary culpability of an intention to encourage. This 
helped justify the accomplice being labelled with the principal’s crime but fair warning 
was not provided to defendants who were unaware of PAL. This is because prior to 
Jogee there was little publicity on PAL, so that most defendants would have been 
unaware of their impending criminality for the principal’s collateral offence. Even if 
they were aware of PAL, it was hard for them to understand, providing a possible 
breach of the principle of legality because the law was not clear. The law was 
complicated. Judges and academics alike struggled with PAL yet alone those in the 
criminal world.127 
 
The moral justification for constructive crimes and their labelling can be understood in 
relation to a conviction of the principal for murder because the defendant is to blame 
for the result of an attack, where serious harm was intended, but death in fact 
resulted. This same justification is not so straightforward for PAL. The secondary 
party’s involvement in PAL is not more blameworthy than a person who commits 
unlawful act manslaughter by assaulting a victim, which resulted in death. The latter 
secondary party would be labelled with the offence of manslaughter. Yet, an 
accomplice under the doctrine of PAL could be liable for murder if the principal kills 
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the victim and the accessory assisted an attack with only foresight of a possible 
death.128 This clearly illustrates the potential of unfair labelling in PAL. 
 
Further, the breach of the principle of fair labelling was greater for PAL than for basic 
complicity. In standard accessorial liability, the principal may have to intend an 
offence for conviction and the accessory would have to intend to assist or encourage 
the principal in their offence.129 In theory, the mens rea element of the accessory 
would match that of the principal for a specific intent crime. However, in a PAL factual 
matrix, labelling was not applied consistently between a principal for murder and a 
secondary party to PAL. Intention was required for the label of a principal as a 
murderer but only foresight of the killing or serious harm was necessary for the 
secondary party. Labelling between the offence of the principal and that of the 
accomplice was not consistent in relation to the requisite mental element of both 
parties. 
 
In addition to the usual principle of fair labelling described above, there was a further 
issue regarding the labelling of PAL. Originally, the term ‘joint enterprise’ was used 
as an ‘umbrella’ term.130 ‘Joint enterprise’ has been given various definitions over the 
years. Lord Lane in Hyde 131  explained that there were two main types of ‘joint 
enterprise’ cases where death resulted to the victim. The first was where the principle 
aim of the participants was to do some kind of physical injury to the victim. The 
second was where the principal aim was not to cause physical injury to any victim 
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but, say, to commit burglary and the victim is assaulted and killed as a possibly 
unwelcome incident of the burglary.132 This approach from Hyde was more recently 
confirmed by Krebs, although she subsequently argued that the first limb was 
redundant because, more correctly, it should be considered as part of the basic law 
on complicity.133 This is correct because the first limb would have fallen within the 
requirements of the 1861 Act. It was an unnecessary definition from the start.  
 
The use of the term ‘joint enterprise’ was confused over time. Lord Mustill in Powell; 
English recognised the contradiction in using the term ‘joint enterprise’ to reflect 
liability for a secondary party who was a party to an express or tacit agreement to do 
the act in question and also for the individual who disagreed with the act and made 
this clear to the principal, so did not intend the principal to commit the collateral 
crime.134 The definition of the term ‘joint enterprise’ was muddled further in ABCD135 
when Lord Hughes set out three situations when the term ‘joint enterprise’ or 
‘common enterprise’ might be used. This guidance has not been without criticism 
because two of these definitions were more accurately defined as joint principalship 
or basic complicity. 136  
 
Ultimately, the basic form of secondary liability became redundant as ‘everything is a 
joint enterprise’ and the various levels of liability were conflated.137 Only the third 
definition from ABCD was the true offence of ‘joint enterprise’, more recently called 
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‘PAL’, which has become so controversial. Yet, judicial literature often seemed to use 
the term ‘joint enterprise’ for all accessorial offences.138 The CPS and the courts 
appeared to merge other forms of secondary liability with the label ‘joint enterprise’ 
instead of acknowledging a distinction between them. It was this third definition that 
was the more usual application of ‘joint enterprise’, discussed in detail in Jogee as 
PAL.139 
 
The ambiguities in terminology were exacerbated by the adoption of different terms 
to cover both basic and parasitic complicity.140 In addition to ‘joint enterprise’, terms 
such as ‘common enterprise’, ‘common purpose’, ‘common purpose complicity’, 
‘collateral joint enterprise’ as well as ‘PAL’ were in common use prior to Jogee.141  
 
The more recent term PAL has been described as ‘inelegant’.142 However, the ability 
of prospective offenders to understand this term is important. Pre-Jogee, it could be 
suggested that it was not fair to label a defendant and convict her for an offence for 
which the label, PAL, was unintelligible to them. This would breach the principle of 
fair labelling and potentially the principle of legality. The law should describe the 
criminal offence to society with precision, so that society can understand the nature 
of the secondary party’s wrong. As such, the state is bound by the everyday 
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understanding of the terminology it adopts.143 Neither the label joint enterprise nor 
PAL fulfilled this role. 
 
Conclusion 
The doctrine of PAL was initially developed by the courts in order to protect the public 
from the potential for group violence to rapidly escalate and the difficulties of proving 
which participant wielded the knife or pulled the trigger. Despite the procedural and 
evidential advantages of this doctrine, it has been shown above that it could be harsh 
to defendants. To compensate, Powell English introduced the fundamental difference 
rule, which swung the pendulum in the other direction by being too lenient on some 
defendants, relieving them of any homicide offence.  
 
It has been shown in this chapter that the legal foundations of PAL in terms of 
causation were uncertain and the doctrine breached the principles of fair warning, 
correspondence, fair labelling, and legality in many respects. Furthermore, the rules 
did not translate well into cases of spontaneous violence. 
 
In addition, the mens rea of this route to liability was controversial. JC Smith 
recognised the harshness of this doctrine twenty years ago.144 He suggested that it 
could be altered to necessitate intention of the accomplice that the principal should 
carry out the collateral crime and there was no reason why the House of Lords could 
not modify the law.145 It took until 2016 in Jogee for this to happen, so that intention 
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on the part of the accessory is now a requisite element for all acts of the accomplice. 
This is discussed in further detail together with the resulting impact of Jogee on the 
identified principles in the next chapter. 
 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that issues arise from the relationship of complicity with 
the various principles under discussion in this thesis and that these principles are not 
always fulfiiled. This current chapter has focused on PAL and its relationship with the 
same principles, identifying that these breaches were even greater in PAL. Whether 
Jogee has improved the relationship of complicity with these principles is considered 
next in Chapter 4.
 89 
CHAPTER 4 – JOGEE’S IMPACT ON COMPLICITY AND PAL IN RELATION TO 
THE IDENTIFIED PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
It was shown in Chapter 3 that PAL was always part of complicity and, despite its 
continued application by the courts, PAL breached many of the principles of criminal 
law. In 2016, Jogee1 restated the law of complicity which, in the Supreme Court’s 
view, had been misinterpreted for 30 years, in an attempt to remove any potential for 
injustice to defendants. The purpose of this chapter to is evaluate the judgment from 
Jogee, in order to assess whether it will improve the relationship of complicity with 
the principles of criminal law under discussion in this thesis and whether PAL still 
exists after Jogee. 
 
The chapter starts by setting out the restatement of law from Jogee, followed by 
consideration of why the Supreme Court chose to make this decision. It then moves 
on to analyse the Jogee judgment in detail, in relation to the identified principles of 
criminal law. In particular, the actus reus and mens rea of complicity are analysed 
together with the use of weapons and manslaughter as an alternative verdict 
following Jogee. Difficulties are identified with Jogee, while respecting that the overall 
aim of the judgment was to remove the injustice caused by the previous law from 
Chan Wing-Siu2 and Powell; English.3 It is shown that many of the breaches of 
criminal law principles that existed with complicity prior to Jogee still remain. The 
chapter moves on to consider whether PAL exists, post-Jogee, and the general 
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application of the case to criminal law. It will show that PAL may no longer exist, but 
joint enterprise, referring only to joint group criminal ventures, 4 will remain. It also 
suggests that Jogee applies throughout the criminal law and not just to the law of 
murder.  
  
While Jogee appeared to improve the relationship of complicity with the principles of 
fair warning, fair labelling, correspondence and individual autonomy, this apparent 
improvement may not be as great as that first expected by some academics and 
lobby groups.5  On closer reading and analysis, the judgment may actually raise 
further issues, resulting in potential for continuing breaches of these principles and 
confusion in terms of mens rea. Furthermore, the debate on causation in complicity 
remains post-Jogee. 
 
The restatement of the law of complicity from Jogee? 
Following Jogee, 6 the secondary party must now factually assist or encourage every 
crime for which she is to be held liable. Jogee7 held that accessorial liability requires 
the defendant to assist or encourage the commission of the offence of the principal, 
with the intention to assist or encourage the commission of the crime. This requires 
knowledge of any existing facts necessary for it to be criminal.8 If the collateral crime 
requires a particular intent, the accomplice must intend to assist or encourage the 
                                            
4 See Note on terminology above, 9. 
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principal to act with that intent.9 Association between the two participants and the 
presence of the accomplice is only evidence whether assistance or encouragement 
were provided.10 Furthermore, assistance and encouragement do not have to have a 
positive effect on the actions of the principal or the outcome.11 Secondary liability no 
longer requires the existence of an agreement between the parties.12  
 
Jogee13 decided that authorisation of the collateral crime cannot automatically be 
inferred by the accomplice continuing in the initial crime, having foreseen the 
possibility of the second crime. Foresight by the secondary party of the second crime 
carried out by the principal, is now only evidence of intention to assist or encourage 
that further crime.14 Subsequent to Jogee, the Court of Appeal in Anwar15 confirmed 
that it will be up to the jury ‘to look at the full picture or factual matrix’ to see if the 
necessary intent can be inferred. In effect, Jogee confirmed that there is no, and 
probably never was,16 a separate route to liability called PAL. It must be shown that 
all acts of the principal were intentionally encouraged or assisted by another 
participant, whether it is an initial joint criminal venture or a further collateral crime 
subsequently carried out by one party alone. 
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Jogee17 also suggested that if a defendant is party to a violent attack on a victim, 
without an intention to assist in causing death or serious harm, but the violence 
escalates and a fatality arises, they would be guilty of manslaughter and not murder. 
The Supreme Court18 qualified this by stating that if death was caused by some 
overwhelming supervening act by the principal, which nobody could have 
contemplated so that the accomplice’s act is confined to history, the accessory will 
not be liable for the death. 
 
By restating the law, the Supreme Court was presumably intending to clarify the 
elements of accessorial liability and rectify any areas of law that have caused 
injustice. Yet, it will be argued below that this may not have been achieved and that 
breaches of the principles of fair labelling, legality, correspondence and individual 
autonomy remain. This is unfortunate because it means that the decision in Jogee 
may not have the impact that was initially expected by many commentators 
immediately after the decision.19 
 
Why did the Supreme Court restate the law of complicity in Jogee? 
The Supreme Court gave five reasons for restating the principles in Jogee. The first 
reason was that the rule from Chan Wing-Siu was based on an incomplete, and 
sometimes erroneous, understanding of earlier case law and that the Supreme Court 
in Jogee20 had had the benefit of a fuller analysis of the law than other courts. Doubts 
have been raised on whether the Supreme Court had in fact undertaken a fuller 
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analysis of the law but this work does not have space to explore this issue further.21 
Jogee22 used Chan Wing-Siu as the starting point and so this thesis takes the same 
approach. The development of PAL from common law could form an inquiry in its 
own right. 
 
The second reason provided by the Court23 was that the law was not working well in 
practice, was controversial and had led to numerous appeals. Indeed, this is correct 
and many of the problems with the Chan Wing-Siu principle have been discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
The third reason was based on the importance of complicity in the common law.24 
Complicity is a vital area of law responsible for upholding the liability of secondary 
parties for their part in the criminal actions of others and the Supreme Court agreed 
that if the courts have taken a wrong turn then it should be corrected. This thesis will 
suggest that despite the focus of Jogee on PAL, PAL was part of complicity. As the 
facts in Jogee were an example of basic complicity, not PAL, the court could have 
given greater consideration to both basic complicity and the unitary system of liability, 
in order to highlight the potential for breaches of the principles of criminal law. While 
complicity was put into statutory form in 1861, so any fundamental changes would fall 
to Parliament, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to highlight inconsistencies. 
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The fourth and fifth reasons have the most importance. The fourth reason given25 
was that foresight of what might happen was only evidence from which a jury may 
find a requisite intention in criminal law. Following Chan Wing26 foresight of a criminal 
offence became a substantive rule requiring a jury to find that intention in a 
defendant. This resulted in a reduction in manslaughter and an over extension in 
murder convictions for accessories. This problem was compounded by the already 
over-inclusive nature of the common law of murder, which allowed for a mental 
element of an intention to cause serious harm, without any intent to kill. 27  It is 
anticipated that this was one of the primary reasons for the judgment in Jogee. 
Judges and academics were aware of the increased use of PAL by the prosecution 
together with continual pressure on the courts and Parliament to intervene. 28 
Parliament had shown no enthusiasm for legislation and so it fell to the judiciary.29 
 
The fifth reason provided in Jogee30 was the resulting anomaly of a lower mental 
element for an accessory than for the principal, in the case of specific intent crimes 
such as murder. Prior to Jogee, to be guilty of murder a principal had to kill with an 
intention to kill or cause serious harm, whereas the accomplice only had to foresee 
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that the principal might kill the victim, with an intention to kill or cause serious harm. It 
was easier to convict the accomplice than it was the primary actor, in some factual 
scenarios. Indeed, this anomaly had been raised on a number of occasions by the 
courts31 and was discussed in Chapter 3.32  
 
In addition to the reasons outlined above, Jogee provided an important clarification of 
Rahman33 in relation to murder. Jogee34 confirmed that an intention to assist an 
infliction of serious harm was no different to the intention to assist an intentional 
killing and is sufficient for secondary liability. This aligns complicity with the law of 
murder. This is an important clarification, because to differentiate between an 
intention to cause serious harm and an intention to kill in complicity would have 
undermined the whole basis of our law of murder.35  
 
More concerning was the Supreme Court’s later reference to bringing the common 
law back into line with other statutory provisions. The Court referred to s 8 of Criminal 
Justice Act 1967, which states: 
 A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an 
offence- 
 
a. shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a 
result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and 
probable consequence of those actions; but  
                                            
31 Powell; English (n 3); Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129. 
32 Above, 67 - 70. 
33 Rahman (n 31). 
34 Jogee (n 1) [95]. 
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b. shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by 
reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the 
evidence as appear proper in the circumstances. 36 
 
Even if the result is natural or probable, the jury does not have to find that the 
defendant intended the consequence. It is just a question of evidence for the jury. 
Jogee also appeared to be consistent with the approach taken in the context of 
intention for the purposes of murder.37  
 
Jogee38 also referred to Parliament’s enactment of s 44 Serious Crime Act in 2007. 
This provides that: 
(1) A person commits an offence if – 
(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the 
commission of an offence; and 
(b) he intends to encourage or assist its commission. 
 
(2) But he is not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the 
commission of an offence merely because such encouragement or 
assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act.  
 
While not totally without ambiguity, Parliament appears to state that foresight is not 
an adequate mental requirement for the inchoate crime of intentionally assisting or 
encouraging another to commit an offence and so Jogee39 endeavoured to bring the 
law of complicity in line with this.  
 
However, complicity and the Serious Crime Act offences should not be compared in 
this way, because they are different types of offence. Buxton argues that s 44 of the 
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Serious Crime Act is unique in that it inculpates the accomplice before the 
commission of the principal offence and that the purpose behind this provision was 
not to widen the law so as to convict an individual who was just indifferent to (but 
foresaw) an offence that did not in the end take place.40 The mental element of 
intention, not based on mere foresight, provides this.41 The circumstances anticipated 
in s 44 are inchoate and a defendant is liable whether or not the ultimate crime is 
committed. To incriminate an individual because of their reckless behaviour despite 
the fact that the offence was not carried out would almost certainly be too wide a 
form of criminality. Intention as a mental element avoids this.  
 
Complicity, on the other hand, is concerned with liability for another party’s crime, 
which does take place. All those responsible should be held to account, even if they 
were indifferent to the commission of the offence, if they intended to assist or 
encourage the principal. The restatement of intention in Jogee ensures this. Indeed, 
an accessory is subject to the same criminal label and associated stigma as the 
principal, whereas the label for an inchoate offence is independent to the principal 
offence. It follows that the reference to foresight as an inadequate mens rea in the 
Serious Crime Act 2007, should have no connection to foresight as an inadequate 
mental element in complicity. The arguments for mens rea in each offence should be 
considered on their own merits because they are different types of offence. Indeed, 
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this may be the reason why Parliament did not legislate on accessorial liability so as 
to reinstate intention as the mens rea for complicity at the same time as their 
enactment of the Serious Crime Act 2007.  
 
Ormerod and Laird agreed that the reference in Jogee to both these statutory 
provisions was illogical. In their view, s 8 relates to intention as to consequences and 
s 44 relates to intent as to purpose, whereas Jogee is about an accessory’s intent as 
to the principal’s likely intention to commit the crime.42 Their approach has some 
strength; s 8 states that a jury ‘shall not be bound in law to infer that ‘he intended or 
foresaw a result’ (a consequence) and s 44 refers to the fact that the accessory is not 
to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the commission of an offence (a 
purpose).  
 
However, Ormerod and Laird omitted to state that the intention for complicity after 
Jogee, may be similar to s 44 in that it is an intention to assist or encourage (a 
purpose) which has to be proved, as well as the added element that they also need 
that intention in relation to the required mens rea of the offence of the principal 
(Ormerod and Laird’s accessory’s intent as to the principal’s likely intention to commit 
the crime).  
 
It is suggested in this thesis that the mental element of an offence should be 
considered on an individual basis and not just because another offence uses a legal 
term in a particular way. If this is correct, then the reference to other statutory 
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provisions is inappropriate. In practice, this may just be an academic point as the 
Supreme Court43 made clear that consistency of statutory provisions was just one of 
a number of reasons given to justify their decision to change the law. It is not listed 
as the only or even principle reason, just one which is noteworthy.  
 
Encouragement or assistance and causation in complicity after Jogee 
The conduct element for complicity is encouragement or assistance.44 This is not 
new. However, little further guidance was provided in Jogee, other than it has to be 
more than a remote contribution, which was left up to the jury.45  
 
Importantly, Jogee held that the secondary party must assist or encourage every act 
of the principal.46 This is new and results in the demise of PAL. If an accessory and a 
principal agree to carry out one crime but the principal goes further than agreed and 
commits a collateral crime, the secondary party may not be liable for the second 
crime depending on whether their contribution to the first crime is interpreted as 
assisting or encouraging the second. Prior to Jogee, the secondary party’s 
contribution to the initial crime was inferred to provide the necessary assistance or 
encouragement for the collateral crime, if the accomplice had foreseen the possibility 
of the second offence. Following Jogee, actual assistance or encouragement must 
be proved in relation to the collateral crime. It may be that the contribution to the 
initial crime may still provide the necessary conduct element for complicity but it will 
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be up to the jury. Complicity appears to be increasingly a jury prescribed law, which 
can lead to inconsistent decisions and a potential to breach the principle of legality.  
 
For example, if two parties agree to commit burglary and yet one party kills the 
occupier of the property when they are disturbed, whether the accomplice to the 
burglary is liable for the murder will depend on whether their contribution to the 
burglary is considered to be encouraging murder. The secondary party may not have 
assisted directly in the murder by words of support or restraining the victim, but by 
participating in the burglary itself, they could still be considered by a jury to be 
encouraging a potential murder. This is not what the Supreme Court in Jogee was 
necessarily anticipating. It is suggested that the Court required the secondary party 
to assist or encourage the principal in the act of murder itself, to be liable as an 
accomplice to murder. It is disappointing that Jogee did not discuss this point in detail 
in order to provide a fixed, clear criminal law, as a framework for the lower courts. 
 
If this assistance or encouragement is established, Jogee confirmed that a positive 
impact on the principal’s actions or on the result is unnecessary.47 Yet, this may 
result in unfair labelling of the accomplice and fair warning may not be provided by 
the criminal law. This is because by not requiring a positive impact from the 
encouragement or assistance on the principal’s conduct or the outcome, there is no 
material relationship between the actions of the accomplice and the conduct of the 
principal. Accordingly, it is hard to claim that the accessory is implicated in the 
primary wrong of the principal and there appears to be no culpability and 
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responsibility by the secondary party in respect of the primary actor’s criminal 
offence.48  
 
By contrast, this approach respects the role of individual autonomy. By actively 
assisting or encouraging the principal, the accomplice exercises their right to choose 
whether to assist or encourage the principal and is held responsible for their choice. 
This has always been a problem with complicity, because liability can derive from the 
actions of the principal alone. The remit of the Supreme Court was not to change the 
derivative nature of complicity, yet it is the unitary system and its derivative nature 
that has been the cause of many of the breaches of the criminal law principles. 
 
Alternatively, it could be suggested that Jogee supported the idea that there is no 
need for the accomplice’s acts to have caused the principal to commit the second 
offence. If correct, Jogee ignored Mendez,49 which held that secondary liability was 
based on causation. Dyson believes Jogee ‘fudged’ the causation issue, although he 
suggested this approach allows for the situation where, for example, a number of 
defendants offer a knife to the principal but the principal only takes one.50 This is 
because all defendants could be liable, even though the principal was assisted in fact 
by only one participant. All the defendants were prepared to assist the primary actor 
and intended to do so. It was just the principal’s choice which knife she took, but any 
one of the knives could have been selected. The principal’s choice did not alter the 
                                            
48 Sullivan GR ‘First degree murder and complicity – conditions for parity of culpability 
between principal and accomplice’ [2007] 1 (3) Crim Law and Philos 271, 283. 
49 [2010] EWCA Crim 516, [2011] QB 876. 
50 Dyson M, Buxton R, ‘Letter to the Editor’ Crim LR 638, 639. 
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fact that all participants intended to assist the principal and had their knife been 
selected they would have had the requisite conduct element for complicity.  
 
This approach also deals with issues of evidential uncertainty of what actually 
assisted the primary actor.51 It may be hard to prove that the encouragement or 
assistance of a particular accomplice, where there are a number of accomplices, 
actually had a positive impact on the conduct of the principal. This maintains flexibility 
for judges to allow for individual circumstances. 
 
However, despite potentially implying that accomplice’s acts need not have caused 
the principal to commit the second offence, words of causation were included in 
Jogee. The case52 held that a secondary party should not be liable for the death of a 
victim by the principal where the death was caused by ‘some overwhelming 
supervening act’ by the primary actor which nobody in the defendant's shoes could 
have contemplated might happen and is of such a character as to relegate his acts to 
history; in that case the defendant will bear no criminal responsibility for the death’. 
This implied that the secondary party will be liable, unless there is some 
overwhelming supervening act which was a novus actus interveniens breaking the 
chain of causation. If the acts of the accomplice do not need to cause the act of the 
principal, then there will not be a chain of causation to break.  
 
The approach in Jogee in this respect is unhelpful. Instead of clarifying the issues of 
causation in relation to accessorial liability, the Supreme Court appears to have 
                                            
51 ibid. 
52 Jogee (n 1) [97]. 
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muddled it further. Causation has always been an issue in both basic complicity and 
PAL, yet Jogee made no reference to this. Owing to the failure of the Supreme Court 
to confront the causal requirement for complicity in Jogee, uncertainty will continue. 
 
Has a new fundamental difference rule been created in Jogee? 
Jogee appears to have replaced the fundamental difference rule, discussed in the 
previous chapter, 53  with another similar rule. While the judgment stated that a 
secondary party would not be liable where there is ‘some overwhelming supervening 
act by the perpetrator’, 54  this is potentially the fundamental difference rule in a 
different guise. The judgment continued that there should be no need to refer to the 
fundamental difference rule enunciated in Powell; English, unless there was an 
overwhelming supervening event. This implies that they are to be based on the same 
rule. All the issues relating to fair labelling due to the old fundamental difference rule 
may well still apply to the new test.55 Furthermore, it is not clear whether the earlier 
case law interpreting the old fundamental difference test will apply to this new rule. 
 
Dyson describes this new test as ‘vague’.56 It does appear vague, with the potential 
to breach the principle of legality. This is because Jogee does not set out what is 
needed to establish an overwhelming supervening event. This would have helped 
judges direct juries on this new test. No doubt it will take future case law to establish 
the definition of an overwhelming supervening act, similar to the plethora of appeals 
following the development of the fundamental difference rule in Powell; English. It is 
                                            
53 Above, 74 - 80. 
54 Jogee (n 1) [97]. 
55 Above, 74 - 80. 
56 Dyson, ‘Case Comment’ (n 5) 197. 
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unfortunate that the Supreme Court in Jogee did not take the opportunity to prevent a 
similar set of appeals arising from the new test by setting out a statement of 
principles upon which this new test could be based. This would have provided clarity 
to those involved in the criminal legal system, complying with the principle of legality 
and potentially fair warning to the criminal fraternity.  
 
Is prior agreement still a requirement post-Jogee? 
Before Jogee, PAL required a prior agreement between the parties to carry out one 
crime, as a result of which a foreseeable second crime was committed by the 
principal. This is no longer the case. Jogee made clear that prior agreement 
between the parties for secondary liability is no longer required.57 Very often there is 
prior agreement between two or more defendants to carry out a criminal offence, 
which would provide the necessary encouragement for secondary liability.58 In these 
circumstances, it would be fair to label the secondary party as a principal 
(dependent on the level of the accomplice’s involvement). Furthermore, by choosing 
to enter into the agreement with the principal the accomplice exercises their 
individual autonomy. This has not changed the law and has always been the 
situation for basic complicity.  
 
Following Jogee, whether there was prior agreement is now largely irrelevant. An 
accessory has to assist or encourage the principal in every offence whether or not 
they were agreed. This is why the doctrine of PAL no longer exists. Jogee may 
appear to detract from fair labelling and individual autonomy because if there is no 
                                            
57 Jogee (n 1)  [17] and [78]. 
58 ibid  [78]. 
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prior agreement then it may not be fair to label the accessory as the principal and 
they may not have exercised their right to choose to carry out the crime. However, 
because the secondary party now has to have assisted or encouraged every offence 
of the principal, it will be fair to label her with the offence of the principal (again 
dependent on her level of involvement). Similarly, if they have assisted or 
encouraged the principal in every offence and have chosen to do so without being 
under any form of duress, then the principle of autonomy is respected. 
 
This new approach is particularly helpful when it comes to spontaneous violence, 
where it can be hard to prove prior agreement between the participants. Subject to 
later comments on the mens rea for complicity, Jogee appears to make convictions 
for spontaneous violence easier, as long as assistance or encouragement by the 
secondary parties of the primary actor’s crime can be shown. This assistance or 
encouragement can take the form of support by words or actions or by a supportive 
presence.59 This will assist with fair labelling in that it may be appropriate to label an 
individual as a ‘criminal’, if they have supported the principal in his crime. Whether it 
is fair to label her with the offence of the principal in accordance our unitary system 
of complicity, is more open to debate.  
 
In practice, following Jogee, the problem may be an evidential one of proving 
intentional assistance or encouragement by every defendant. 60  These evidential 
problems prior to Jogee did not arise because proof of mere foresight was sufficient. 
                                            
59 ibid [78]. 
60 Below, 108-132. 
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This is where the prosecutorial advantage of the Chan Wing-Siu direction can be 
seen. 
Association and presence at the crime post-Jogee 
Jogee 61  confirms that ‘neither association nor presence is necessarily proof of 
assistance or encouragement’. Association with the principal or presence at the 
scene of the offence may be evidence of assistance and encouragement but no more 
than that. Just because a defendant has some association with the defendant or 
happens to be present at the scene of the crime or in the vicinity, it will not 
necessarily be established that she assisted or encouraged the principal to carry out 
the offence. Again, this is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.  
 
Association will be relevant when it relates to previous acts by both parties, towards 
but prior to the commission of the ultimate offence. Similarly, a group of people can 
encourage an offence by their presence. It would be up the jury to decide whether 
this presence provided intentional support to the principal, so encouraging her to 
commit the crime. This should be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Jogee identified a de minimis principle in terms of assistance and encouragement. 
This is where the acts of the accomplice are remote in terms of time, place or 
circumstances to the acts of the primary actor, so that the secondary party should not 
be considered to have assisted or encouraged the principal.62 Again, whether the 
acts are too remote to be assistance or encouragement is for the jury to decide. For 
example, if a secondary party provided the principal with tools a long time before the 
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principal’s crime took place and for a different purpose, this would not be seen as 
encouragement. This reflects the principle of fair labelling because it would be unfair 
to label an individual with the offence of the principal, if conduct of the accomplice 
was too remote. 
 
Jogee recognised that defendants gain courage when supported by a large group of 
people ‘lending force’ to the acts of the primary actor.63  Force of numbers can 
provide the necessary encouragement in secondary liability.64 For example a group 
of friends watching another attack a victim may well encourage the primary actor. 
The principal would know by the spectators’ presence that she could rely on them to 
join in if necessary. If, on the other hand, the spectators were a group of elderly 
people, incapable of coming to the principal’s assistance, then there would be no 
encouragement by their presence. 
 
This recognition of support providing encouragement has the advantage that it may 
help justify the label attached to an accomplice upon conviction. If the presence of 
the defendant as part of a large group does in fact encourage the principal, then the 
accomplice should be held responsible for their actions and the label may be 
supported, depending on the level of their involvement. Where a defendant present is 
one of a large number of defendants, it may be relatively straightforward to show that 
by the presence of the large group the principal was encouraged. However, an issue 
remains, post-Jogee. The prosecution still has to prove that each member of the 
                                            
63 ibid [11] (Lord Toulson and Lord Neuberger). 
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group intended by her presence to encourage the principal.65 This may be hard to 
achieve in practice. 
 
Beyond stating that ‘numbers matter’ the judgment from Jogee provides no guidance 
on when a group of individuals will encourage a principal merely by their presence.66 
As a result, adequate warning to those with a tendency towards crime is 
questionable. More publicity of liability by presence at the scene of a crime is 
necessary, in order to provide warning to potential criminals. There was initial 
publicity of Jogee after the judgment was handed down, but little advice to those with 
a propensity to crime setting out the continuing criminalisation based on mere 
presence.67 
 
The mens rea of complicity after Jogee 
The restatement of the law following Jogee related mostly to mens rea, which held 
that complicity requires an intention to assist or encourage a criminal offence with 
knowledge of any of the existing facts necessary to make it criminal. 68 However, this 
is problematic and the issues raised are discussed below. In particular, it was shown 
in Chapter 2 that the mens rea for complicity has two components: the mental 
element in relation to the accessory’s own conduct and the mental element of the 
accessory relating to the actions of the principal.  Jogee did not clearly identify these 
                                            
65 Below, 108-132. 
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two separate aspects, creating confusion with a potential breach of the principle of 
legality. 
 
Jogee held that the mens rea for assisting and encouraging a crime is ‘an intention to 
assist or encourage the commission of the crime’. 69 This seems straightforward and 
confirms that a defendant cannot recklessly, negligently or accidentally assist or 
encourage a criminal offence. However, National Coal Board v Gamble 70  was 
endorsed implying that the secondary party may just have had to act voluntarily.71  It 
was shown earlier in this thesis that merely requiring an accomplice to act voluntarily 
is not a high level mental element.72 Jogee does not change this. 
 
Intention versus knowledge 
The Supreme Court 73  continued that this intention ‘requires knowledge of any 
existing facts necessary for it to be criminal’. Ormerod observed that the Court ‘has 
been less rigorous with the language than might have been expected’.74 He referred 
to the use of the term ‘intention’ which is then said to require ‘knowledge’. In this way, 
the Court appeared to equate intention with knowledge. 75  Yet, in the area of 
conspiracy, it has been established that knowledge is a true belief and relates to a 
present set of facts, whereas intention relates to a future set of facts.76 Therefore, an 
accomplice cannot show future intention by having some sort of present knowledge. 
                                            
69 ibid [9] (Lord Toulson and Lord Neuberger). 
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72 Above, 37-40. 
73 Jogee (n 1) [9] (Lord Toulson and Lord Neuberger). 
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In Ormerod’s view, use of the word ‘intention’, instead of ‘knowledge’, was what the 
Supreme Court intended and would have been more accurate. If so, the discussion in 
the case of foresight becomes relevant, because what is intended depends on what 
is foreseen.77 
 
While Ormerod is correct that knowledge often speaks to the present and intention to 
the future, knowledge could be important to prove conditional intention by a 
secondary party. Jogee held that there was still a role for conditional intention in 
complicity, one that will be argued below may now be increasingly used by the 
prosecution.78 This is where knowledge may become relevant. The accessory must 
have knowledge of the possible conditional collateral crime, in order to conditionally 
intend it. The secondary party cannot know the future actions of the principal (future 
facts can be known but not future actions of another participant) so the present 
knowledge of the principal’s plan to commission the future conditional target crime, if 
necessary, may be relevant.79  
 
This is where Maxwell80 and Bainbridge81 are important. These cases held that the 
knowledge of the secondary party of a range of potential crimes means that they had 
the conditional intention that the primary actor would carry out one of these crimes.82 
Maxwell was endorsed in Jogee.83 
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The use of the phrase ‘knowledge of any existing facts necessary for it to be criminal’ 
in Jogee84 is similar to the phrase ‘knowledge of the essential matters’ frequently 
quoted prior to Jogee from Johnson v Youden.85 The phrase from Johnson v Youden 
was never easily understood by juries or lawyers and presumably the Supreme Court 
in Jogee were trying to assist with this. It is doubtful that merely replacing ‘essential 
matters’ with ‘existing facts’ will remove confusion because Jogee did not expand on 
the level of knowledge of these facts required necessary to provide a fixed, certain 
and prospective law.  
 
If intention and knowledge cannot be directly equated, Dyson has suggested that 
whether the secondary party believed that the principal would carry out the collateral 
offence should be the mental element.86 This would be hard to prove in practice.87 
The problem with belief is that a level of belief would need to be established, which 
may ultimately result in a form of recklessness by falling back on the need for 
foresight of the crime, which the Supreme Court was trying to avoid. 
The accessory’s level of knowledge of the principal’s crime 
The level of knowledge required by the accessory of the principal’s crime was not 
resolved in Jogee. Ormerod and Laird have confirmed that where knowledge is 
required, foresight should not be relevant because a defendant cannot know what will 
happen in the future.88 It was because of the strict nature of knowledge being in the 
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present tense that the courts started to dilute this mens rea requirement in 
Bainbridge and Maxwell, discussed earlier.89  
 
The judgment in Jogee90 later stated that the accomplice ‘does not have to “know” (or 
intend) in advance the specific form of crime that will be carried out’ and Maxwell was 
endorsed. It is sufficient that the crime carried out by the secondary party is within the 
range of possible offences, which the accessory intentionally assisted or encouraged 
the principal to commit.91 It appears that while the Supreme Court stated that the 
mens rea of complicity required knowledge of the essential matters of the crime, it 
immediately diluted this requirement. Foresight may still remain important in some 
circumstances, those where the accomplice encourages or assists the principal to 
commit one of a range of offences.92 
Does the accomplice have to intend the principal’s crime? 
In addition to the lack of clarity on intention and knowledge, the Supreme Court was 
not rigorous in its statement on the mens rea requirement of the accessory in relation 
to the principal’s offence. Jogee held that the accomplice should intend to assist or 
encourage the principal to act with the required mens rea for the offence.93 What this 
means has been the subject of subsequent debate.94 The wording is not clear and 
could have been more explicit. 
 
                                            
89 Above, 43-46. 
90 Jogee (n 1) [14] –[16]. 
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92 Virgo G, “The relationship between inchoate and accessorial liability’ (n 41) 6. 
93 Jogee (n 1)  [10]. 
94 See the debate between Buxton, ‘Jogee: upheaval in secondary liability for 
murder’ (n 40) and Dyson and Buxton, ‘Letter to the Editor’ (n 50). 
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What seems certain, however, is that the Supreme Court intended that the secondary 
party may intend the principal to carry out the offence, but this need not necessarily 
be the case.95 The accomplice need not intend the principal to carry out the offence 
in terms of it need not be her aim or purpose.96 A retailer carrying out her everyday 
business may deliberately sell a kitchen knife or baseball bat to a known violent 
criminal in order to progress her business, but it may not be her purpose to assist the 
criminal. However, Jogee confirmed that she might be liable as a secondary party. 
On this basis, it may not be fair to label the secondary party as a principal and 
furthermore, fair warning of an impending criminal offence may not have been 
provided. If the retailer does not have to intend the principal to carry out the offence, 
adequate warning that liability for that offence is not provided to the secondary party. 
 
Where an accessory provides the assistance prior to the commission of the offence, 
it will be even harder to be sure that they intended the principal to carry out the 
offence with the required mental element, particularly if the principal has not finalised 
her plans. However, Jogee confirmed that if the accessory, intending to help the 
principal, provides a weapon to enable the principal to carry out a crime in the future, 
this will be sufficient to convict the accessory, even if they do not care whether the 
crime is carried out. Intention is different to desire.97 This confirms National Coal 
Board v Gamble.98 The result is that Jogee does not necessarily resolve the potential 
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unfair labelling of a retailer as a murderer in accordance with our unitary system of 
liability, who is merely interested in furthering their business by the sale of an item to 
an individual with a propensity to crime.  
 
Dyson has argued that Jogee leaves a ‘gap for us in whether (the secondary party) 
intended the crime to take place’ because the case did not state that the accomplice 
had to have intended the crime to be carried out.99 Dyson’s preference was for this to 
be specifically included within the mens rea. If Jogee had required the accomplice to 
have a positive intent that the crime be committed then this would have provided a 
more principled approach to fair labelling. The mens rea of complicity would, without 
doubt, have been higher as a result and this may have been Dyson’s preference.  
 
In addition, the correspondence principle would have been fulfilled for specific intent 
crimes. The accomplice by her intentional encouragement or assistance would intend 
the primary actor to commit the offence. Also, both the principal and the accomplice 
would have to intend the substantive offence. Despite this, proving this intention may 
be hard for prosecutors. As it is, the accomplice just has to intend to assist or 
encourage the principal in her commission of the crime with the relevant mens rea. 
She does not have to intend the principal to commit the offence.  
 
Dyson’s alternative of a belief by the secondary party that the principal would carry 
out the crime may prove easier to establish but necessitates a level of belief similar 
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to foresight which existed prior to Jogee. It was this use of a foresight based mens 
rea that the Supreme Court was trying to amend in Jogee. 
 
Buxton agreed with Dyson that there is a gap in Jogee in relation to this aspect of the 
mental element for complicity. He concluded that  ‘we may in practice have arrived 
back at that case [Gamble] as the ruling authority’.100 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
actually endorsed Gamble in Jogee101 and the judgment includes an example of 
where it would be appropriate to direct the jury that it is sufficient that the secondary 
party intended to assist the principal to act with the required mental element. The 
example given was: 
… where D2 supplies a weapon to D1, who has no lawful purpose in 
having it, intending to help D1 by giving him the means to commit a 
crime (or one of a range of crimes), but having no further interest in what 
he does, or indeed whether he uses it at all.102 
 
This clearly shows that the Supreme Court does not require the secondary party to 
have intended the crime be committed to find liability. All that is required to justify 
liability is an intention by the accomplice to assist or encourage the principal to carry 
out the crime with whatever mental element makes up the crime. If the accessory 
selling the weapon has no interest in what the buyer does with it or whether they use 
it at all, even though she knows it is giving the principal the means to commit an 
offence, then the accessory does not desire or intend it to take place. It is not their 
aim or purpose that the gun is used in an offence. Despite this they are still liable as 
an accessory to whatever crime the principal carries out and can still be labelled with 
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the same offence as the principal. Jogee does not seem to resolve the fair warning 
or labelling issues of our unitary system of liability. 
 
In summary, the restatement of intention in Jogee as the requisite mental element for 
complicity may initially appear to help fulfil the principle of fair labelling because a 
secondary party has to assist or encourage every act of the principal. If a secondary 
party intends to assist or encourage the principal to commit a crime and does so, 
then it may be fair to label them as a principal. In addition, the decision appeared to 
improve the fair warning provided to potential criminals because, as shown in the 
previous chapter, merely allowing the foresight of a crime to provide the necessary 
mental element for an accessory did not provide adequate warning to them that they 
could be criminalised. They now have to intend to assist or encourage the offence. 
 
Further, individual autonomy is supported by the mens rea set out in Jogee.  By 
intending to assist or encourage the principal the accomplice is exercising his right to 
choose to do so.  
 
However, it has been shown above that this apparent improvement in fair labelling 
and fair warning may be too simplistic, due to the decision’s lack of clarity in respect 
of the accessory’s mental element in relation to the principal’s offence. This may also 
permit a breach of the principle of legality. It would be expected that a judgment from 
the Supreme Court, after so many years of academic debate and calls for reform, 
would clarify the law, not muddle it further. 
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In any event, unfair labelling may also arise from the restatement of mens rea in 
Jogee for a different reason. If a secondary party does not intend to assist or 
encourage the principal’s criminal offence, but is still reckless towards the principal’s 
offence, it may still be appropriate to hold them responsible, even if at a different 
level to an accomplice who intended to assist or encourage the primary actor.103 If a 
participant takes part in one crime but the principal carries out a collateral crime 
which was foreseen by the accomplice, should the secondary party’s contribution to 
the first crime not be considered by the jury to be encouragement of the second 
crime, then the reckless behaviour of the accomplice may not be criminalised at all. If 
Jogee decriminalises reckless complicity, then the acquittal of an accomplice may 
unfairly understate to the public, and the victim, the defendant’s fault. Furthermore, it 
would not reflect the individual autonomy of the secondary party that by participating 
in the initial joint venture they chose to continue, despite the unjustified risk of a 
subsequent collateral crime.  
 
What threshold of foresight is necessary for intention in complicity, post-Jogee and 
has the mens rea for accomplices been aligned with that of principals? 
Following Woollin, 104  there is now a high threshold of foresight for liability of a 
principal in the context of murder and that is foresight of a virtual certain result, death 
or serious harm. However, Woollin105 also held that this did not necessarily apply 
throughout the criminal law, although in practice it has become of general application. 
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Jogee held that the foreseeability of consequences in complicity can be evidence of 
intention to assist or encourage the principal offence but should ‘not necessarily be 
inferred’.106  Unfortunately, no threshold of the level of foreseeability for complicity 
was included in the judgment.107 There was no reference to Woollin and no guidance 
on the level of foresight of the collateral crime that is required in order to prove an 
intention to assist or encourage. If the secondary party believes that there is a small, 
but real, chance that the principal will intentionally act to commit a crime, it is 
uncertain whether the jury can infer the necessary intention to assist or encourage or 
whether there has to be a high level of foresight, as per Woollin.  
 
While it is disappointing that the level of foresight required to find an intention to 
assist or encourage was not set out in Jogee, this is unsurprising as it would not have 
been the constitutional role of the Supreme Court to analyse and amend the 
definition of intention in criminal law. The Court’s role was to reconsider the law of 
PAL, not the definition of intention. However, it would have been helpful if the 
decision had referred to Woollin in order to confirm whether the high level of foresight 
required for a principal to murder applied to accomplices as well, particularly as 
Jogee was a murder case.  Jogee, as a case on complicity, applies to crimes other 
than just murder, and so doubt remains as to the level of foresight required by 
accomplices in order to find an intention to assist or encourage other offences. 
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Instead, the judgment in Jogee held: 
…in the common law foresight of what might happen is ordinarily no 
more than evidence from which a jury can infer the presence of a 
requisite intention.108 
 
By using the word ‘might’ the Court in Jogee implied a potentially wider level of 
foresight in complicity than that from Woollin.109 The outcome from Jogee is that in 
the context of murder there are potentially differing thresholds for intention, 
dependent on whether the defendant is a principal or a secondary party.  
 
A breach of the wider application of the correspondence principle would arise 
because the mens rea for the principal differs from that of the accessory. If the 
defendant is a principal, then she must have foreseen that the death of the victim 
was virtually certain to have resulted as a consequence of her act, in order to be 
guilty of murder. On the other hand, an accomplice may be liable if they foresaw that 
the principal might kill the victim with intent, as long as this level of foresight was 
more than de minimis. 
 
This problem could be particularly acute in group crime where the prosecution cannot 
show which party was the principal.110 There could be an issue as to which threshold 
the jury should be directed to apply. This is unfortunate, resulting in a potential 
breach of the principles of legality and fair warning, because trial judges may give 
different directions to juries on this point.111 Inconsistencies in jury decisions may 
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arise. Furthermore, with this potentially much broader level of foresight left to the jury 
to decide, opinions are bound to differ. Unanimous decisions may be hard to reach. 
 
Chapter 1 illustrated that the mens rea for complicity of an intention to assist or 
encourage (endorsed by Gamble in Jogee) together with a low potential threshold of 
foresight, means that the accomplice must merely have acted voluntarily with a low 
level of foresight of the collateral crime. It is highly unlikely that this was what the 
Court in Jogee intended in their judgment. This approach would not achieve fair 
labelling or fair warning. It would not be fair to label an accomplice as a principal if 
she had merely acted voluntarily with a low level of foresight of the collateral crime.  
 
The law prior to Jogee allowed for a number of defendants to be convicted of an 
offence, even though it could not be established which party carried out the fatal act. 
This is a common scenario, particularly in group crime and spontaneous violence. 
The ability to try and convict offenders even if the primary actor could not be 
identified is paramount. Otherwise, it would be too easy for criminals to achieve 
acquittal by simply denying responsibility for the fatal act in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary. This may no longer be the case because the threshold of foresight 
required may vary dependent on the role of the participants. While this has not been 
problematic in other areas of criminal law (for example, the mens rea of the inchoate 
offence of conspiracy is different from the mens rea of the main offence) 112  it 
becomes a problem for the law of complicity when the principal in a group cannot be 
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identified. Further, it is important that juries can be given consistent directions when 
the principal cannot be identified.  
 
In addition, to provide a fair labelling system of criminal law, offences should leave no 
room for confusion, with open-ended concepts avoided.113 By not setting out the 
threshold of foresight necessary to provide evidence of intention, the requisite mens 
rea, following Jogee, is too vague to provide for fair labelling. If different trial judges 
direct juries in different ways then the label attached to the secondary party may not 
be applied consistently. All the concerns regarding fair labelling discussed in Chapter 
2 may reappear.114 
 
Simester differed to Ormerod in his approach to the definition of intention. He applied 
Woollin, without question, to the law of complicity following Jogee.115  However, he 
suggested that the decision in Jogee is equally as flawed.116 He posited that Jogee117 
held a retailer would be criminally complicit if they sold a baseball bat knowing that 
the primary actor was buying it to use as a weapon, just in case it was necessary, 
because the retailer would have intended to sell the bat to the principal.118 Simester 
adopted the definition of oblique intention from Woollin, to show that the retailer does 
not act so as to assist or encourage the primary actor, nor are they virtually certain 
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that the principal will use the bat to kill a victim. In his view, the retailer should not be 
liable as a secondary participant.  
 
On these facts and the definition of oblique intention from Woollin, Simester is 
correct. The retailer should not be liable. She was merely trying to progress her 
business venture. Even if she has some level of culpability, it should not be at the 
same level as the principal offender required by our unitary system of liability. 
Whether Ormerod’s or Simester’s view is right, both have a sound basis, the 
Supreme Court should have been clearer in their approach to this element of mens 
rea. While it was not the Supreme Court’s role in Jogee to reconsider the definition of 
intention per se, it would have been helpful to trial judges and juries if the Court had 
been more transparent on the level of foresight required to find intention in complicity. 
Instead, it has been left to the courts to reconsider. 
 
The Supreme Court recognised that the secondary party’s intention to assist or 
encourage may be co-extensive on the facts of the case with an intention by her that 
the crime be committed.119 Even where this is so, Jogee does not recognise the 
problem highlighted by Lord Steyn in Powell; English that ‘the real world proof of an 
intention sufficient for murder would be well nigh impossible in the vast majority of 
joint enterprise cases’.120 Jogee seems to ignore the practical difficulties of proving 
intention where a group of participants is involved. This was one of the advantages of 
the Chan Wing-Siu principle of equating foresight with intention. 
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It is clear from Jogee121 that the Court was endeavouring to bring the mens rea of an 
accessory to murder in line with the threshold for the principal. Yet it has been shown 
above that whether this has been achieved is uncertain. Jogee established that 
foresight of a crime by an accomplice can be evidence of an intention by her to assist 
the principal in their crime, but it is only evidence of this intention, not a substantive 
rule of law. The level of foresight necessary to find intention was not specified in 
Jogee and so the potential arises for differing thresholds dependent on whether the 
participant was an accomplice or principal. Differing thresholds may breach the 
principles of legality, fair warning, fair labelling and correspondence.  
 
The use of conditional intention in Jogee 
The aim in Jogee122 was to return the law to where it was before Chan Wing-Siu.123 
The judgment stated: 
…the proper course for this court is to re-state, as nearly and clearly as 
we may, the principles which had been established over many years 
before the law took a wrong turn. … The long-standing pre Chan Wing-
Siu practice of inferring intent to assist from a common criminal purpose 
which includes the further crime, if the occasion for it were to arise, was 
always a legitimate one; what was illegitimate was to treat foresight as 
an inevitable yardstick of common purpose.124 
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This quotation implies that the Justices intended a return to a ‘scope’ based 
approach. This was confirmed later in Jogee, when the Justices held that juries 
should be directed to consider: 
… whether they are sure that D1’s act was within the scope of the joint 
venture, that is, whether D2 expressly or tacitly agreed to a plan which 
included D1 going as far as he did, and committing crime B, if the 
occasion arose.125  
 
The term ‘scope’ is not set out by the Court, other than to say that to be liable the 
accomplice appears to have had to agree (expressly or by implication) to the later 
offence being carried out, if necessary. This is conditional intention.126 The secondary 
party intends the principal to carry out the collateral offence, if the circumstances 
require it.  
 
Jogee reinstated intention to assist or encourage the principal in his offence as the 
mental element for complicity. Yet, this idea of conditional intention may prevent the 
restatement of mens rea having the impact intended by the Supreme Court. While 
foresight by the defendant that the principal will kill or cause serious harm to the 
victim is only evidence of intention, the Supreme Court confirmed there was still a 
concept of conditional intention.127 Ormerod has speculated that the Court may have 
expected this concept to only apply in limited circumstances, but in practice a 
defendant convicted under Chan Wing-Siu may now be held liable by having a 
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conditional intention that the principal would carry out the crime.128 For example, if 
the parties agree to carry out a burglary and the secondary party intends the principal 
to cause serious harm to any intruder, should the situation arise, then this would be 
conditional intention and the secondary party would be liable for any serious harm 
caused by the primary actor. If the accomplice knew that the principal was carrying a 
weapon during the burglary, conditional intention may be easier to establish if the 
principal uses the weapon against an intruder.129 As a result, it is anticipated that 
prosecutors may now use this conditional intention route to overcome the demise of 
PAL. 
 
However, foresight by the accomplice of the principal’s crime as evidence of a 
conditional intention may mean that a juror’s role has got harder and a potential 
breach of the principle of legality could arise. Juries will have to be sure that by 
foreseeing a future potential crime the secondary party intended the principal to 
commit that crime. This will depend on the jury’s interpretation of the facts of the 
case. Some scenarios may be hard for them to read, particularly where the offence is 
unplanned and spontaneous.130 While juries are guided on the law by the trial judge, 
they have to interpret the facts of the case in accordance with the law. Law that is too 
fact based can lead to inconsistent jury decisions and an unclear basis of law. 
 
If conditional intention is proved, then the ability of the court to label the accomplice 
as a criminal may be fair. However, the question as to whether it is fair to label an 
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accomplice at the same level as the principal remains. This will depend on the facts 
and circumstances of the case. Whether potential offenders are aware of their 
potential liability based on conditional intention is doubted and the principle of fair 
warning may still not be fulfilled, following Jogee. 
 
Simester has suggested that conditional intention may have been mishandled in 
Jogee.131 Indeed, the inclusion of conditional intention appears to allow defendants to 
be criminalised based on foresight. Using Simester’s baseball bat example 
mentioned earlier,132 a retailer as a secondary party does not have a conditional 
intention at the time of the sale of the bat to the primary actor. It is the primary actor’s 
intention to use the bat that is conditional. 133  This would also apply where the 
assistance of the accomplice was provided sometime earlier, because the principal 
may not have decided what to do at the time of the accomplice’s assistance and 
encouragement.  
 
For Simester the discussion of conditional intention was a ‘red herring’.134 Doctrinally 
this is correct because all future conduct is conditional, either explicitly or implicitly.135 
If any conduct has not yet taken place then there is always the possibility that the 
actor may change their mind for some reason. Jogee appeared to continue the idea 
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raised in conspiracy cases136 that conditional intention is a special form of intention, 
yet all future intention is conditional. Jogee stated that  
‘If it (the jury) is satisfied also that D2 must have foreseen that, in the 
course of committing crime A, D1 might well commit crime B, it may in 
appropriate cases be justified in drawing the conclusion that D2 had 
the necessary conditional intent that crime B should be committed, if 
the occasion arose; or in other words that it was within the scope of the 
plan to which D2 gave his assent and intentional support’. 137   
 
This statement is doctrinally problematic because it implies that the jury may, but 
does not have to, find a conditional intention. Yet, all future conduct is conditional in 
some way. So this special form of intention may not exist. 
 
In complicity, the secondary party’s act is completed when her assistance or 
encouragement is finished. It is at that time that they must have the certain intention 
to assist or encourage the particular crime (or one of a range of crimes) that the 
principal carries out.138 The intention of present conduct can never be conditional by 
its very nature.139 Any previous conditions must have been resolved by the time of 
the conduct. At this point the principle of individual autonomy is upheld, because the 
accomplice made the choice to assist or encourage the principal with a particular 
mental element at that time.  
 
However, a secondary party cannot intend that the primary actor will do a particular 
future act because it is not necessarily virtually certain to happen. The principal is 
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open to change her mind beforehand. A secondary party cannot intend a principal’s 
future conduct but they can still desire it or believe it may take place. The secondary 
party can act in order to assist or encourage the principal to carry out a particular 
crime, but the secondary party cannot intend the principal’s crime (with the exception 
of procuring). She can only intend her own conduct of assisting or encouraging.  
 
Similar to Ormerod, Simester reflected on the lack of precision in Jogee.140 This is 
disappointing after years of academic debate and calls for reform.141 It is this lack of 
refinement which may leave open the possibility for a breach of the principle of 
legality, by being unclear and uncertain.  
 
Is there a lacuna in the law, following Jogee? 
With only intentional assistance or encouragement criminalised following Jogee, a 
lacuna in the law may arise if reckless participation is not covered by the Serious 
Crime Act 2007.142 There has been debate on the mens rea required under this Act 
but the trend seems to be towards a set of intentional inchoate offences.143 As a 
result, defendants who recklessly assist or encourage an offence may not be 
criminalised at any level, following Jogee. Moriarty provides an example: the principal 
who killed a victim while trying to disarm a gun found under the sofa at a drug fuelled 
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party could be charged with homicide.144 Despite this, whoever put the loaded gun 
under the sofa aided the homicide by providing the gun in the first place. If this was 
intentional assistance, then complicity would arise and the accomplice could be liable 
as the principal.  
 
If, on the other hand, no intentional assistance could be proved, liability as an 
accomplice to a homicide would not arise. Yet, they are culpable. If they saw the risk 
of the gun being used and still left it under the sofa for someone to find, they should 
be held responsible for their reckless actions. If a person was injured as a result of 
the use of the gun, the person who placed the gun ready to be found should bear 
responsibility for the results that follow from its use, even if at a different level to an 
accomplice who intended to assist or encourage the perpetrator.145  Jogee does not 
allow for liability in this factual scenario. 
 
By restating the mens rea for complicity as intention, unfair labelling may arise. 
Following Jogee, the potential decriminalisation of reckless accomplices may unfairly 
understate to the public and the victim the defendant’s fault. It would also not reflect 
the individual autonomy of the secondary party because they chose to provide 
reckless assistance or encouragement.  
 
Further, the correspondence principle is breached. The accomplice was reckless in 
their actions, yet no criminal liability attaches to these actions. It seems clear that a 
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lacuna in the law may exist, post-Jogee, and it follows that many of the principles of 
criminal law are compromised. 
 
The use of weapons to establish mens rea 
Jogee has improved the approach to establishing an intention to assist or encourage 
by an accomplice where a principal has used a weapon. The decision held: 
In particular, his (the accomplice’s) intention to assist in a crime of 
violence is not determined only by whether he knows what kind of 
weapon D1 has in his possession. The tendency which has developed 
in the application of the rule in Chan Wing-Siu to focus on what D2 knew 
of what weapon D1 was carrying can and should give way to an 
examination of whether D2 intended to assist in the crime charged.146 
 
Jogee recognised that the decision in Powell; English had resulted in judges focusing 
on whether the defendant knew the principal had a weapon and what weapon it was, 
instead of the intentions of the secondary party. By including the word ‘only’ in the 
above statement, it would appear a defendant could still claim that she did not intend 
to assist the principal, because she did not know that the principal had a particular 
weapon. However, this is not now the only factor to be considered. Whether she did, 
or did not, know the principal had a weapon may help provide evidence of what the 
secondary party intended. In any event this is to be decided by the jury.  
 
Discussing weapons, Jogee held: 
Very often he (the secondary party) may intend to assist in violence 
using whatever weapon may come to hand. In other cases he may think 
that D1 has an iron bar whereas he turns out to have a knife, but the 
difference may not at all affect his intention to assist, if necessary, in the 
causing of grievous bodily harm at least. 147  
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The Justices in Jogee specifically adopted the type of weapons used in the facts of 
Powell; English as an example. It is irrelevant whether a wooden post or a knife was 
used, all that matters is the secondary party’s intention. The issue is whether the 
accessory intended to assist in the principal’s infliction of grievous bodily harm or an 
intentional killing. The difference in weapon cannot be used to absolve the secondary 
party of liability, where she did have one of these intentions. This allows for the jury 
to ignore any difference in weapon and just consider the secondary party’s intention. 
Presumably Jogee was trying to prevent the use of fundamental difference rule 
where a different weapon was used.148 
 
This clarification of the law in relation to the use of weapons may also aid fair 
labelling. If the accomplice intended to assist in the infliction of serious harm or death 
and a fatality arose then it would be fair for the accomplice to be labelled with a 
homicide offence, whatever weapon was used. Jogee also allowed a court to 
consider how a weapon was used by the principal. This aids fair labelling because 
how a weapon is used may help establish the intentions of the accomplice to assist 
the principal in her offence. This removed earlier criticisms of Powell; English that the 
way a weapon was used was not taken into account under the Powell; English 
direction and Jogee placed greater reliance of the principle of legality by providing a 
clear and consistent law. 
 
Lord Toulson and Lord Hughes continued: 
Knowledge or ignorance that weapons generally, or a particular weapon, 
is carried by D1 will be evidence going to what the intention of D2 was, 
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and may be irresistible evidence one way or the other, but it is evidence 
and no more.149  
 
It is for a jury to decide based on all the evidence. This still leaves the secondary 
party open to claiming that they were not aware that the principal had a weapon and 
so they did not intend to assist the principal to use the weapon, hoping that the court 
would decide that the use of the weapon was an overwhelming supervening act.150  
 
Manslaughter as an alternative verdict, following Jogee 
Jogee confirmed that a secondary party who took part in a crime which led to the 
death of a victim could be liable for murder or manslaughter, dependent on their 
mens rea.151 If an accomplice is part of a group attacking a victim but without the 
mens rea for murder, but the violence escalates and proves fatal, then the secondary 
party will be liable for manslaughter and not murder.152 This is because they did not 
intend to kill or cause serious harm. This approach concurs with the liability of the 
accomplice being derived from the principal’s act alone.153 
 
However, the cases relied on in Jogee to support an alternative verdict of 
manslaughter were surprising. Reid154 and Smith (Wesley)155 were included to show 
that a participant who did not have the intention to kill or cause serious harm, but 
took part in an attack, could be liable for manslaughter, even if the principal was 
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guilty of murder. 156  Yet, in Smith the principal was actually also convicted of 
manslaughter, not murder. Similarly, neither Reid nor Smith made any direct 
reference to complicity or the 1861 Act at all. The courts in these cases focused on 
the liability of the defendant for manslaughter as a result of an unlawful act and 
whether the participants were acting together as part of that unlawful act to give rise 
to a manslaughter verdict. These were inappropriate cases for Jogee to follow, which 
was a clear case of complicity. 
 
Furthermore, it is unclear from Jogee whether this liability of the accessory is as a 
principal to manslaughter or as a secondary party to a homicide.157 Dyson correctly 
suggests that the better route is via complicity. As a secondary party she would have 
assisted or encouraged an unlawful act which caused death. As a principal, she 
would have had to directly cause the fatality. However, the actions of the individual 
who carried out the stabbing may break the chain of causation required for 
manslaughter of the assister as a principal. Liability as a secondary party would be 
the preferred route and it is anticipated that this was the intention of the Supreme 
Court, albeit the Court was not specific on this point. 
 
Following Jogee, convictions for murder are likely to reduce but convictions for 
manslaughter will increase, as accessories start to plead that they did not have the 
intention to cause serious harm or to kill. Where group violence results in a fatality all 
the active participants will be open to a manslaughter conviction.158 This will give the 
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judge more flexibility in sentencing, which can be from outright acquittal to a life 
sentence, dependent on the judge’s view of the culpability of the accomplice.159 The 
facts of each case can be taken into account, including mitigating circumstances. The 
discretion of judges in terms of sentencing allows for fair labelling to be better 
reflected in comparison with the law prior to Jogee.  
 
This approach also reduces the potential for unfair labelling in some factual 
circumstances where, prior to Jogee, there was a complete acquittal of a secondary 
party in accordance with the fundamental difference rule in Powell; English. 160 
Following Jogee, where an accomplice cannot be shown to have intended to assist 
or encourage the principal in the crime of murder, but only an intention to cause 
some harm which results in death, the accomplice may now be liable to 
manslaughter.161 Therefore, the accomplice is not completely relieved of liability and 
instead, is labelled as a manslaughterer. 162   
 
The relationship of complicity with the correspondence principle is also improved. 
The actions of an accomplice are criminalised in accordance with a mens rea that 
relates directly to their actions.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the possibility of an alternative manslaughter verdict for a 
secondary party, when the principal is liable for murder, appears to conflict with s 8 of 
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the 1861 Act, which requires an accessory to be tried, indicted and punished as a 
principal offender.163 The principal carried out a murder but the accessory is only 
guilty of manslaughter. Under s 8 if the principal commits murder then the accessory 
should be convicted of murder and the judge reflects the extent of the accessory’s 
role through sentencing with different starting tariffs.164 It also seems awkward to say 
the accomplice encouraged manslaughter if the primary actor did not carry out 
manslaughter.165 It cannot be said that that the accessory assisted or encouraged the 
primary actor’s actual crime, murder, because the principal carried out a different 
crime to the one with which the accomplice is labelled as having assisted.  
 
Despite the above criticisms, the restatement of intention as the requisite mental 
element of the accessory in Jogee is important. If the accessory intends the principal 
to carry out an offence with whatever mental element is expected, then they will be 
punished as a principal offender in accordance with s 8. Where the accomplice does 
not intend the principal to carry out an offence, say an intentional killing (murder) but 
intends them to cause only actual bodily harm, the accessory cannot be liable under 
s 8 because they do not have the intention to assist the principal’s offence. 
Nevertheless, the accomplice should be held responsible for their contribution, even 
if their intentions were different to that of the primary actor and that is where 
manslaughter can be substituted following Jogee. 
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The issue for the jury then becomes a matter of evidence as to what the accomplice 
intended. Following a change of evidence by the primary witness, it was shown at the 
retrial in Jogee that the accomplice only intended to commit actual bodily harm (not 
serious harm or death as first proved at the initial trial). As a result, Jogee was held 
liable for manslaughter.166 In spite of this, s 8 does not incorporate provision for an 
alternative offence.167 Derivative liability for a lesser-included offence168 should only 
be possible when the accomplice intentionally assists or encourages an offence, 
which is part of a greater substantive offence.169 
 
A manslaughter verdict for a secondary party appears to accord with the fair labelling 
principle on the basis that if there is no intention to assist or encourage the principal 
in the causing of death or serious harm, it would be wrong to label her as a murderer. 
However, to label an offender with manslaughter can only be justified by transferred 
liability. Liability transfers from the principal’s offence of murder which took place, to 
manslaughter which might have taken place.170 To label an offender for a crime that 
could, but did not, take place, seems to go against the principles of fair labelling, fair 
warning and correspondence. Baker has argued that the accomplice should not be 
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convicted of manslaughter because it is not a lesser-included offence to murder, but 
an alternative offence with different elements.171  
 
Instead of the manslaughter verdict from Jogee, Baker recommended an accomplice 
be charged for an inchoate crime under ss 44 and 45 of the Serious Crime Act 
2007.172 If an accomplice were labelled as an inchoate offender, this would more 
accurately reflect fair labelling for their crime. The accessory encouraged or assisted 
in an offence (say actual bodily harm) that did not take place, instead grievous bodily 
harm or killing by the principal took place. The label attached to the accessory under 
ss 44 and 45 more accurately reflects the fact that the crime they had intended to 
assist did not take place. Baker’s argument has depth because if the principal has 
deliberately departed from the plan to cause actual bodily harm and instead caused 
serious harm or even death, all we know is that the accomplice attempted to assist 
an assault contrary to s 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.173 It cannot 
be proved whether that assault would have caused death, had it taken place, giving 
rise to a manslaughter charge.174  
 
Therefore, to allow fair labelling and fair warning, the inchoate offences of the 
Serious Crime Act 2007 should be invoked. Also, the correspondence principle would 
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be more accurately fulfilled because the mental attitude of an intention to assist by 
the accomplice would match the attempted act actually carried out. 
 
These issues are compounded because Jogee is of general application to the 
criminal law175 and what the position will be in non-homicide cases is unclear.176 A 
problem arises where the accomplice does not intend to assist or encourage the 
principal in his crime but is still culpable in some way. If there is no lesser-included 
offence, it is uncertain how the jury should be directed and the accomplice may be 
relieved of liability. This could also be an illustration of unfair labelling by being too 
lenient. For example, where the principal intends to commit theft but the accomplice 
is reckless as to locking a door and is aware of the risk of theft as a result. There is 
no lesser-included offence to theft and so the accomplice could be acquitted, unless 
negligence could be proved.  
 
It has been suggested that Jogee alters the established law of unlawful act 
manslaughter.177 This could form an inquiry in its own right and does not form part of 
this thesis on grounds of space. 
 
Leave to appeal and the requirement for a substantial injustice 
A change in the law can lead to a surge in the number of appeals. In order to allay 
these fears, the Supreme Court specifically referred to the effect of Jogee on past 
convictions. It was said that in order for an appeal to be successful, if out of time, 
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exceptional leave of the Court of Appeal must be given and they would only grant this 
leave if a ‘substantial injustice’ could be shown.178 An appeal would not be allowed 
simply because the law had changed. This was justified in part by reference to earlier 
drink driving cases where the court had expressed its concern of ‘alarming 
consequences’ from allowing the general reopening of old cases.179  The offence of 
murder, however, is very different to dangerous driving and the sentences are 
different to reflect this. 180 
 
The phrase ‘substantial injustice’ has been described as ‘elusive’.181 Indeed, if a 
secondary party has been labelled a murderer instead of guilty of manslaughter, this 
must be a substantial injustice. It results in a stigma to the defendant for life.182 That 
person is labelled as one of the ‘most heinous offenders against social norms’.183 
Furthermore, there is a great difference in the starting point for sentencing between 
the two offences.  
 
Similarly, Jogee held that an appeal should be allowed despite a time lapse.184 This 
is a good decision of the Supreme Court. If somebody was wrongly convicted of 
murder, and labelled as a murderer many years ago, there is no reason why that 
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should be ignored in favour of a defendant convicted more recently. 185  To the 
contrary, there would be a greater injustice to the person convicted historically. She 
will have spent more time in prison and labelled as a murderer based on an 
erroneous decision. This could be a ‘substantial injustice’. 
 
It is understandable that the Court in Jogee wished to limit the potential number of 
appeals following their restatement of the law but ‘substantial injustice’ needed 
defining or an alternative set of words adopted. This would have provided clarity to 
Jogee and helped fulfil the principle of legality. This issue may have been 
compounded by the first Court of Appeal decision following Jogee. Johnson186 held 
that first the Court of Appeal should consider whether a substantial injustice had 
been suffered and, if so, was the conviction unsafe. The reverse would be more 
appropriate. The decision should be made as to whether the conviction was unsafe 
and then had a substantial injustice been suffered, because no appeal would be 
available unless the conviction was unsafe.187 This would save court time. 
 
Buxton raised two issues, which may have an impact on fair labelling for the 
defendant. First, facts could arise where the conviction is unsafe, based on Jogee, 
but a substantial injustice is not found for policy reasons. If Buxton is correct, it would 
be unfair to label an offender as a principal if her conviction was unsafe, particularly if 
the offence is murder with the stigma attached. Second, Buxton suggested that 
substantial injustice considerations could be used as a ‘makeweight’ where a 
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conviction is unlikely to be unsafe but this is not absolute.188 In Hall,189 part of the 
Johnson appeal applications, the Court asked the question:  
Can it therefore be said that there is a sufficiently strong case that the 
defendant would not have been convicted of murder if the law had been 
explained to the jury as set out in R v Jogee? 
 
In their view, the answer was no and the appeal was dismissed. This may be the 
correct decision for the facts of this particular case, but Buxton has suggested that 
this test from Johnson may put the threshold for unsafety too high. In other words, 
there has to be a high level of certainty that the defendant would have been found 
not guilty under Jogee, before an appeal will be allowed. It is understandable that the 
Court of Appeal in Johnson was keen not to open the floodgates to out of time 
appeals. However, it may not be fair to label an offender as a principal, particularly 
where a fatality is concerned, if there is a possibility, even if it is a low possibility, that 
she may have been acquitted under Jogee.  
 
Since Jogee, the first appeal where the defendant was able to show a substantial 
injustice, Crilly,190 confirmed the need for a high threshold from Johnson. The appeal 
was allowed due to the particular facts of the case. However, Crilly confirmed that for 
an appeal to be successful the judgment in a case must have been based on 
foresight.191If the evidence cannot safely infer an intention for the collateral offence to 
be committed, then the judgment may cause a substantial injustice and leave for 
appeal will be granted. This supports the basis of the judgment in Jogee. 
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The term ‘substantial injustice’ is discussed above in the context of its use in Jogee. 
This thesis does not consider the term in the wider context of the general theory of 
justice on grounds of space. 
 
Does PAL/joint enterprise exist post-Jogee? 
The answer to this question depends on the use and definition of the term ‘joint 
enterprise’. The term was used by academics192 and judges193 in different ways. This 
has been part of the reason for the complicated nature of this doctrine.194 
 
Prior to Jogee, ‘joint enterprise’ was used as an ‘umbrella term’,195 referring to all 
complicity liability.196 Dyson has shown that when searching Westlaw for cases in 
2014, all 68 cases found used the term ‘joint enterprise’ to describe offences of basic 
accessorial liability on the basis that they were ‘in it together’.197 These words are 
more correctly words of basic accessorial liability because if they were ‘in it together’ 
then the accessory must have assisted or encouraged the principal with a common 
purpose in mind that was intended. ABCD added to the confusion when it held that 
there were three different uses of the term ‘joint enterprise’ which included both basic 
complicity and PAL.198  
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Baker referred to ‘joint enterprise’ as the initial joint criminal venture out of which a 
collateral offence may arise.199 This form of ‘joint enterprise’ will still exist post-Jogee 
because there will continue to be group crime. To avoid confusion, it is 
recommended in this thesis that the use of the term ‘joint enterprise’ in this context 
should be avoided altogether. Instead, another term should be used to refer to group 
violence.200 
 
The definition of joint enterprise as group crime is different to the rule discussed in 
Chan Wing-Siu, which was based on the idea that defendants could be convicted for 
foreseen collateral offences of the primary actor, beyond those agreed as part of the 
joint venture. This was also termed ‘joint enterprise’ by the Court in ABCD201 but 
more recently labelled PAL in both Gnango202 and Jogee, in an attempt to avoid the 
previous confusion. 
 
Jogee appeared to remove the possibility of any prosecutions for PAL altogether.203 
The decision held that ‘there is no reason why ordinary principles of secondary 
liability should not be of general application’. 204  The secondary party must now 
                                            
199 Baker, Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity (n 21). 
200 Confusion on terminology remains post-Jogee as can be seen in Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region v Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87, (2016) 19 
HKCFAR 640 where the HKCFA thought abolishing PAL would also abolish basic 
joint enterprise. 
201 ABCD (n 193) (Lord Hughes). 
202 Gnango (n 193). 
203 Persuad S and Hughes C dispute this in [2016] ‘In Practice: Joint enterprise’ LSG 
11 Apr 22 and state that Jogee has not done away with joint enterprise, but they 
seem to be in the minority. 
204 Jogee (n 1) [76]. 
 144 
physically assist or encourage every crime for which they are to be held liable.205 
This is the backbone of why PAL no longer exists.206 While Chan Wing-Siu appeared 
to create a separate route to liability, which became known as joint enterprise (then 
PAL) for where a principal goes beyond what was originally agreed between the 
parties, Jogee held that these actions can be covered by the Accessories and 
Abettors Act 1861. It would seem that there is now no need for a separate doctrine (if 
there ever was one) and PAL no longer exists as a legal rule.  
 
Stark, commenting on Jogee, has said that following this case ‘ordinary accessorial 
liability is all there is’.207 Dyson believes that Jogee has ‘shorn off’ joint enterprise 
(PAL) from criminal law. In his view ‘parasitic complicity is history’.208 Simester says 
‘…that boat has now sailed from English shores. No longer can S become guilty of 
foreseen ancillary crimes by pursuing a shared criminal purpose with P. S must be a 
party directly to any crime of which S is convicted. Extended joint criminal purpose 
(terminology from Australia) is thus interred, at least for now’.209 The trend is that PAL 
as a separate doctrine no longer exists. 
 
Undoubtedly, the basic form of joint enterprise referring to general group criminal 
offences will remain. With the demise of PAL there are now only three bases of 
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liability.210 A criminal can now be liable as a principal (or joint principal), having 
carried out the actus reus with the relevant mens rea, or as an accessory under 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 because she assisted or encouraged the 
principal in the acts which made up the crime, or under the Serious Crime Act 2007 
for an inchoate offence.211  
 
If there is no separate liability for PAL because it falls within ordinary secondary 
liability, the secondary party must assist or encourage every act of the principal to be 
liable as an accessory.212 It follows that, in secondary liability, it does not matter 
whether the accomplice assists or encourages the principal in a crime with or without 
the prior agreement of the principal, or whether the accomplice aids or abets the 
principal in one crime but the primary actor goes on to commit a second crime, the 
same legal rules apply.  
 
In the case of a burglary by two defendants where one of them goes on to commit 
murder of the occupier who confronts them, the accomplice must now intentionally 
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assist or encourage the principal to commit the murder to be guilty of murder. This 
thesis advocates that this approach is what the Supreme Court intended. Yet, earlier 
sections in this chapter have shed doubt on this simplistic interpretation of intention. 
However, if PAL always was part of complicity, the assistance or encouragement for 
the collateral offence must have been provided by the secondary party’s participation 
in the initial criminal venture. 
 
Whether the secondary party has in fact assisted or encouraged the principal 
continues, after Jogee, to fall to the jury to decide. Different juries may have different 
views on both assistance and more particularly encouragement, although this is no 
different to the law before Jogee. What one jury may consider encouragement, 
another may not. A breach of the principle of legality may arise in view of the 
potential for inconsistent decisions. This is inherent in a jury system but provides 
flexibility in individual circumstances. This flexibility allows for juries to take into 
account all the evidence, facts and circumstances of each defendant in each case.  
 
The general application of Jogee to criminal law 
It has been debated as to whether Jogee applies only to murder or whether it applies 
throughout the criminal law.213 Dyson believes that Jogee applies throughout the 
criminal law.214 Buxton said that it ‘may do so’,215 although added that a subsequent 
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court may hold that the Supreme Court were simply eradicating the doctrine of joint 
enterprise (if it existed in the first place).216  
 
While Jogee was based on the offence of murder, the Court did not state that their 
decision was confined to murder. In fact, the first few paragraphs of the judgment 
introduce the basic law of complicity under the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. 
This Act covers all areas of complicity, not just murder. Similarly, in the paragraphs 
setting out the restatement of the principles, there is no reference to the newly 
enunciated law applying only to murder.217  Therefore, it seems likely that the new 
approach applies to most areas of criminal law. Indeed, the previous approach under 
Chan Wing-Siu also applied throughout the criminal law, so there is no reason why 
this should change. This thesis assumes that Jogee applies to all relevant areas of 
criminal law. 
 
Conclusion  
Jogee restated intention to assist or encourage as the mens rea for complicity 
following years of uncertainty as a result of the conflation of the mens rea for basic 
complicity and parasitic liability. 218  This decision appears to have been made 
following concerns that the application of PAL had produced significant injustice.219 
Despite this restatement of mens rea, it has been shown above that many issues 
remain unresolved following Jogee.  
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The Supreme Court restated the principles of complicity but provided little by way of 
detail to support their restatement, in terms of examples for future reference by the 
lower courts. Too much has been left for the jury to decide. The jury must decide 
whether the accomplice has assisted or encouraged the principal, even if by mere 
presence or association. The jury must decide whether the accomplice intended to 
assist or encourage the principal with the relevant knowledge of the offence. The jury 
must decide whether foresight of the collateral offence provides the necessary 
intention for complicity. The jury must decide if there has been an overwhelming 
supervening event that relieves the accomplice of liability for the principal’s offence. 
The result is increased pressure on the jury, which may lead to inconsistent decisions 
due to limited guidance from the Supreme Court as to how juries should be directed 
by trial judges. Inconsistent decisions could signify a potential breach of the principle 
of legality due to the law not being fixed clear and prospective.  
 
Jogee did not enter into or resolve some of the debates from earlier cases and may 
have raised further issues. For example, there is little reference in Jogee to the 
causation debate. On the one hand Jogee held that the assistance or 
encouragement need not have an impact on the actions of the principal, implying that 
the acts of the accomplice need not cause the result, yet later the decision referred to 
an overwhelming supervening event which may break the chain of causation 
between the actions of the accessory and those of the principal. Furthermore, this 
simply appears to be the fundamental difference rule under a new name.  
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However, the primary change from Jogee relates to mens rea, but even this is not 
rigorously laid out. The judgment seems to equate intention with knowledge and 
there is ongoing uncertainty regarding the threshold of foresight necessary for juries 
to find an intention of the accomplice. The outcome is a potential breach of the 
principles of correspondence, legality, fair labelling and fair warning. The use of 
conditional intention is anticipated to replace the foresight test but conditional 
intention may not be an appropriate tool in complicity, as all future intentions are 
conditional. In any event, there is a fine line between conditional intention and 
foresight as evidence of an intention to commit a crime, which will be left to the jury to 
decide. As a result, it is important that judges give consistent directions to juries, but 
little guidance to the lower courts is provided in Jogee. These issues provide further 
potential for a breach of the principle of legality, fair labelling and fair warning. 
 
Jogee has not provided advice on what the secondary party’s mental state must be 
as to whether the principal will commit the crime, other than to endorse Gamble, 
which merely required the accomplice to act voluntarily. An individual merely going 
about their lawful business may still be liable as an accomplice, if they are merely 
reckless towards a principal’s offence. It appears that the fair labelling and fair 
warning issues that existed prior to Jogee may well remain. 
 
Similarly, the restatement of mens rea of intention to assist or encourage the 
principal offence requires the accessory to aid every offence of the principal and so 
appears to improve the fair labelling and fair warning of complicity. However, a 
lacuna in the law may arise resulting in a potential for reckless complicity to go 
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unpunished. This may result in unfair labelling by being too lenient on some 
offenders who recklessly aid a principal offence.  
 
There are also concerns whether complicity alone can accommodate the fast moving 
developments of violent group crime, which often escalate rapidly and which were 
previously accommodated within PAL.220 Simester has predicted that this could result 
in pressure to restore PAL or the dilution of the mens rea of basic complicity again.221 
He suggests that PAL could have been ‘tweaked to avoid overreach’.222 How this 
could be achieved is beyond the scope of this thesis on grounds of space. However, 
it is clear that PAL had prosecutorial advantages in situations of violence that could 
quickly get out of hand. Placing more decisions on the jury was not necessarily the 
best solution to the injustice caused by PAL. In any event, the injustice from Chan 
Wing-Siu and Powell; English may have been caused more by the injustice of the law 
of murder and the mandatory life sentence, rather than PAL itself.223  
 
Further, while Jogee confirmed that prior agreement between the parties is no longer 
a requirement for liability, the prosecution now has to prove that every participant 
intentionally assisted or encouraged the crime of the principal. In cases of large-scale 
violence this may prove difficult to achieve, resulting in potential criminals being 
acquitted of any homicide with unfair labelling consequences (if manslaughter is not 
an alternative verdict). While an acquittal does not label a defendant, unfair labelling 
arises because the acquittal may be too lenient from a victim’s perspective. 
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By restating the mens rea of complicity as an intention to assist or encourage, the 
Supreme Court were almost certainly attempting to remove some of the injustices 
caused by PAL. In doing so, it initially appears to improve issues of fair labelling, fair 
warning, and correspondence. Also, it allows for individual autonomy. On closer 
analysis, issues with the compliance of these principles remain, due to less than 
careful wording. 
 
Adopting recklessness as the mental element for complicity was an alternative.224 
Prior to his involvement in the Jogee case itself, Dyson had suggested that if a risk-
based test for fault in violent group crime were to be used, the accepted definition of 
common law recklessness should be adopted.225 In his view, albeit as a second best 
to intention, the test of foreseeing a risk and going on to unjustifiably taking that risk 
could be applied across all of secondary liability.226 This could be more rigorous, 
practical and consistent with other areas of criminal law.227  
 
Dyson’s approach would have improved the relationship of the mens rea for 
secondary liability with many of the principles of criminal law. By only criminalising 
unjustified risk taking, the principles of correspondence, fair labelling and fair warning 
are better fulfilled. If a defendant foresees a risk of an offence taking place and 
continues to participate, it is more likely to be fair to label them with the same crime 
as the principal. If it was unjustifiable for them to take that risk, fair warning has been 
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considered. There would be greater correspondence between the foresight of the 
principal’s offence and the accomplice’s mens rea requirement. Furthermore, the 
inconsistency of the dual risk-taking approach, which existed prior to Jogee, is 
removed. Having one test for risk taking instead of two would also make the role of 
the jury more straightforward.228 This would help secondary liability fulfil the principle 
of legality by providing a consistent approach.  
 
Finally, the use of manslaughter as an alternative verdict also raises concerns. A 
manslaughter verdict for a secondary party initially appears to accord with the fair 
labelling principle, because if there is no intention to assist or encourage the principal 
in the causing of death or serious harm it would be wrong to label her as a murderer 
and a conviction for manslaughter would be a better approach. However, it has been 
shown that doctrinally it could be incorrect to approach the convictions of co-
participants in this way. It could be wrong to label an offender with a crime that did 
not take place. This also goes against the derivative nature of complicity. On the 
other hand, the principle of correspondence would be better fulfilled because the act 
carried out by the accessory would correspond with the requisite mental element. 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to show that while Jogee appeared to improve the 
relationship of complicity with the principles of legality, fair warning, fair labelling, 
correspondence and individual autonomy, this apparent improvement may not be as 
great as it is anticipated the Supreme Court might have liked.  On closer reading and 
analysis, the judgment may actually raise further issues resulting in a potential for 
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continuing breaches of these principles and confusion in terms of mens rea. 
Furthermore, the debate on causation in complicity remains post-Jogee.
 153 
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has examined the law of complicity and also the doctrine of PAL, which 
existed in England and Wales prior to February 2016, in relation to a set of evaluative 
principles of criminal law. This work includes consideration of the most recent case to 
reach the Supreme Court on complicity, Jogee, 1  and whether this decision has 
improved the issues raised. This chapter sets out the main findings of this research 
and draws on findings across the various chapters. 
 
Three principal claims have been made in this research. The first is that in some 
factual scenarios, the law of basic complicity breached many of the principles of 
criminal law, prior to Jogee. Furthermore, the causal contribution required of an 
accomplice was unclear and the mental element was diluted over the years. The 
second claim relates to PAL. This thesis suggests that the breaches of the principles 
of criminal law found in relation to complicity were even greater for PAL. The final 
claim is that the most recent case, Jogee, has not resolved these breaches and any 
changes made will have little impact on the law of complicity in practice. Further, 
Jogee may have muddled the law by creating additional issues, particularly in relation 
to the interpretation of intention in complicity and the level of foresight required for a 
jury to find intention in complicity.  
 
Each of these claims is summarised in turn below. The first claim is that before 
Jogee, standard complicity breached many of the principles of criminal law. It was 
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shown in Chapter 2, that while complicity allows for a wide variety of accomplices 
with both minor and major contributions to the principal’s offence, the unitary basis of 
liability could be harsh on some accessories. It does not allow for differing 
contributions made by secondary parties to be reflected in their conviction. 
Parliament appears to have given preference to the practical advantages of the 
unitary system, at the expense of complying with the criminal law principles.  
 
For example, the role of individual autonomy in complicity is contradictory. An 
accomplice may choose to assist or encourage the principal in their offence but a 
system that allows the accomplice to be charged and convicted as a principal ignores 
the autonomy of the principal to act as a novus actus interveniens. Furthermore, 
whether the actions of the secondary party have to cause the principal offence has 
never been settled and it seems that the courts will allow an attenuated causal 
influence of the accomplice to be recognised.  
 
Moving on to the mens rea for complicity, it seems that the apparent simplicity of an 
intention to assist or encourage an offence is deceiving. In truth, the mens rea has 
been hard to define. The requirement of an intention to assist or encourage appears 
to fulfil the correspondence principle. However, it has been shown that an intention of 
the accomplice to assist or encourage merely requires them to have acted 
voluntarily. There was no requirement for the accessory to intend the principal to 
carry out the substantive offence. In any event, the mental attitude of the accomplice 
towards the conduct and fault element of the principal’s criminal offence was diluted 
over the years to a form of recklessness. Yet, in the context of murder, a principal 
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had to intend to kill or cause serious harm to be liable. It follows that the differing 
mental attitudes between an accomplice and a principal to murder breached the 
correspondence principle, adopting the wider approach to correspondence set out in 
the Introduction.2  
 
Part of the problem is that no statutory definition of mens rea in complicity has been 
provided by Parliament, leaving it to the courts to decide. A strict interpretation of the 
requirement of knowledge of the essential matters of the principal’s offence, from the 
most commonly cited case on mens rea in complicity, Johnson v Youden,3 could 
have led to undue leniency to some accomplices. This resulted in a dilution of mens 
rea to allow for conviction of a secondary party if she turned a blind eye or was aware 
of the range of crimes that the primary actor intended to commit. This dilution of 
mens rea resulted in breaches of the principles of fair warning and legality. 
 
Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 also raises issues of fair 
labelling, by allowing accomplices to be labelled and convicted as principals. The 
accomplice can be given the same label, yet it is the principal who makes the 
decision, as an autonomous agent, whether or not to commit the substantive offence 
and may make the decision not to do so. Furthermore, the primary actor need not be 
encouraged by the actions of the accomplice.4 It is unfair to label an encourager as 
the principal when their contribution did not have an effect on the conduct of the 
primary actor. 
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An issue of fair labelling in complicity also arises because the definition of aiding, 
now assisting or encouraging, is broad, resulting in uncertainty with the potential for a 
breach of the principle of legality. 5 A jury is open to find almost anything as aiding 
leading to inconsistent decisions. This leads on to the second claim in this research. 
 
The second claim in this thesis is that the breaches of these principles found in 
relation to complicity were even greater for PAL. In PAL the arguments for the 
causation theory upholding liability were even more remote than for basic accessorial 
liability. This is because it was hard to say that an accomplice, who merely foresaw 
the possibility of the second crime, had caused the offence. Yet, in accordance with 
the unitary theory of liability, the accomplice was liable for the principal’s collateral 
crime. Furthermore, similar to the problem in complicity, the principle of individual 
autonomy suggests that the primary actor would assume responsibility for their own 
actions, thereby relieving any other party involved.6 As a result, any suggestion that 
the secondary party who has contributed to a PAL is liable for a collateral offence of a 
principal appears to go against this fundamental principle.7  
 
On the other hand, the mens rea for PAL and basic complicity eventually merged so 
that both required a form of recklessness. The lower mens rea following the PAL 
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route to liability meant it was easier for prosecutors to use PAL against secondary 
parties than to charge them in accordance with the Accessories and Abettors Act 
1861. The result was two standards of risk taking: foresight of a substantial or real 
risk for secondary parties to a PAL and traditional recklessness, defined as foresight 
of a risk by a principal, which was unjustifiably taken. 
 
At the same time, PAL breached the principles of fair labelling, fair warning, legality 
and correspondence, particularly where a homicide arose. Secondary parties who 
participated in group crime could be convicted of murder and labelled a murderer, yet 
they had only foreseen the possibility of death or serious harm. They did not have to 
intend death or serious harm themselves. The actions of the accessory did not 
correlate with their mental attitude leading to a breach of the correspondence 
principle. A breach of this principle also arose in relation to a murder, and other 
specific intent crimes, because while the principal would only be liable if they 
intended to kill or cause serious harm, the accomplice could be liable on mere 
foresight that the principal may intentionally kill or cause serious harm. The mens rea 
for the secondary party did not correspond with that of the principal. 
 
A mental attitude that requires mere foresight as the relevant test raises issues of the 
threshold of that foresight, because the foreseeability test does not spell out how 
foreseeable a harm must be to be legally foreseeable’.8 Prior to Jogee, the law did 
not provide this, leading to a possible breach of the principles of legality, fair labelling 
and fair warning. The harshness of PAL was mitigated by the courts using the 
                                            
8 Moore M ‘Foreseeing Harm Opaquely’ in in Shute S, Gardner J and Horder J 
Action and Value in Criminal Law (OUP 1993) 126. 
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fundamental difference rule. This rule, from Powell; English, 9  was controversial 
because it was not consistently applied and too much emphasis was placed on the 
type of weapon used by the principal instead of the intention of the accessory. 
 
Finally, accurate labelling of the PAL route to liability has also been identified as an 
issue. Many different terms were in use for the same set of rules and the term ‘joint 
enterprise’ has been used to include basic as well as PAL. This caused confusion 
among judges and academics. 
 
The third claim in this thesis is that although Jogee has improved some aspects of 
complicity, it has not resolved all the breaches of principle raised in this research and 
the decision will have little impact on the criminal law. Jogee may have even created 
additional issues, particularly in relation to the interpretation of intention and the level 
of foresight required to find intention in complicity. The result is that the restatement 
of an intention to assist or encourage as the mens rea for complicity may not work 
well in practice. 
 
Jogee confirmed that the actus reus of complicity is assisting or encouraging a 
criminal offence. Also, it asserted that the accomplice must assist or encourage every 
criminal act of the principal. This is the essence of why PAL no longer exists. If the 
accomplice must assist or encourage every act of the principal, then there is no need 
for PAL, because basic complicity will suffice. Despite this, Jogee held an 
accessory’s conduct need not have a positive impact on the principal’s actions or on 
                                            
9 [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL). 
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the result. If this is right, it is hard to claim that the accessory is implicated in the 
primary wrong of the principal and there appears to be no culpability by the 
secondary party in respect of the primary actor’s criminal offence. This could lead to 
a potential breach of the principles of fair labelling and fair warning in some 
circumstances. 
 
Similarly, if a positive impact on the actions of the principal is not required, no causal 
contribution by the accessory is also implied. Yet, later in the Jogee judgment words 
of causation were used, where ‘some overwhelming supervening act’ was said to 
break the chain of causation between the acts of the accomplice and that of the 
principal. The Supreme Court did not enter into the debate regarding the necessary 
causal contribution of an accomplice. This does not bring clarity to this area of law 
but the advantage is that flexibility is maintained for individual circumstances to be 
taken into account. 
 
This new ‘overwhelming supervening act’ rule may be the fundamental difference 
rule in a different guise. However, Jogee provided helpful guidance on the use of 
weapons in complicity. Prior to Jogee, the courts tended to focus on whether the 
accomplice knew the principal was carrying a weapon or a particular weapon. 
Following Jogee, the courts should centre on whether the accomplice intended to 
assist or encourage the crime committed by the principal. Knowledge or ignorance of 
a weapon, or a particular weapon, is now only evidence of whether the accessory 
intended to assist or encourage the principal in her offence. A mere difference in 
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weapon can no longer be used to absolve the secondary party of liability. It is what 
she intended that matters. 
 
Jogee also provided good clarification that prior agreement between the parties to 
commit an initial criminal venture is no longer a prerequisite for liability. This is 
particularly helpful in cases of spontaneous violence, when PAL was most commonly 
used, where proving prior agreement has been hard for the prosecution. In practice, 
post-Jogee the problem may be an evidential one of proving intentional assistance or 
encouragement by every defendant. 
 
An association with the principal or presence at the scene of the crime can now be 
evidence of assistance and encouragement by an accomplice but no more than that. 
Jogee confirmed that presence in numbers could show an intention to encourage. 
This is good guidance from the Supreme Court, although no further detail was 
provided, presumably to allow for flexibility in individual circumstances. 
 
The main outcome from Jogee related to mens rea, which has now been reinstated 
as an intention to assist or encourage a criminal offence with knowledge of any of the 
existing facts necessary to make it criminal. 10  This appears to improve the 
relationship of complicity with the principles of fair labelling and fair warning. If the 
accessory intends to assist or encourage the principal it will be fair to label them as a 
principal in some, but not necessarily all, factual scenarios and fair warning is 
provided. The correspondence principle appears to be better fulfilled because the 
                                            
10 Jogee (n 1) [9]. 
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accomplice has to intend to assist every act of the primary actor. However, this 
restatement of the mental element is problematic because Jogee endorsed earlier 
case law, such as Maxwell11 and Bainbridge,12 that had diluted this intention. In 
addition, Gamble was supported which implied that the secondary party in her 
assistance or encouragement may just have to act voluntarily which is not a high 
level mental element.13 
 
The restatement of intention by Jogee as the requisite mental element appears to 
improve the relationship of complicity with the principles of fair labelling, 
correspondence and fair warning. On closer analysis, this improvement is 
compromised by the fact that the accomplice does not have to intend the principal to 
carry out the substantive offence. This is because Jogee held that the secondary 
party may intend the principal to carry out the offence, but this need not necessarily 
be the case.14 Post-Jogee, a retailer carrying out her everyday business appears to 
remain liable as an accomplice, with implications of unfair labelling. 
 
Furthermore, following Jogee, foresight of this substantive offence by the accessory 
is now only evidence of an intention to assist or encourage the principal offence by 
the accomplice, but no guidance as to the threshold of this foresight is provided in the 
case. There was no reference to Woollin,15 with the result that in the context of 
murder there are potentially differing thresholds for intention, dependent on whether 
                                            
11 [1978] 1 WLR 1350 (HL). 
12 [1960]1 QB 129 (CA). 
13 Jogee (n 1) [9]. 
14 ibid [10]. 
15 [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL). 
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the defendant is a principal or a secondary party, again providing a potential breach 
of the wider interpretation of the correspondence principle. This is an issue that the 
courts may need to clarify in the future. 
 
The Supreme Court endeavoured to bring the mens rea of an accessory to murder 
back in line with that for the principal. By restating intention as the mens rea for 
complicity, the Court appears to achieve this for specific intent crimes, so rectifying 
the previous breach of the correspondence principle. Whether this will succeed is 
uncertain. The restatement of intention in Jogee only relates to an intention to assist 
or encourage by the accomplice, not an intention by the accessory that the principal 
commit the crime. The correspondence principle may remain unfulfilled as liability 
can still arise if the accomplice is merely going about their daily business but in doing 
so assists or encourages the primary actor in their offence. Yet in the case of a 
specific intent offence the principal still has to intend the offence. 
 
Also, the judgment in Jogee seems to mishandle another aspect of mens rea, the 
use of conditional intention, resulting in a continuing breach of the principle of 
legality. This is because a secondary party can act in order to assist or encourage 
the principal to carry out a particular crime but a secondary party cannot intend the 
principal’s crime (with the exception of procuring). She can only intend her own 
conduct. Strictly speaking, she cannot conditionally intend a future crime.  
 
Moving on to a different aspect of Jogee, the introduction of manslaughter as an 
alternative verdict for an accomplice who did not intend death or serious harm, allows 
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for the conviction of an accomplice where reckless culpability is found. This is a good 
outcome from Jogee. Otherwise, an accessory that was reckless to a result could be 
absolved of liability, which would be too lenient. 
 
It can be seen from the above discussion that while Jogee purported to improve the 
injustice caused by the law post-Chan Wing-Siu and Powell; English, when the 
decision is evaluated against the principles of fair labelling, fair warning, individual 
autonomy, legality and correspondence, it may not have fully achieved this. Statutory 
reform in complicity would be welcome and indeed the House of Commons Justice 
Committee recommended intervention by Parliament in their Report in 2012.16 In 
2014 the same committee recommended the Government request the Law 
Commission to undertake an urgent review of the law of PAL in murder cases for 
codification in statute. 17  Disappointingly, the Government has not shown any 
enthusiasm for reform in this area of law. It may be for this reason that the Supreme 
Court chose to review this area of law in Jogee. 
 
A reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s reasons for the restatement made in 
Jogee 
The judgment in Jogee set out five reasons for restating the law.18 An analysis of the 
first reason given based on the history of PAL does not form part of this thesis on 
grounds of space. The second reason provided was that the law was not working 
well in practice, was controversial and had led to numerous appeals. Despite the 
                                            
16 Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise (HC 2011-2012) [36]. 
17 Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise: follow-up  (HC 2014 - 5) [47]. 
18 Above, 92 - 95. 
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change from Jogee, this thesis contends that the case will have less impact than 
commentators first thought and actually raises further issues.  
 
The third reason given by the Supreme Court was that in view of the importance of 
complicity, if the courts had taken a wrong turn then it should be corrected. This 
research suggests that the corrections made may not have the impact intended. 
 
The fourth reason was that foresight of what might happen was usually only evidence 
from which a jury may find a requisite intention for complicity in criminal law. Yet, the 
Supreme Court did not mention the level of foresight arising from Woollin and 
whether this applied to complicity. As such, the level of foresight required to find 
intention in complicity remains uncertain after Jogee. 
 
The fifth reason provided in Jogee was the anomaly of a lower mental element for an 
accessory than for the principal, in the case of specific intent crimes, such as murder. 
By restating an intention to assist or encourage with knowledge of the essential facts 
of the offence, the Supreme Court appeared to remove this anomaly. However, the 
Court did not specifically state that the accomplice had to intend the primary actor to 
commit the crime. As a result, in some circumstances this anomaly may still arise. 
For example, where the accomplice assists the principal because the secondary 
party is trying to further her business, but she does not actually intend the principal to 
commit the substantive offence. 
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The future  
Limited case law was included in Jogee supporting the changes made and this 
authority was not compelling. 19  More importance seems to have been given to 
decisions of the High Court of Australia.20 These cases are not binding precedent 
and do not have to be followed. Importantly, subsequent decisions from this court 
have chosen not to follow Jogee and have endorsed the existence of PAL.21 It will be 
interesting to follow how future courts in Australia continue to handle the doctrine of 
PAL. The continued use of PAL has also been endorsed in Hong Kong, 22 
subsequent to Jogee, although this may be based on a misunderstanding of 
terminology.23 
 
In addition, the judgment in Jogee, did not make any reference to the 1966 Practice 
Statement24 or clearly state that it was overruling earlier case law. This means that 
earlier court decisions have not been officially overruled and Jogee potentially sits 
alongside them.25 While unlikely, this could mean that a later court may arguably 
distinguish Jogee and follow an earlier decision of the Supreme Court endorsing the 
previous foresight based test.  
                                            
19 Buxton R, ‘Jogee: upheaval in secondary liability for murder’ (2016) Crim LR 324, 
331. 
20 Johns (1980) 143 CLR 108; Miller (1980) 55 AJLR 23; McAuliffe [1995] HCA 37; 
Clayton [2006] HCA 58. 
21 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30. Joint Enterprise has also been endorsed in 
Hong Kong in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Chan Kam Shing [2016] 
HKCFA 87, (2016) 19 HKCFAR 640. For a critical analysis of Miller v The Queen 
[2016] HCA 30, see Baker, ‘Unlawfulness’s doctrinal and normative irrelevance to 
complicity liability: a reply to Simester’ [2017] J Crim Law 393. 
22 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87. 
23 Krebs B, ‘Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal: divided by a common purpose’ [2017] 
J Crim L 271. 
24 Practice Statement (HL: Judicial Precedent) [1966] 3 All ER 77. 
25 Simester AP, ‘Accessory liability and common unlawful purposes’ [2017] LQR 73, 
88. 
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The principles of autonomy, fair labelling, fair warning, legality and correspondence 
and the doctrines of causation and mens rea discussed in this thesis are all guiding 
limits on the scope of the prohibitions set by the courts. The argument put forward in 
this research is that, prior to Jogee, the law of complicity and the doctrine of PAL 
breached many of these guiding principles. Furthermore, the judgment by the most 
recent case to reach the Supreme Court on complicity, may not have significantly 
improved the relationship of complicity with these principles.  
 
It has also been contended that Jogee effectively abolished PAL. Whether basic 
complicity can adequately deal with gang crime, in particular spontaneous violence, 
remains to be seen.26 If it becomes evident that the return to an intention based 
mental element in complicity is too lenient on defendants, due to the evidential 
difficulties, this research recommends that Parliament finally reviews and updates the 
original statute from 1861. This could allow for a reckless based mental element of 
an accomplice where the principal’s crime is a basic intent one.  
 
Alternatively, Parliament should amend the Serious Crime Act 2007 to allow for an 
independent offence that criminalises the conduct of joining a criminal venture, as 
suggested by Baker.27 Similarly, the Supreme Court could give further consideration 
to the ‘authorisation’ approach suggested by Virgo and Krebs.28 
                                            
26 The HKCFA doubted basic accessorial liability would be sufficient in Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region v Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87, (2016) 19 
HKCFAR 640 [94-96]. 
27 Baker DJ, ‘Unlawfulness’s doctrinal and normative irrelevance to complicity liability: 
a reply to Simester’ [2017] J Crim Law 393, 415. 
28 Virgo G, ‘Case in detail: Mendez and Thompson’ [2010] Arch Rev 4, 5; 
Krebs B, ‘Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal: divided by a common purpose’ 
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In Jogee, the Supreme Court did not have the remit to amend existing statutory rules. 
While a deeper analysis of the current law of complicity as a whole could have been 
undertaken, the Supreme Court was not in a position to amend the Accessories and 
Abettors Act 1861. The most the Court could do was to bring the common law back 
into line with common law principles of an intention based offence. The Supreme 
Court has done as much as it can in terms of rectifying this area of law, so it is hoped 
that Parliament may finally intervene, if the restatement from Jogee does not operate 
well in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                        
[2017] J Crim L 271; Krebs B, ‘Mens rea in joint enterprise: a role for 
endorsement?’ [2015] CLJ, 74(3) 480; Krebs B, ‘Accessory liability: persisting 
in error’ [2017] CLJ 7. An analysis of the authorisation approach was not 
included in the thesis on grounds of space. 
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